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The Irish Institute of Technology (hereinafter referred to as IoT) sector is poised to 
undergo a period of transformation, consolidation and system reconfiguration, to be 
brought about through a series of institutional mergers, collaborations and alliances. This 
research focuses on the Irish higher education (hereinafter referred to as HE) landscape, 
and in particular, on the journey of three groups of IoTs (hereinafter referred to as 
Alliances) as they plan to merge and subsequently apply to be re-designated as 
technological universities (hereinafter referred to as TUs). This research provides a 
contemporaneous account of how the Irish IoTs are organising themselves for merger and 
examines the substantial challenges which lie therein. By examining and comparing three 
Alliances which are undergoing a similar process but with varying degrees of success, this 
research explores the key factors which facilitate on one hand, and/or inhibit on the other, 
merger negotiations and the merger process in HE, both at a system and institutional level. 
This knowledge will be useful to policy makers and other higher education institutions 
(hereinafter referred to as HEIs), particularly in Ireland’s IoT sector, which is likely to 
experience a wave of mergers over the coming decade.  It also contributes to the relatively 
scant body of literature on the nature of and the factors impacting upon the merger process 
in higher education, and of mergers in the Irish HE context. 
A qualitative study, employing a multiple case study approach, was adopted, which 
investigated the facilitatory, inhibitory and critical success factors across three Alliances of 
Irish IoTs who are proposing to merge, through document analysis, interview and the use 
of audio and visual materials, collected from March 2015 to August 2016. Based upon a 
thematic analysis of data gathered from the three cases, this research identifies and 
categorises the key factors that are perceived to facilitate on the one hand, or inhibit on the 
other, the merger process in HE, both at a system and institutional level. A framework 
consisting of political, strategic, operational, emotive, historic and cultural factors is 
proposed, examined and discussed, and recommendations for both institutional and system 
level actors are provided. In addition, this research proposes a micro-political model which 
details the various phases through which HE mergers proceed, and argues that it is the 
macro and micro-political and emotive factors, rather than strategic or operational factors, 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction and Aims  
  My research aims to make an important contribution to both Irish and international 
HE literature, policy and practice by informing academics, HE institutions and policy 
makers about the experiences of Irish IoTs as they negotiate, agree and prepare to merge to 
form TUs. My interest in this topic arises from my management role in one of the IoTs 
which is currently undertaking a rather difficult and challenging merger process. I am 
interested in examining this purported merger, along with other similar cases, to determine 
both what factors are at play are during the merger process, and to investigate which of these 
facilitate or inhibit the progress of HEIs as they journey towards merger. A knowledge and 
understanding of both the dynamics and stages of the pre-merger and merger process is 
critical for all HEIs who are proposing to merge. Therefore this study is focused on the 
process, rather than the outcomes, of merger. This study examines the journey through the 
merger process of three Alliances of IoTs during the period from late 2010 through to 
August 2016.  
  The central aim of my study is to identify the facilitatory and inhibitory factors that 
have impacted upon the progress of three Alliances of IoTs as they prepare to merge, in an 
attempt to increase understanding of the pre-merger and merger process in HE. This 
knowledge will be of particular use to policy makers and other HEIs, particularly in 
Ireland’s IoT sector, which is likely to experience a wave of mergers in the coming decade. 
There are some clear gaps in our theoretical knowledge regarding the merger process itself 
and much of the research to date has focused on what factors led to the successful 
implementation of an agreement to merge. The literature has not focused to significant 
extent on what happens during the actual merger process itself, during which crucial 
decisions about partner choice, vision and mission, due diligence arrangements and 
engagement with both internal and externals stakeholders take place. This phase, which sets 
the foundations for the actual merger, is largely neglected in the HE literature. My study 
aims to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge available regarding this 
critical stage of proceedings 
  The substantive aim of my study is to identify the factors which facilitate on the 
one hand, and inhibit on the other, the merger process in HE in Ireland, both at a system and 
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institutional level. The theoretical aim is to construct and adopt a framework based on the 
key facilitatory and inhibitory factors drawn from higher education and management 
literature, and to use this framework to see how far those factors apply to the Irish HE 
context in particular.  
  In terms of its methodological approach, my study will adopt a qualitative 
approach, using case studies to gather data on the perceptions of management in IoTs 
preparing to merge, through interview, document analysis and the use of audio and visual 
materials. This Chapter sets out my research questions, the context within which my 
research takes place, and an outline of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The central research question of my study is: What are the key factors which 
facilitate on one hand, or inhibit on the other, the merger process in the Irish IoT 
sector? 
In order to answer this question, I have developed a number of sub questions as 
follows: 
1. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main facilitators of the 
merger process? 
2. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main inhibitors of the 
merger processes? 
3. Do any of these factors differ from those identified in the literature as being 
facilitatory or inhibitory factors for HE mergers, and if so, what were the 
particular features of the Irish context that led to these differences? 
4. What are the micro-political/policy phases through which the proposed mergers 
may proceed? 
5. What critical success factors for HE mergers can be identified from these 
cases? 
In order to answer these questions, I will develop a conceptual framework based on 
the key facilitatory, inhibitory and critical success factors identified from the literature as 
impacting upon mergers in HE and I will then examine the applicability of this framework 





1.3 Overview of Thesis 
My thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1 – Introduction - has outlined 
my research aims and questions. Chapter 2 – Background and Context - will present in 
some detail the context, impetus and process for mergers in the Irish HE landscape.  
Chapter 3 – Literature Review - will focus on theories derived from the literature 
which are relevant to my research questions. I will conduct a critical examination of the 
nature of mergers in HE and alternatives to merger; the key drivers for mergers in HE, 
which I will classify as system or institutional level drivers; merger typologies or variables 
and their impact upon the merger process; and facilitatory and inhibitory factors to the 
merger process, which I will classify into system level and institutional level factors. Key 
issues will be identified and discussed. The literature review will form a conceptual 
framework to frame and guide my research questions and methodology, and will identify 
the contribution I expect my research to make to the overall body of knowledge in this 
area.  
Chapter 4 – Research Design: Methods & Methodology - will present my 
individual approach to research design, which is based on an interpretivist, constructivist 
approach, executed through a qualitative, multiple-case study involving three Alliances 
preparing to merge in Ireland, and employing a variety of methods of data collection. It 
will present an account of the steps taken at each stage of the study, with a critical 
reflection on the methodological choices made.  
Chapters 5 & 6 present my findings, along with an analysis and discussion of same.  
Chapter 5 contains a within-case analysis of each Alliance. This will focus on the unique 
context of each case and will identify and discuss the key factors which management 
perceive to have facilitated and/or inhibited the merger process in that particular Alliance.  
Chapter 6 will present and discuss a cross-case analysis of the data to identify 
similarities, which would be expected at system level, and differences, which may be more 
prevalent at an institutional level between the cases/data. It will propose a broad 
classification for the facilitatory and inhibitory factors found across the cases. 
These findings will inform Chapter 7 – Recommendations & Conclusion – which 
will present and discuss my response to the research questions posed and assert the 
significance of the study in terms of its contribution to academic knowledge. It will contain 
a self-reflection upon the limitations of my research design and findings. Finally, it will 
present recommendations for further research on the topic. 
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2. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Irish HE Landscape and the IoT Sector 
  The Irish HE landscape is almost exclusively public in nature and is characterised 
by a binary divide, with traditional universities and IoTs operating in parallel, if not in 
harmony, with each other. The IoTs were originally established as Regional Technical 
Colleges in the 1970’s and were placed on an independent statutory footing by the Regional 
Technical Colleges Act 1992. Section 5 of that Act provides that the primary function of 
Regional Technical Colleges is to provide higher education for the economic, technological, 
scientific, commercial, industrial, social and cultural development of the State, with 
particular reference to the region served by the college (Ireland, Regional Technical 
Colleges Act, 1992). 
  In the late 1990’s, all of the Regional Technical Colleges were upgraded to IoTs. 
At present, there are 14 IoTs in Ireland, dispersed on a regional basis across the State. IoTs 
generally offer academic programmes of study at sub-degree, degree and post graduate 
levels across a wide range of disciplines, focusing on applied, work based and professionally 
orientated education to serve the region in which they are situated. Some also engage in 
university level research, knowledge exchange and transfer, although generally not to the 
same extent as the traditional universities.  
  In recent years, IoTs have come under considerable pressure from the government 
to reform. The National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 (DoES, 2011), which 
espoused long term, high level strategic objectives for the entire Irish HE sector, set an 
agenda for transformation in the sector which has continued to gain impetus. 
 
2.2 The Emergence of a ‘Third Sector’- Technological Universities 
The National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 called for the development of 
a “coherent set of higher education institutions, each of significant strength, scale and 
capacity” (DoES, 2011, p.14). It attempted to refocus the efforts of HEIs by engaging them 
in planned mission shift, rather than mission drift, and in this manner, reconfigure the Irish 
HE landscape to ensure a coordinated system of responsive institutions with diverse 
profiles and missions. It demanded enhanced collaboration and institutional consolidation, 
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particularly in the IoT sector (DoES, 2011, p.15) and envisaged that “based upon 
demonstrated strong performance against mission-relevant criteria…some (IoTs) could 
apply for re-designation as technological universities” (DoES, 2011, p.15).  
The National Strategy clearly stated that the creation of TUs was aimed at 
“promoting institutional mergers and ensuring advanced institutional performance” (DoES, 
2011, p.103). It is interesting to note that there was not unanimity in the expert group 
which produced the National Strategy on the creation of TUs. The counter view expressed 
by some members was that the creation of TUs would not solve the issue of mission drift 
and would result in a third tier of institutions (DoES, 2011, p.103). Nonetheless, 
subsequent reports and publications have indicated a clear intention from policy makers to 
pursue the creation of TUs.  
While some HEIs have welcomed the proposed creation of TUs (mainly those in 
the IoT sector itself), others have been less embracing. The opportunity to apply for re-
designation as a university is naturally an attractive proposition for IoTs, who suffer from a 
variety of ‘second sector’ difficulties. IoTs are not only less well funded than traditional 
universities, but also carry the burden of being more heavily regulated and having 
significantly less autonomy and flexibility than the universities. The IoT label is not one 
which is readily understood internationally, which can make it more difficult for the Irish 
IoT sector to attract international students. It can also limit the potential positive dynamic 
effect which a HEI can have on a region in terms of attracting foreign direct investment 
and industry to the region.  
 
2.3 The Nature and Role of a Technological University 
Since the publication of the National Strategy in 2011, much debate has centred on 
what exactly a TU is or should be and confusion and ambiguity is evident (Von 
Prondzyski, 2011, 2015).  The ‘traditional’ university sector has been particularly scathing 
of the notion of a TU and argues that TUs are nothing more than IoTs by another name and 
will weaken and undermine the existing Irish university brand (Flynn, 2012).  Some opine 
that TUs should be focused on, and indeed limited to activity in the STEM (science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics) fields; others that they will be no different from 
existing universities and are just a political tool, which will populate an already over-
crowded, under-funded and under-performing university marketplace (Flynn 2012). There 
is a significant degree of tension between the various positions expressed above, 
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particularly in relation to the academic fields in which the new TUs should engage. IoTs, 
which have been accused of ‘mission drift’ by the traditional universities, now provide 
programmes of study across a wide range of discipline areas, including business, law, 
humanities and the arts. This area of study represents a large portion of the registration 
figures in most IoTs and is something which they will be extremely hesitant to sacrifice in 
order to create a TU which would be limited to activity in the STEM fields. Indeed, it 
would make no sense for them to do so, given both regional need, student demand and 
funding arrangements in the sector at present. It should also be noted that the traditional 
universities are themselves guilty of so-called mission drift, offering applied/vocational 
programmes of study, focusing on work based learning and engagement activities and 
offering programmes of study which traditionally were provided by the IoT sector.  
Internationally, Davies (2014, p.3) notes that TUs have conventionally been 
regarded as having a primary focus on the science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) subjects, often as a consequence of their historical antecedents as 
polytechnics, technical institutes, fachhochschule, etc. Davies (2014, p.3) states that TUs 
have also accumulated related areas of professional training and that many now have a 
much broader spread of disciplines, though generally connected to the STEM focus. This 
clearly indicates that, as the name suggests, international TUs have perhaps a greater, 
although not exclusive, focus on technology/STEM subjects than may be the case in most 
traditional universities. It is also interesting that Davies (2014, p.3) links this characteristic 
to the historic developmental trajectory of TUs, many of which it seems have undergone a 
transformation from operating as polytechnics, technical institutes, fachhochschule, etc., to 
re-designation as TUs, often as part of national higher education system reconfiguration 
efforts. This is certainly reflects the Irish context as discussed above.  
Davies (2014, p.3) proposes a tripartite classification of positioning possibilities or 
models of TUs. Firstly, he suggests, there are TUs of  
acknowledged international excellence as research intensive/graduate universities with 
strong commercialised Research and Development (R&D), highly elitist Continuing 
Professional Development (CPD) and which invariably score highly as leaders in 
global rankings. They tend to invent and incubate future fields of study, usually of an 
interdisciplinary nature (Davies, 2014, p.3).  
 
Davies (2014, p.3) suggests Caltech, ETH Zurich, EPF Lausanne, MIT, Delft, 
Imperial, Tokyo IT, Hong Kong UST and Strathclyde as examples of TUs which would 
fall into this category. Secondly, Davies (2014, p.3) suggests, there are TUs with a “strong 
focus on professional education but with a formidable applied research, R&D and 
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Knowledge Exchange (KE) base.” Davies (2014, p.3) offers Cranfield, RMIT, Queensland 
UT, Coventry, Hertfordshire, Heriot Watt and Eindhoven as examples which fall into this 
category. Finally, Davies (2014, p.3) suggests, there are TUs with  
a primary focus on education and CPD for business, industry and the professions with 
a predominantly regional and national role e.g. Ørebro and Oulu. They are certainly 
research supported and informed, and with appreciable applied R&D and consultancy”. 
 
This final category is most closely related to the starting position of most Irish 
IoTs who are proposing to merge to form TUs. It is also the category which most 
closely aligns with the vision for TUs expressed by Irish policy makers, if perhaps not 
the potential TU partners themselves, some of who are slightly more ambitious in their 
aspirations.  
In addition to the classification offered above, Davies (2014, pp.4-5) provides some 
further perceptions on generic characteristics of TUs. He identifies that they typically 
focus on STEM subjects, although not exclusively so, with non-technological subjects 
having a significant role to play. Most operate with overarching, multi-disciplinary 
academic fields, without traditional disciplinary boundaries, which are often made explicit 
in mature TUs. Davies (2014, p.5) argues that TUs should have an entrepreneurial culture, 
reflecting an ethos of partnership and accountability and that they should also be places of 
critical and useful learning. Furthermore, TUs should proactively engage at a strategic 
level with stakeholders, regional, national and international, so-called ‘glocalisation’ 
(Davies, 2014, p.5). They should be sustainable across all areas of activity and have a clear 
and explicit mission, vision and growth trajectory (Davies, 2014, p.5). Davies (2014, p.5) 
also highlights the importance of engaging in innovation and knowledge exchange 
activities with industry and the community and the importance of TUs positioning 
themselves as academically rigorous, yet industry oriented institutions.  
In the Irish context, the National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 (DoES 
2011, p.103) states that internationally, a TU is “a higher education institution that 
operates at the highest academic level in an environment that is specifically focused on 
technology and its application.” The National Strategy provides that TUs are expected to 
have a distinct mission and character to preserve diversity in the Irish higher education 
system (DoES, 2011, p.103). It states that TUs will be distinguished from existing 
universities by a mission and ethos that is “based on career-focused higher education with 
an emphasis on provision at levels six to eight (undergraduate certificates, diplomas and 
bachelors degrees) and on industry-focused research and innovation (DoES, 2011, p.105).” 
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This appears to indicate that while the mission and ethos of TUs and IoTs will be broadly 
similar, a distinction will be found in the level of industry focused research and innovation 
expected of TUs, which will be a defining characteristic. It also indicates that TUs will 
operate primarily at levels six to eight on the National Framework of Qualifications 
(NFQ), and states that while TUs will have “involvement at levels nine and ten (masters 
and doctoral degrees) appropriate to their mission…the major proportion of activity at 
these levels will be concentrated within the existing university sector” (DoES, 2011, 
p.105).  In relation to the academic focus of TUs, the National Strategy provides that  
the fields of learning will be closely related to labour market skill needs with a 
particular focus on programmes at levels six to eight in science, engineering and 
technology and including an emphasis on workplace learning…it will play a key role 
in facilitating access and progression (particularly from the workforce) by developing 
structured relationships with providers of further education and training (DoES, 2011, 
p.105). 
 
This, read in light of the explicit criteria for designation which are discussed 
below, give an indication of the nature and function of TUs envisaged in the Irish 
context. 
2.4 The ‘Merger Prerequisite’ 
In 2012 the HEA published Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape. This 
strategy document provided further details on the the process and criteria which IoTs must 
undertake to apply for re-designation as a TU. Controversially, this included a requirement 
to merge with at least one other IoT before TU status could be conferred upon an existing 
IoT.  
The aim of government policy in this respect was twofold. Firstly, they had in mind 
a ‘mopping-up’ exercise, to reduce the overall number of IoTs and reduce fragmentation in 
the sector, creating critical mass and scale. This, it was envisaged, would also lead to 
increased efficiencies and economies of scale, particularly through the rationalisation of 
programme offerings which tend to be replicated across the sector (HEA, 2012). It is not 
surprising that this was a priority for policymakers, given that the merger requirement 
came at a time of unprecedented economic crisis in the State and amid a wider 
rationalisation and cost cutting agenda from government. Secondly, policy makers 
envisaged the creation of a third ‘TU’ sector in the Ireland, as discussed above. To achieve 
these dual aims, the National Strategy linked the creation of new TUs to consolidation of 
the existing IoT sector, and government policy since has continued along these lines, 
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emphasising that only IoTs who merge will be permitted to make applications for TU 
designation (HEA, 2012).  
The requirement to merge as a pre-requisite for TU designation has been criticised 
by some of the IoTs who feel that they have been on the path to university designation for 
some time and who argue that the requirement to merge may actually weaken their vis-à-
vis the established TU criteria, particularly in relation to research and staff qualifications. 
A full merger requirement prior to designation is not reflective of the position in many 
other countries which have allowed similar system reconfiguration and re-designations to 
take place using looser federation models as a transition state, rather than requiring a full 
merger. The merger pre-requisite also has caused significant political difficulties and 
dilemmas for the government, particularly in one case where the merger requirement has 
come under considerable fire. Over time, implementation of the National Strategy will 
likely result in the creation of a third sector of TUs in Ireland, and in the longer term 
possibly lead to the death of the existing IoT sector as most if not all of the existing IoTs 
make the transition to become TUs. 
In recent months, the merger requirement has come under renewed attack, with 
many in the IoT sector and the various HE Trade Unions putting political pressure under 
those in power to remove it entirely from the legislation. While at present the requirement 
to merge remains a sine quo non for TU designation, no legislation has been enacted. Until 
so enacted, it is possible that the requirements in this regard could change.  
 
2.5 Process for Designation as a TU 
A four stage process for designation was established in Towards a Future Higher 
Education Landscape (HEA, 2012), and has been supplemented by the establishment of 
key criteria which must be met before an institution can be designated as TU. These 
criteria play a critical role in the merger process and are likely to have a significant impact 
upon that process. The established four stage process for designation appears to be overly 
complex and lengthy, and may in fact serve to frustrate the parties to an Alliance, leading 
to a negative outcome. 
The first stage is a formal expression of interest from two or more IoTs to the HEA, 
which will consider the application in the context of a system wide analysis of Ireland’s 
HE needs and the strategic implications arising from the establishment of a new university.  
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If the expression of interest is met with approval from the HEA, then the Alliance 
of IoTs can move onto stage two of the process, which involves the preparation of a 
business plan to meet the criteria. This plan must address how the Alliance proposes to 
meet the established criteria, setting out the process requirements and timelines in a 
detailed fashion. As the establishment of a TU requires a merger of two or more IoTs, the 
stage two business plan must be based on a legally binding memorandum of understanding 
(hereinafter referred to as an MOU) between the IoTs, which has been approved by the 
Governing Body of each, describing their consolidation into a new single institution.  
Once the MOU has been agreed, and the business plan submitted, the Alliance 
moves on to stage three of the process, which involves an evaluation of the plan by an 
international expert panel, appointed by the HEA. This panel must consider the capacity of 
the partners to achieve the objectives of the merger and the existing position of the partners 
in relation to each of the TU criteria. The expert panel will also consider the capacity of 
the partners, based on their developmental trajectory, to meet those criteria within a 
reasonable timeframe. If the expert panel agrees that the plan presented represents a 
credible and realisable proposal, the panel may offer advice to the Alliance or the HEA 
relating to the implementation of the plan and the partners will proceed to stage four. If the 
expert panel does not agree that the plan is credible and realisable, then the application will 
not proceed any further and the Alliance will not be permitted to make another such 
application for a period of five years. This appears to be a draconian and arbitrary time bar 
which may be placed on an Alliance who has likely acted in good faith, and in line with 
national policy, to effect institutional change, and no rationale for its imposition has been 
offered. 
The fourth and final stage is the application for designation as a TU. This can only 
be made when a legal consolidation or merger has been achieved and the Alliance 
considers that all the criteria for designation have been met. In essence, this means that a 
final and irrevocable decision to merge must be made by the IoTs before a final decision is 
made on re-designation as a TU. Again this is another controversial provision, which in 
essence means that an Alliance may find itself in the position of having undergone a 
merger/consolidation, but possibly not achieving TU designation, which was the main 
driver behind the merger.  
This final application for designation is again reviewed by an expert panel, which 
will have regard to the criteria for designation, along with the legal and administrative 
requirements applying to universities in Ireland, the configuration of institutions within the 
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Irish HE system, the characteristics of TUs internationally, detailed statistical profile data 
and the overall merits of the application. The expert panel then makes a recommendation 
to the HEA which will consider the report and advise the Minister for Education and Skills 
on how to proceed.  
It is evident that the HEA act as ‘gatekeepers’ throughout the process, whose role is 
to consider the reports from the Alliances and the international ‘expert panels’ and to 
advise the Minister for Education and Skills on how to proceed. The international expert 
panels will be appointed by the HEA and will report to it twice during the process on the 
merits of the application, with the ultimate decision being left in political hands. How this 
process will operate in practice, and whether it will serve to further the HE reform agenda, 
or hinder it, will be investigated further during my research. Figure 1 below illustrates the 
four key stages in the process. 
 
 
Figure 1: Key Stages in Process for Designation as a TU according to HEA 
(2012) 
 
2.6 Criteria for Designation as a TU 
In addition the requirement for merger, the Towards a Future Higher Education 
Landscape (2012) and subsequent Technological Universities Bill (DoES, 2014) 
established key criteria which must be met by merged IoTs at stage four before they can be 
Stage 4 
Implement plan and formal application for designation, based on criteria 
Stage 3 
Consideration of plan by Expert Panel. If not credible/realisable, cannot reapply for 5 years. 
Stage 2 
Business plan to meet criteria and MOU to merge 
Stage 1 
Formal expression of interest 
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designated as TU. Appendix A of Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape (2102) 
established detailed criteria around mission, institutional, student and staff profiles, 
teaching learning and curriculum development, research, international profile and 
leadership, management and governance. Under this framework, TUs will be characterised 
by breath of programme provision across levels six to ten of the NFQ and will have 
programmes which are vocationally/professionally orientated, with a strong focus on 
science and technology. A TU is required to have research-informed, practice-led curricula 
and to employ teaching, learning and assessment processes which support its core mission 
to develop graduates who have a focus on the world of work, engagement, employability 
and citizenship. In terms of research, the criteria stipulate that the focus must be on 
applied, problem orientated research. Additional criteria relating to the international profile 
and leadership, management and governance structures are also specified. 
The publication of the General Scheme – Technological Universities Bill (DoES, 
2014) provided further detail on the proposed characteristics for the design of a TU in the 
Irish context. Head 50 of that Bill highlights the role of TUs in providing and promoting, 
inter alia, enterprise focused course of study, opportunities for work based learning, 
enterprise focused research, development and innovation (RD&I), accessible and flexible 
learning pathways and facilities for technological and professional university education. It 
calls upon TUs to support the development of a skilled workforce, to support 
entrepreneurship, enterprise development and to serve their communities and the public 
interest by fostering close and effective relationships with local, regional, national and 
international stakeholders.  
Unfortunately, the criteria for re-designation published in the Heads of Bill in 2014 
differ in a number of respects from those published in Towards a Future Higher Education 
Landscape 2012, leading to some confusion. For example, the landscape document 
requires that enrolments in the applicant institution in “research programmes at Levels 9- 
10” will not be less than 4% of FTE enrolments at levels 8 to 10. The Heads of Bill, on the 
other hand, provide that there must be a minimum of 4% of full time equivalent student 
enrolments in honours degree programmes or above to be enrolled in “postgraduate 
programmes”, without specifying if these needed to be research or taught postgraduate 
programmes. Another difference relates to staff qualifications. The landscape document 
requires that at least 45% per cent of full time, higher education, academic staff, will hold 
a Level 10 qualification or the equivalence in professional experience, combined with a 
terminal degree appropriate to their profession and that the proportion of such staff that 
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hold an equivalence in professional experience shall not exceed 10% of full time, higher 
education, academic staff. The Heads of Bill provide that 45% of full time academic staff 
must hold a doctoral qualification or terminal degree appropriate to their profession, but 
does not specify a 10% limit on these staff numbers, nor does it impose the additional 
requirement of having equivalence in professional experience. 
Additionally, the published Heads of Bill do not offer the degree of institutional 
autonomy which would usually be expected of a university, particularly in relation to staff 
contracts and financial/budgetary arrangements, which are ultimately controlled by the 
State. This lack of autonomy is a real impediment to the creation of truly entrepreneurial 
and innovative TUs. 
If and when enacted, the Technological Universities Bill will enshrine the re-
designation process and the merger requirement into law, with a proposed appeal 
mechanism provided for. However, despite being published on 22
nd
 January 2014, the Bill 
has yet to be enacted, creating further delay and uncertainty for the Alliances who wish to 
merge and apply for re-designation. Until so enacted, it remains possible that the process 
or criteria which the Alliances will be subject to may change at any stage, including the 
requirement to merge before making a TU application. It is worth noting that the draft 
Heads of Bill delegate the relevant government minister legislative authority to ultimately 
establish the definitive criteria for re-designation by means of a Statutory Instrument. This 
means that the criteria, if not the process, may be subject to change even after the 
enactment of the relevant legislation, at the whim of the government of the day. This 
brings an unnecessary and intolerable degree of uncertainty to the process. It is also worth 
noting that since the Bill was published, there has been much debate around and opposition 
to the merger pre-requisite at a political level, particularly from opposition parties. The 
previous government had aimed to pass the Bill before its dissolution in February 2016. 
However, due to considerable opposition in parliament, and from the relevant trade unions, 
the Bill did not get passed before parliament was dissolved and a new minority 
government was subsequently formed.  It remains to be seen whether the current minority 
government will be in a position to pass the proposed Bill in its current format, although it 
does seem unlikely given that all of the other major parties opposed aspects to it, 
particularly the merger pre-requisite. It has been suggested that an exception to the merger 
pre-requisite should be made for IoTs for whom merger is not feasible for geographical 
reasons, although further elucidation on this point has not been forthcoming. In recent 
months some have suggested that the merger requirement may be removed entirely, 
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leading to further uncertainty. However, the Bill is not one which has been identified by 
the current government as a priority for the coming term, raising further doubts about the 
likelihood of its passage through parliament in its current format. 
Table 1 below provides a summary of the key criteria which must be met by the 
merged IoTs in order to be re-designated as a TU. These criteria are also likely to play a 
significant part in merger negotiations and process as the IoTs must ensure that, when 










History/Tradition   TUs – third type of HEI 
 Existing binary divide between Universities and IoTs will remain 




 Entrepreneurial ethos - use and exploit its expertise and resources, whether commercially or otherwise 
 Externally orientated and engaged – meet the needs of its region, support links with enterprise, business, professions and stakeholders 
 Sustainable and efficient, service led organisation 
 
 
Mission and Vision  
 Prepare graduates for complex professional roles in a changing technological world 
 Advance knowledge through research and scholarship and disseminate this knowledge to meet the needs of society and enterprise 
 Vocationally/professionally orientated higher education, with a strong focus on science, engineering and technology and labour market skill needs  
 Breadth of programme provision across levels 6 to 10 of the NFQ, with an emphasis on provision at levels 6 to 8. Level 10 provision in small number of fields/departments only 
 Play a key role in facilitating access and progression (particularly from the workforce) 
 
Teaching & 
Learning Profile  
 Provide programmes from Levels 6 to 10 on the NFQ, with emphasis on provision at levels 6 to 8 and involvement at levels 9 and 10 appropriate to their mission 
 Vocationally/professionally orientated programmes with a specific focus on science, engineering and technology, providing opportunities for work based learning  
 Curriculum content and research-informed, practice-led teaching, learning and assessment processes which are developed in conjunction with business, professional organisations, etc., and 
which develops graduates who have a focus on the world of work, engagement, employability and citizenship 
 At least 90% of all full time staff will hold a level 9 qualification and that at least 45% of full time staff will hold a level 10 qualification or the equivalent in professional experience, rising 
to 65% of staff with level 10 qualifications within 10 years of designation 
 
Student Profile  
 
 Provide accessible and flexible learning pathways 
 At least 30% of students enrolled must be lifelong learning students enrolled on professionally orientated programmes and industry up-skilling, including part-time, work related 




 Emphasis on industry/enterprise-focused research and innovation 
 Focus on applied, problem orientated research and social and technological development and innovation 
 At least 4% of full time equivalent students at levels 8 to 10 must be enrolled in research programmes 
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 Research capacity to support on-going programmes, projects and doctoral training in at least three fields of knowledge as defined by ISCED fields of study at the two digit level, and 
demonstrate a trajectory showing that the institution can extend this to support two further fields within five years of designation. 




 Support entrepreneurship, enterprise development and innovation 
 Exploitation of intellectual property and technology and knowledge transfer 
 Provide consulting/problem solving services that are particularly relevant to the region 
International 
Orientation 
 International orientation which specifically reflects its mission 




 TUs required to have particular regard to the needs of the region in which it is located 
 Primarily have an  industry/enterprise focus – make a measurable impact on local, regional economic development, businesses and enterprise and support the development of a skilled 
workforce 
 Also required to serve their communities and the public interest by fostering close and effective relationships with local, regional, national and international stakeholders (e.g. local 
authorities and regional assemblies) and enrich cultural and community life 
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2.7  Response of the Irish IoT Sector to National Strategy 
  The response of the IoTs to the National Strategy and the potential ‘prize’ of re-
designation as a TU has varied and is dependent mainly upon the ultimate strategic intent 
of the particular IoT. Out of the 14 IoTs, responses can broadly be categorized as follows.  
  Firstly, three regional Alliances of IoTs formed almost immediately (in 
2011/2012) and began the process outlined by the HEA for designation as a TU. My 
research will focus primarily on the journey of these three Alliances towards merger, 
thereby meeting one of the key criteria for re-designation as a TU. These three Alliances 
are at varying stages of the four step merger and re-designation process, as outlined above. 
Alliance A, which consists of 3 IoTs, has successfully undergone stages one, two and three 
of the process and was originally due to merge in August 2015. However, the absence of 
legislation and other factors have led to this date pushed back on a number of occasions. 
Alliance B, which consists of two IoTs, has successfully undergone stage one, two and 
three of the process, but has not yet set a definitive date for merger. Alliance C, consisting 
of two IoTs, successfully completed stage one of the process but failed to submit a stage 
two application due to a very public falling out, with one of the partners unilaterally 
suspending all merger activities. That partner’s President and Chairperson of its Governing 
Body have since vacated their posts and a Ministerial appointed independent expert 
published a report on the viability of the proposal going forward. Since then, the 
appointment of an independent facilitator/mediator has resulted in the partners attempting 
to get the process back on track. More recently, a fourth Alliance has emerged and has 
made a stage one application, although by their own admission they see merger and re-
designation as a medium to long term goal. For this reason, they are unlikely to make any 
significant inroads on the merger process by the time my research is conducted, and so will 
not form part of my study. However, my research, which focuses on the experiences of the 
other three Alliances, should be a rich source of data for that Alliance in the future. 
Secondly, a small number of IoTs have chosen to form strategic 
alliances/collaborations with the existing university sector and are not pursuing re-
designation as a TU. Finally, the remaining IoTs have neither formed alliances with other 
IoTs with a view to merger and re-designation, nor have formed strategic alliances with 
the university sector. Presumably, these IoTs have made a deliberate strategic decision in 
this regard. Perhaps they have chosen to wait and see if and how the three existing 




may be geographically or politically isolated and lack a suitable partner. Others may feel 
that they best serve their region and mission by retaining their current IoT status. 
However, this may prove to be a risky strategy, particularly if the existing Alliances are 
successful in their TU bids, as the remaining small number of IoTs will essentially end 
up in the third tier of HEIs in Ireland. Recently, those in this category have come under 
increasing pressure to either join together to form a new Alliance (which would make 
little sense given geographic considerations), or to join other existing Alliances with a 
view to merger (which would considerably slow down progress made in these Alliances 
to date).  
Figure 2 below categorises the responses of the IoT sector to the National 
Strategy based on their strategic intent and Table 2 provides details of individual IoTs’ 
























Re-designated as a TU Merge with another IoT 
Retain existing IoT status 







Table 2: Strategic Response of Individual Irish IoTs to the National Strategy 
for Higher Education to 2030*  
 
IoT Strategic Response to National Strategy 
Athlone Institute of Technology Retain existing IoT status 
Institute of Technology, 
Blanchardstown 
Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Institute of Technology, Carlow Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Cork Institute of Technology Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Dublin Institute of Technology Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Dundalk Institute of Technology Strategic alliance with a traditional university 
Dun Laoghaire Institute of Art, 
Design & Technology 
Strategic alliance with a traditional university 
Galway-Mayo Institute of 
Technology 
Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Letterkenny Institute of 
Technology 
Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Limerick Institute of 
Technology 
Retain existing IoT status 
Institute of Technology, Sligo Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Institute of Technology, 
Tallaght 
Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Institute of Technology, Tralee Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 
Waterford Institute of 
Technology 
Merge with another IoT and apply for re-designation 
as a TU 





2.8 Government vs Institutional Objectives 
From an examination of national policy and strategy above, it appears that the 
objective of government and policy makers is to reduce fragmentation, duplication and 
the number of IoTs, while also creating efficiencies and economies of scale. In contrast, 
and unsurprisingly, the IoTs themselves are focused on TU designation, mutual growth 
and financial security. This lack of alignment is problematic and is a point to which I will 
later return. Table 3 below compares the government/policy and institutional objectives 
for merger in the Irish context.  
 
Table 3: Government vs Institutional Objectives for Mergers in the Irish 
Context 
 
Government/Policy Objectives Institutional Objectives 
 
Reduce fragmentation in the sector Re-designation as a TU 
 
Reduce duplication Strengthen competitive/market position 
 
Fewer, larger institutions with critical mass  
 
Mutual growth 
Create efficiencies and economies of scale 
 



















3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  My literature review will focus on questions which are relevant to the aims of my 
research. My substantive aim is to identify the factors which facilitate on the one hand, and 
inhibit on the other, the merger process in HE in Ireland, both at a system and institutional 
level. The theoretical aim of my research is to construct and adopt a framework based on 
the key facilitatory and inhibitory factors drawn from HE and management literature, and 
to use this framework to see how far those factors apply to the Irish HE context in 
particular. This chapter aims to critically review relevant literature to identify gaps in our 
existing knowledge and to develop a conceptual framework around facilitatory and 
inhibitory factors to higher education mergers which can be applied to my study.  
  My core research question is “What are the key factors which facilitate on one 
hand, or inhibit on the other the merger process in the Irish IoT sector?” This core 
research question will be used to establish a central enquiry from which review questions 
for this chapter will be drawn. These questions, presented in the table below, emerge from 
a critical assessment of current theory and gaps in knowledge drawn from the bodies of 
literature identified below. These review questions will also facilitate the generation of 
appropriate and relevant research questions that are explicitly linked to my evaluation of 
the literature. 
Table 4: Review Questions and Related Literature Source 
Review Questions Literature Sources 
1. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to 
be the main facilitators of the merger process?    
2. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to 
be the main inhibitors of the merger process? 
3. Do any of these factors differ from those 
identified in the literature as being facilitatory 
or inhibitory factors for HE mergers, and if so, 
what were the particular features of the Irish 
context that led these differences? 
 Mergers & Acquisitions 
Theory 
 Mergers in Higher 
Education 
 Change Management 
Theory 
 Interpersonal and Inter- 
organisational Trust  
 Organisational Culture 




through which the proposed mergers must 
proceed? 
Education 
 Political Systems Model 
of Policy Formation in HE 
 HE Collaborations 
5. What critical success factors for HE mergers 
can be identified from these cases?  
 
 Mergers in Higher 
Education 
 HE Collaborations 
 
I will therefore conduct a critical evaluation on what the existing HE merger 
literature suggests are the facilitatory and inhibitory factors which impact upon the 
merger processes, and what micro-political/policy phases proposed mergers in the sector 
go through.  To provide context, and to further inform my research, I will also analyse 
key concepts regarding mergers and acquisitions generally, the typologies/characteristics 
of HE mergers, alternatives to merger in the HE sector, and the key drivers for merger, 
but with a critical eye on their impact on the merger process, rather than outcomes. From 
this review, I will develop and adopt a conceptual framework to frame and guide my 
research questions and methodology, and will identify the contribution I expect my 
research to make to the overall body of knowledge in this area.  
 
3.2 Mergers and Acquisitions: Theory and Process 
A wide body of strategic management literature exists on mergers and 
acquisitions theory and practice. This body of literature differentiates between mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers, focusing to a large degree on the private sector. In this 
context, merger can be defined as a strategy through which two firms agree to integrate 
their operations on a relatively co-equal basis (Hitt et al, 2013). Often a new entity is 
formed subsuming the merging firms. Hitt et al (2013) argue that few true mergers 
actually occur, because one firm is usually seen as dominant due to market share or firm 
size. An acquisition, according to Hitt et al (2013), is a strategy through which one firm 
(acquirer) buys a controlling interest in another firm (target) with the intent of making the 
target a subsidiary firm within its portfolio. Finally, Hitt et al (2013) define a take-over as 
an acquisition strategy where the target firm does not solicit the acquiring firms bid. In 




Generally speaking, mergers can be seen as consisting of three distinct phases – 
Pre- Merger; Merger and Post Merger – each of which have different focus. Phase one, 
which is the pre-merger phase, focuses on merger justification, searching for and 
securing partners/targets, negotiation, due diligence and merger and integration planning. 
Phase two, is the merger itself, and is essentially a point in time when the two or more 
separate legal entities become one. Phase three focuses on post-merger integration, 
adding value, creating efficiencies and achieving the objectives of the merger begins. 
Figure 3 below indicates the key general stages in merger processes as identified from 
the broad merger literature. 
 
 
Figure 3: Key Stages in Merger Process  
 
3.2.1 Private Sector Mergers 
Private sector mergers are primarily driven by economic/market forces such as 
the aim to increase market share and profitability, and to create synergies and economies 
of scale and learning. According to Bower (2011), mergers and acquisitions are 
employed as a strategic response to overcapacity; to acquire research and development; 
to re-shape the competitive landscape; as a response to industry convergence; to facilitate 
product or market extension; or as part of a geographical rollup. Mergers and acquisitions 
are often grounded on a resource based view of the firm, and may be seen as a means of 
acquiring unique resources and capabilities. In the private sector, the financials, high-
Phase 1- Pre-Merger:  
Merger Justification, 
Search & Screening, 
Negotiation, Due 
Diligence & Merger 
Planning 
Phase 2- Merger:  
Legal Process at a point 
in time whereby 2 
separate legal entities are 
dissolved and a new 
legal entity is formed.   
Phase 3 - Post Merger:  








technology, industrials, materials and energy and power sectors represent the greatest 
concentration of mergers and acquisitions globally (Desyllas, 2014).  
Mergers in the private sector are often preceded with a lengthy pre-merger 
process, involving a number of critical stages. Initially, a ‘merger justification’ process 
will take place, which involves an assessment of the value creating potential of the target 
firm, the identification of a widely shared view or purpose, along with the likely sources 
of benefits and problems and the maximum price to pay for the target firm (Desyllas, 
2014). Secondly comes the ‘search and screening process’, which involves the 
identification of potential targets, and short-listing process to identify those which satisfy 
the acquirer’s criteria, informed by sources of information on the target including 
databases, personal contacts and publically available information, including company 
accounts, surveys, journals, credit ratings, etc. (Desyllas, 2014).   
Once a target firm has been identified, the ‘negotiation’ process begins. At this 
stage, if the firms are publically listed companies, a wide variety of regulations relating 
to shareholder and market information and prohibitions on dealing in shares, imposed by 
the relevant stock exchange, may come into play. Either before or during the negotiation 
stage, a ‘due diligence’ process will be undertaken to identify and confirm or disconfirm 
the business reasons for the proposed merger (Burke, 2000). The aim of this due-
diligence process is to provide the decision makers with key information required on the 
target’s strengths and weaknesses and on opportunities from and potential problems of 
the deal.  This due diligence process is particularly important from a legal perspective, in 
order to protect board members against potential post-merger claims from shareholders 
and others. The due diligence process will usually involve a series of audits on specific 
areas of interest to the acquirer (Harvey and Lusch, 1995). A financial audit will examine 
financial statements and express an opinion on the fairness with which they present the 
financial position of the firm, results of operations and changes in financial condition in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. A legal and environmental 
audit will take place to investigate ownership of securities, intellectual property rights, 
legal titles, current and contingent liabilities, etc. A macro-environmental audit, 
production audit, R&D audit, marketing, management and information systems audits 
may also take place, along with a cultural and political audit to provide all of the 
information required to the target acquiring firm, who may then use the information to 
make a final decision on whether or not to merge/acquire and what price to pay. Once a 




objectives of the merger through a ‘post-merger integration’ process which will focus on 
value creation.   
3.2.2 Public Sector Mergers 
On the other hand, mergers in the public sector (which is where most HE mergers 
have occurred) tend to be government driven, and often occur against a backdrop of 
continual restructuring activities, from government departments to frontline activities 
(Talbot and Johnson, 2007). These are primarily driven by a desire to achieve cost 
efficiencies and improve service (Frumkin, 2003). O' Flynn et al (2014) argue that in the 
public sector, mergers are often seen in terms of collaboration or consolidation, rather 
than in the more aggressive acquisition mode evident in the private sector. Therefore 
researchers have generally aligned mergers in the public sector to other forms of joint 
work, such as cooperation and coordination, although they caution that this may mean 
that important insights may be missed into public sector merger activity. Within the 
public sector, merger activity in Ireland and the UK has taken place across a number of 
sectors, in particular health, local government, central government and education. 
Frumkin (2003) found that within the public sector, effective communications, swift 
implementation, the creation of a new culture and being prepared to make adjustments 
were key success factors to the merger process, and that mergers would only be viewed 
as successful if they satisfy or exceed the expectations of the constituents who are served 
by the agencies in question. O' Flynn et al (2014) found that public sector mergers should 
focus on adding value, and that this value could be added by espousing a clearly 
articulated and accepted rationale for the merger and by employing an effective change 
management process, which recognises the demands upon human synergy which mergers 
make in complex service environments. Table 5 below presents the key differences 
between public and private mergers, in terms of drivers, process and sectors.  
Due to these differences, much of the management literature, which is focused on 
private sector mergers with economic drivers, acquisition and take-over focused 
processes, and highly specialised global sectors, is of limited use when examining public 







Table 5: Key Differences between Private and Public Sector Mergers 
 
Differentiator           Private Sector Mergers        Public Sector Mergers 
Drivers Primarily driven by 
economic/market forces such as the 
aim to increase market share and 
profitability, and to create synergies 
and economies of scale and learning 
(Desyllas, 2014) 
Tend to be government driven 
 
Often occur against a backdrop 
of continual restructuring 
activities (Talbot and Johnson, 
2007) 
Process Aggressive acquisition mode 
evident (O' Flynn et al, 2014) 
Often seen in terms of 
collaboration or consolidation 
(O' Flynn et al, 2014) 
Sectors Concentrated in the financials, high-
technology, industrials, materials 
and energy and power sectors 
globally 
Sectors include health, local 




3.3 Mergers in Higher Education 
A merger between two or more HEIs can of course take place within the private 
or public sector. However, as my research is situated within a public sector HE context, 
and given the difficulties associated with the application of the wider body of 
management literature on mergers to the public sector, it is necessary to examine the 
specific body of research that has developed in this specific area, and this will be used to 
frame and guide my research.  
A decision to merge is likely to be the most difficult and far-reaching decision a 
HEI will ever take (Hinfelaar, 2012). Mergers of HEIs involve either the dissolution of 
one or more partners and assimilation into another partner (typically a take-over), or the 
dissolution of all partners and the creation of a new institution (typically a ‘full-merger’) 
(HEFEC, 2012). A full merger involves the dissolution of both partners (with the 
subsequent loss of autonomy), and the creation of a new legal entity, which is comprised 




structures, staffing arrangements, budget, and academic mission, policies and procedures. 
(Davies J, 2013).  
Many countries have experienced significant waves of merger activity amongst 
HEIs, including Australia, the United States, Norway, Finland, South Africa, the 
Netherlands, and Canada (Harman, 1986, 1991, 1993, 2000; Harman & Harman, 2002, 
2003, 2008; Brown et al, 2004; Eastman & Lang, 2001; Goedegeburre, 1989, 1992; Hall 
et al, 2004; Cartwright et al, 1996).  In the UK, HEFCE (2010) reported that 40 mergers 
took place between HEIs during the period of 1994 to 2008. Ireland, by contrast, has seen 
little merger activity amongst HEIs.  
A merger is but one option open to HEIs and governments when attempting to 
restructure HE systems and institutional relationships. The literature indicates that before 
a decision to undertake a full merger process is made, alternative options and forms of 
collaboration should be fully explored (Harman and Harman, 2008; HEFEC, 2012; 
Davies, 2013). HEFCE (2010) reported that failure to do this has resulted in the 
breakdown of many HE mergers, although further details are not provided. The 
alternative collaborative options open to HEIs include regulation, competition, voluntary 
co-operation (which may be lateral or vertical), the creation of formal consortia (either 
national or transnational), vertical or horizontal regional partnerships, strategic alliances 
or joint ventures, and loose or tight federations (Davies, 2013). These options provide 
policy makers and institutions with a menu from which the most appropriate option to 
achieve a desired objective, be it system restructuring, the creation of larger HEIs or the 
creation of efficiencies or economies of scale, should be selected. Each of these 
alternative positions, ranging from a loosely controlled competition model which 
advocates self-interested strategic alliances, to a tightly controlled federation, warrant 
consideration when presented with a choice regarding system and/or institutional 
reconfiguration (Davies, 2013).  
Indeed, even if a merger is selected as the most appropriate option, the new 
merged institution may choose to adopt either a unitary or federal structure. A unitary 
structure is one where the former participating institutions are no longer recognised as 
such, and a new entity is formed with a single governing body, CEO, governance 
structure, academic policies and procedures, etc. In federal structures, specified 
responsibilities usually remain with the participating institutions, with an overarching or 
central body taking on other agreed roles. Whilst federal models are often more attractive 




recognition of cultural identity, they may limit the amount of rationalisation and 
integration which can be achieved and may be unstable in conflict situations (Harman 
and Harman, 2003). In Australia, for example, from the extensive wave of mergers which 
took place from 1987 to 1991, only three institutions adopted federal models, and out of 
these three one split apart, one has since adopted a unitary structure and the third 
organised itself internally as a unitary organisation from the start (Harman and Robertson 
Cuninghame, 1995).  
It is interesting at this point to note that Irish policymakers do not appear to have 
given any meaningful consideration to the full range of collaborative options available to 
them in this regard and opted for merger as the sole mechanism by which a TU, or indeed 
system restructuring amongst IoTs, could be achieved. This in turn meant that the 
Alliances of IoTs which are the subject of this research did not have any of these 
alternative options at their disposal. In addition, the prescriptive legislation being 
proposed by the Irish government also means that, once merged, a unitary structure will 
essentially be the only legal option open to the new institution. The impact of this on the 
merger process is an issue to which I will later return.  
 
3.4 Drivers for Merger in Higher Education 
A body of HE management literature has documented the use of mergers by 
national governments to effect systematic structural change across most members of the 
OECD. Mergers can be government or sector driven and indeed, the drivers are often 
evident at both at system and institutional level. The literature has identified a wide range 
of drivers for mergers, which are often a combination of push and pull factors which are 
closely linked to the perceived advantages of mergers in HE. Davies (2013) argues that 
mergers are usually motivated by a mixture of desires and that mergers are generally seen 
as a culmination of drivers or push/pull forces, rather than the result of one particular 
motive. Hinfellar (2012) opines that while the decision to merge will be influenced by a 
complex, simultaneous interplay of push and pull factors, at least one of these push or 
pull factors should be so overwhelming that it drives the institution to go ahead and 
merge. Brown et al (2004) suggest that strong negative push factors tend to “overcome 
all barriers” when it comes to mergers and that without such push factors, a range of 




Rowley, (2012) proposed a tripartite classification to examine the key drivers of 
mergers in HE, based on strategic, academic and financial drivers. While this 
classification is useful, it does not differentiate between system level and institutional 
level drivers. Following my review of the literature, I have developed an alternative 





Figure 4: Conceptualisation of Key Drivers for Merger in HE 
 
Firstly, I have identified policy drivers and social drivers, which are mainly 
external and primarily incited by government. These can be regarded as push factors, 
which are likely to arise from external pressures and can often generate defence 
mechanisms (Hinfellar, 2012). Secondly, I have identified competitive and academic 
drivers which are found primarily internally, by institutions themselves. These are often 
referred to as pull factors and can represent attractive options to organisations (Hinfellar, 
2012). Thirdly, I have identified financial drivers, which can be either system level or 
institutionally based, and can act either as push or pull factors, depending upon the 
particular context. Finally, I have identified a category of ‘unstated’ drivers for mergers, 
which if mismanaged and miscommunicated may have a detrimental effect on the 













acceptable and understood way during a merger process. These unstated drivers will be 
examined in more detail in my research.  
The categories of drivers that I have identified from the literature are developed 
further in the table below, which categorises and summarises my proposed classification 
of the key drivers for/advantages of merger from the existing higher education literature. 
 
Table 6: Key Drivers for Higher Education Mergers 
 
Category Level Push or 
Pull 






Push  Align national educational and economic priorities (Harman 
and Meek, 2002) 
 Address system level problems, particularly related to 
institutional fragmentation (Harman and Harman, 2013) 
 Restructure the higher education sector and to build larger, 
more competitive and more sustainable institutions (Harman 
and Harman, 2013). 
 A mechanism to abolish the traditional binary system 
(Harman, 1991) 
 Facilitate institutional transformation within a national 
system (Davies, 2013)  
 Avert the spiral of decline in small HEIs and facilitate the 
creation of critical mass (Davies J, 2013) 






Pull  Strengthen market position, nationally and/or internationally 
(HEFCE, 2012), (Davies, 2013) 
 Prevent a competitor seizing a particular opportunity 
 Move up the national/ international rankings (Davies, 2013) 
 Obtain additional capacity and expertise (HEFCE, 2012) 
 “Mutual growth” for the partner institutions and improving 
their competitive position (Harman & Harman, 2013) 
 Facilitate HEIs moving to the next stage of their life cycle, 
allowing them to stimulate new initiatives, reconceptualise a 






Pull  Improve the scale, range and quality of research (HEFCE, 
2012) 
 Improve the scale, range and quality of teaching and 




 Improve the student experience (HEFCE, 2012) 
 Move towards a more interdisciplinary system with a 






Push  Increase access to and participation in higher education 
(Harman and Meek, 2002) 
 Promote coherence and integration of education, research 
and development within a region (Davies, 2013) 











 ‘Rescue’ weak or non-viable institutions, (Harman and 
Meek, 2002) 
 Need for greater efficiencies (Harman and Meek, 2002) 
 Tackle financial problems (Harman & Harman, 2003) 
 Gain financial strength (HEFCE, 2012) 
 Ensure financial sustainability (HEFCE, 2012) 










 Political pressures (Fulop et al 2002)   
 Under management or mismanagement of organisations 
(Fulop et al 2002) 
 
In most HE mergers, there is a delicate interplay of these push/pull factors at play, 
with both system and institutional level drivers evident. Figure 5 below further 
conceptualises my proposed classification, providing a matrix indicating the interplay 
between system level and institutional drivers on the one hand, and the business and 
























Figure 5: Relationship between System and Institutional Level Drivers for Merger 
 
HEFCE (2010) state that the focus on the driver(s) for merger(s) has fluctuated as 
the external policy environment and economic context has changed. They argue it is 
likely that continued reductions in public expenditure, increasing demand for student 
places, increased expectations regarding quality of HE provision and growing 
competition from emerging economies will continue to provide an impetus for national 
governments and the HE sector to examine the full spectrum of the different models and 
types of collaborative activity, including full mergers of institutions (HEFCE, 2010).  
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As discussed earlier, the National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 (DoES, 
2011) clearly identifies system reconfiguration; access and participation; quality; the 
creation of a new TU sector and; the mopping up of fragmented IoTs to create 
institutions with critical mass and scale as the key drivers for change. Hazelkorn and 
Harkin (2014) state that change in the Irish HE system is being driven by an increasing 
demand for HE at a time when public funding is declining due to the global economic 
crisis and its manifestation in Ireland. They state there is a need for greater efficiency, 
enhanced quality, improved competitiveness and visibility and clearer alignment with 
national policy objectives. Hinfellar (2012) suggests that the drivers for mergers in the 
Irish context at system level relate to issues concerning fragmentation and sustainability, 
and at institutional level centre around institutional ambition and competitive positioning. 
These drivers clearly come within the categories proposed in my framework above. 
 
3.5 Collaboration & Merger Typologies/Variables and Assumptions 
about their Impact upon Process 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The literature has identified a number of structural and cultural variables relating 
to the full spectrum of HE collaborations and merger activity, which can encompass a 
wide range of paradigms of institutional relationship, including co-operations, consortia, 
federations and mergers (Davies, 2013). These variables can have a considerable impact 
on both the collaboration and merger process and outcomes and are worthy of 
consideration when examining the factors at play during such a process. These variables 
are not mutually exclusive, and HE collaborations and mergers will usually be an 
amalgam of the various characteristics presented below. In their research, Harman and 
Harman (2003) identified the following variables, which have become widely accepted 
categories into which HE collaborations mergers can be classified. These variables are 
whether a collaboration or merger is voluntary or involuntary; a consolidation or take 
over; single or cross sector; two partner or multi-partner; and between institutions with 
similar or differing academic portfolios. From my broader research of mergers and 
acquisitions generally, I would also propose an overarching classification, based on 
whether the merger is between private or public sector HEIs, as an addition to Harman 





3.5.2 Merger between Private or Public Sector HEIs 
Mergers, acquisitions or take-overs between private HEIs are likely to be resource 
driven and according to (Desyllas, 2014) are primarily driven by economic/market forces 
such as the aim to increase market share and profitability, and to create synergies and 
economies of scale and learning. Private sector mergers between HEIs are driven by the 
HEIs themselves as a strategic response to competitive pressures, and the focus is 
primarily on value creation.  
Mergers between public HEIs, on the other hand, are more likely to be 
government driven, and often occur against a backdrop of continual restructuring 
activities (Talbot and Johnson, 2007). They are primarily driven by a desire to achieve 
cost efficiencies and improve service (Frumkin, 2003). They are often framed in terms of 
collaboration or consolidation, rather than in the more aggressive acquisition mode 
evident in the private sector (O' Flynn et al, 2014). 
3.5.3 Voluntary or Involuntary (Government or Sector Driven) 
Voluntary collaborations and mergers are generally institutionally driven and 
occur where both parties fully consent to or indeed, co-initiate a collaboration or merger. 
Many academics, (Goedegeburre, 1992; Harman, 1996; Skodvin, 1999; Harman and 
Harman, 2003) argue that a merger which is voluntary is generally easier to organise and 
tends to be more successful than one which is involuntary. This may be due to a number 
of factors such as the greater degree of staff involvement in and ownership of the 
process, and a greater sense of willingness and belonging.  Voluntary mergers often come 
about as a result of a changing competitive landscape and often follow other mergers in 
the sector (Goedegeburre, 2011). However, Harman and Harman (2002) argue that 
behind many voluntary mergers, there is often an external threat or some degree of 
government incentive, pressure or direction. Therefore, although a merger may appear to 
be voluntary, there are often external, push factors which leave the institution with little 
choice but to merge.  
A collaboration or merger which is involuntary or forced often occurs where the 
impetus for collaboration or merger comes from an external force or body (Harman and 
Meek, 2002).These drivers were discussed above and categorised as system level 
drivers/push factors. If a proposed merger is forced, and one or both of the parties rejects 
the idea or benefits of merging, the merger process can become very arduous and 




particularly relevant in the context of my own research and warrants greater attention 
than the existing body of  research has given it. 
3.5.4 A Consolidation or Take-Over 
  Andrade et al (2001) found that in most mergers, there is a perception of ‘winner 
and loser’. The manner in which this perception is framed and managed will depend upon 
whether the merger is classified and presented as a take-over or as a consolidation. A take-
over generally involves the take-over of a smaller/weaker institution by a larger/stronger 
institution. Take-overs tend to be simpler, with the smaller institution being assimilated 
into the larger institution, often as a distinct department or faculty.   
  A consolidation, defined by Harman and Harman (2003, p.32) as “two or more 
institutions of similar size coming together to form a new institution”, is generally assumed 
to be more laborious and presents greater organisational challenges than a take-over. With 
consolidations, difficult issues such as the choice of name for the new institution, the 
appointment of the new ‘Chief Executive’ and senior management team, the new academic 
structures and portfolio, and issues surrounding programme rationalisation need to be 
addressed. Often, when two parties are similar in size and status, considerable effort is 
required to create a ‘merger of equals’ to enable the proposal to be accepted. This can 
result in a more costly and inefficient merger process than could otherwise be the case. 
Parties may sometimes choose, for political reasons, to publically present the merger as a 
‘consolidation’ rather than a ‘take-over’ (Harman and Harman, 2003). However, if this is 
at odds with widely held perceptions, it may result in a loss of credibility among staff, 
students and other stakeholders (HEFCE, 2012).  Harman and Harman’s (2003) research 
found that despite presenting ‘a merger of equals’ there is often a dominant/stronger 
institution whose regulatory framework, policies and procedures, processes, operating 
systems, etc. are seen as the preferred option for the new institution. This can lead to a 
feeling of resentment amongst staff from the weaker institution(s).  
3.5.5 Single-Sector or Cross-Sector 
  Single sector collaborations and mergers are those which involve institutions 
from one sector only (for example, a merger between two or more IoTs), as opposed to 
cross-sector, involving institutions from different sectors (for example, a merger between a 
university and an IoT, or between a FE and HE provider). Research has found that cross-
sector collaborations and mergers can pose particular problems, especially when the 




(Harman and Robertson Cuninghame, 1995). In theory, at least, single sector 
collaborations mergers should be easier to manage (Harman and Robertson Cuninghame, 
1995; Eastman and Lang, 2001), although this is another assumption which my research 
will test. 
3.5.6 Two-Partner or Multi-Partner  
  Two partner collaborations and mergers tend to operate differently to multi-
partner mergers.  Two partner collaborations and mergers tend to be easier to organise, 
although Harman and Harman (2003) state that small institutions in two partner mergers 
sometimes work hard to attract additional partners into the merger negotiations to avoid 
being “swallowed-up” by a larger partner institution. Kyvik and Stensaker (2013) found 
that merger processes involving more than two institutions dramatically reduces the 
chances of reaching a merger decision. 
3.5.7 Partners with Similar or Different Academic Portfolios  
  The final variable identified by Harman and Harman (2013) is whether the 
institutions have similar or different academic profiles. Eastman and Lang (2001) argue 
that merging institutions with complementary missions and academic profiles is easier than 
merging institutions which are radically different from each other, as the commonality in 
terms of academic mission and profile can often indicate a similar degree of commonality 
in academic culture. While this seems logical, merging institutions with similar academic 
profiles frequently forebodes major rationalisation of course offerings in order to achieve 
cost savings, which may trigger disagreement about the distribution of academic and 
administrative tasks and roles in the newly merged institution (Harman and Harman, 2003; 
Kyvik and Stenskar, 2013). My research will test the argument made by Eastman and Lang 
(2001) and also by Harman & Robertson Cunningham (1995) that merging institutions 
with complementary missions and academic profiles is easier, as the Irish Alliances all 
share very similar academic portfolios. 
3.5.8 Summary of Merger Variables and their Impact upon the Merger 
Process 
  My review of merger variables from HE literature is summarised in Table 7 
below, which focuses on what the literature has identified as the resultant impact of those 
key merger variables upon the merger process. However, the literature makes a lot of 






















Table 7: Merger Variables and Assumptions re their Impact upon the Merger Process: 
      Merger     
  Variables 
     Assumptions re Facilitatory Impact on Process         Assumptions re Inhibitory Impact on Process 
  Private Sector  Initiated and driven by the HEIs themselves as a 
strategic response to economic/competitive 
pressures  
 Lengthy pre-merger process involving due 
diligence (Desyllas, 2014). 
 Post-merger integration process focused on value 
creation. 
 
  Public Sector   Tend to be government driven, and often occur against a 
backdrop of continual restructuring activities (Talbot and 
Johnson, 2007).  
 Primarily driven by a desire to achieve cost efficiencies 
and improve service (Frumkin, 2003).  
 Process often framed in terms of collaboration or 
consolidation (O' Flynn et al, 2014). 
  Voluntary  Easier to organise (Harman and Harman, 2003). 
 Often follow other mergers in the sector 
(Goedegeburre, 2011). 
 Tend to be more successful (Goedegeburre, 1992; 
Harman,    
 1996; Skodvin, 1999; Harman and Harman, 2003).  
 
  Involuntary 
 
  More difficult to implement (Harman and Harman, 2003; 
Thompson 2012). 
 Likely to be resistance from partners (Harman and 
Harman, 2003). 





 Must be careful not to lose credibility amongst 
stakeholders if it is really a ‘take-over’ (HEFCE, 2012). 
  Take over  Tend to be simpler – smaller institution assimilated 




  Single sector  Shared missions, cultures, regulatory framework 
and funding structures should make the process 
more straightforward (Harman and Robertson 
Cuninghame, 1995). 
 
  Cross sector 
 
  Different missions, roles, cultures and funding structures 
between the sectors can often cause difficulties (Harman 
and Robertson Cuninghame, 1995). 
  Two partner 
 
 
 Should be easier to reach agreement (Harman and  
Harman, 2003). 
 
 Small institutions in two partner mergers sometimes 
work hard to attract additional partners into the merger 
negotiations to avoid being “swallowed-up” by a larger 
partner institution (Harman and Harman, 2003). 
  Multi partner   Merger processes involving more than two institutions 
greatly reduces the chances of reaching a merger decision 
(Kyvik and Stensaker, 2013) 
  Similar      
academic 
portfolios 
 Commonality in terms of academic mission and 
profile can often indicate a similar degree of 
commonality in academic culture (Eastman and 
Lang, 2001). 
 
 Often predicts rationalisation of course offerings in order 
to achieve cost savings, which may trigger disagreement 
about the distribution of academic and administrative 
tasks and roles in the new merged institution (Harman 
and Harman, 2003; Kyvik and Stenskar, 2013). 
  Different  
academic 
portfolios 
  Differences in academic mission and profile can indicate 
differences in academic culture, which can be 
problematic (Eastman and Lang, 2001). 
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3.6 Merger as a Strategic and Political Policy Formation Process 
As noted above, a decision to merge is likely to be the most difficult and far-
reaching policy decision an organisation will ever take (Hinfellar, 2012), and how that 
decision is made and implemented is key to the outcome of the process. In terms of 
factors which impact upon the process, Davies (1985) suggests that they are numerous 
and reinforce and interplay with each-other both within and outside the HE system, 
making rational, planned policy formation and implementation difficult. He states that 
policy formation in HEIs is inevitably a political process and centres on the disposition of 
power; the capacity to control key organisational influences and; levers or incentives for 
the fulfilment of particular preferences.  
This will have implications for HE alliances planning a merger, which will 
necessarily require the formation and implementation of a wide range of strategies and 
policies.  Davies (2013) argues that highly rational models of entities may founder on the 
vagaries of micro-politics and ineffective processes. Davies (1985) categorises the type 
of policies formed by HEIs into strategic, substantive and climatic policies, and suggests 
that all are necessary to effect change. In the context of a merger proposal and process, 
all three categories of policy formation and implementation will be required; strategic 
policies, encompassing the decision to merge, partner choice, etc.; substantive policies 
encompassing procedural/operational matters such as HR policies, academic policies, etc. 
and; climatic policies, which are in essence cultural and are required to build trust and 
levels of engagement between the parties. 
In order to achieve the objective and effect policy change, Davies (1985) 
proposes a four-phase ‘political systems model’ of policy formation for HEIs, based 
around Enderud’s (1977) work. These phases consist of firstly, a ‘garbage can’ phase 
which is a highly ambiguous period in which the problem must be defined; secondly, a 
‘negotiation and political’ phase, where a workable coalition of interests must be 
established; thirdly, a ‘persuasion and legitimation phase’ which is essentially a collegial 
period where agreement is reached on policy lines of action; and fourthly, a 
‘bureaucratisation’ phase, where the policy is implemented. Davies (1985) elaborates on 
inputs, processes and outputs for each of these stages and opines that if any phase is 
missed, or is given insufficient time, problems may arise later during the policy 
formation process. He cites examples such as a failure to appreciate the magnitude and 




management to get involved in bargains and incentives to develop support for policy 
packages, as being some of the reasons why policy proposals may flounder. Davies’ 
model is clearly applicable to the merger process within HEIs, offering a framework 
around which the merger process can be examined. Although the existing body of HE 
literature has not used this model in the context of mergers, it provides an insightful lens 
for conceptualising and examining why some merger proposals and processes might fail. 
Therefore this model will be drawn upon when examining the phases through which 
proposed mergers must progress.  
 
3.7 Facilitatory and Inhibitory Factors in the Merger Process 
My central research question focuses on facilitatory and inhibitory factors to 
merger processes in HE. It is therefore necessary to identify or develop a conceptual 
framework from the literature through which facilitatory and inhibitory factors relating to 
merger processes in HE, both at system and institutional level, can be identified and 
examined. This framework will both inform and frame my research design, data 
collection and analysis, and presentation of findings. 
Much of the research published regarding mergers in HE to date focuses on 
evaluating the outcomes of a merger and identifying success factors, rather than focusing 
on the process and the factors which positively or adversely affect that process. Brown et 
al (2004, p.2) note that there is “not a great deal of information in the literature about 
process”. This study aims to contribute in a significant way to the body of knowledge 
available in this regard.  
HEFCE (2010), Harman and Harman (2003), Davies (2013) and Brown et al 
(2004), amongst others, have identified a number of factors which, based on lessons 
learnt from HEIs past experiences, can have a critical impact on the merger process. 
Recent research by Curry J (2015) also provides guidance on process in the HE context, 
albeit relating to university-city collaborations rather than mergers per se. Research 
undertaken by Brown et al (2004) is particularly useful, as the focus of their study was on 
the factors in the merger process which led to some merger discussions being abandoned 
while others led to implementation, rather than focusing on evaluating the outcome of 
one single merger. Brown et al (2004) had initially envisaged that their study would 
result in a checklist of ‘do’s and don’ts’ for HE mergers, which would be easily 




data collected from their case studies, they found that this was not possible. Rather, they 
found that same key themes and issues arose in most of the proposed mergers they 
examined. They concluded that it is the combination in which these themes/factors 
occurred, and how they were addressed within the particular context of each merger that 
determines the outcome. This is an interesting finding and one which has not been given 
the attention it deserves in subsequent literature, which all too often seeks to produce a 
hard and fast guide to merger success. A more useful approach might be to investigate 
both what issues arose during the process and then how these were addressed within the 
particular context of the merger itself.  
Brown et al (2004) also identified a range of potentially ‘deal breaking’ issues, 
which could inhibit or frustrate the merger process, and which are linked to the key 
themes that they identified in their research. Because of their emphasis on process over 
outcome and its relevance to my research, I adopted the key themes identified by Brown 
et al (2004) as an initial framework around which I would examine the literature, and 
have subsequently adapted this framework to include additional themes identified as 
relevant to the merger process from the wider body of HE merger and collaboration 
literature. This has facilitated the development of a conceptual framework presented in 
Figure 6 below, around which my interview and data collection schedule is based, data 























Figure 6: Key Factors Impacting upon the Merger Process in HE 
 
3.7.1 Genesis of the Merger Proposal 
  The genesis or drivers of merger, whether they be push or pull factors, naturally 
have a significant impact on the merger process itself. Whether a merger is voluntary or 
involuntary can have a significant influence on the conduct of the partners and the extent to 
which there is real commitment to what is often a very long and demanding merger 
process. Voluntary mergers driven by pull factors tend to be easier to organise and more 
successful than those which are involuntary or driven by push factors (Goedegeburre, 
1992; Harman, 1996; Skodvin, 1999; Harman and Harman, 2003). Brown et al (2004, 
p.10) found that HEIs tend to behave like private sector institutions, “holding on to their 
individuality and independence as long as possible and relinquishing these generally only 
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when severely threatened or when positive opportunities are significant.” They found that 
merger proposals often originated from proposals to increase collaboration. As mentioned 
earlier, HEFCE (2010) and others advise that all HEIs should explore all of the 
collaborative options open to them and make the decision on this basis.  
  Regardless of the push/pull factors driving the merger, the literature indicates that 
there must be a strong educational basis for the decision to merge. The reasons for merger 
should be clearly articulated and based on the educational case rather than on financial 
grounds to facilitate the process (HEFCE, 2010). This is a particularly important factor 
when it comes to getting ‘buy in’ from the academic communities in the individual 
institutions. Davies (2013) also highlights the importance of developing a shared vision, 
which is inspirational, rather than operational, and focusing upon this as the genesis for the 
proposed merger. This aligns with accepted change management frameworks, such as 
those proposed by Kotter (1996), who advocates the need to create a sense of urgency and 
a clear vision for change. 
3.7.2 Role of Key Individuals within Merging Institutions 
  The need for senior individuals within merging institutions to provide strong 
leadership and commitment to the process is well documented. Brown et al (2004) found 
that senior figures must be prepared to champion the merger proposals. Again, this is in 
keeping with most change management literature which identifies the need to champion 
the change initiative within the organisation by building a powerful coalition of supporters 
(Kotter, 1996). Brown et al (2004) note that senior managers and especially the Vice 
Chancellors/Principals/Presidents of both institutions must be absolutely committed to the 
merger, as it is not credible to ask staff within the institution to take the merger proposal 
seriously if it is evident that those at the top of the institution are not fully committed. They 
state that there must be some personal chemistry between the key players, as well as an 
abundance of energy and commitment. They also suggest that ideally this level of 
commitment should be shown by the Chairmen of Councils or Boards of Governors and 
other key lay members. Indeed, despite their central role, the literature reviewed gave 
surprisingly little attention to the role of the Chair/Board of Governors in the merger 
process.  
  Brown et al (2004) and HEFCE (2010) have identified that early agreement on 
the position of the two heads of institution post-merger is an important issue, and can often 




both heads are close to retirement, this can often be a driver/facilitator of the process, but 
can also be an inhibitory factor since the individual involved may be seen as having no 
stake in the new merged institution. HEFCE (2010) also note that agreement on a new 
senior management structure, and indeed, the full new organisational structure, and a team 
of internal staff dedicated to the merger process will act in a facilitatory manner.  
  Changes in key personnel during the process can act either as a facilitatory or 
inhibitory factor, depending upon the context. Generally, changes in key personnel will 
complicate and de-stabilise the process, particularly, if as Brown et al (2004) identified, the 
new personalities clash or if the new individuals are less committed or have a different 
view on how and/or if the merger process should proceed. To this end, HEFCE (2010) 
recommend that risk management plans should be put in place, including contingency 
plans in the event of key staff members leaving. However, in some contexts, it is possible 
that the loss of a particular individual who is a potential blocker could actually facilitate 
and the merger process. 
3.7.3 Communication and Engagement with Stakeholders 
  The need to communicate clearly the vision and need for change is again a key 
step in any change management process (Kotter, 1996). In order to facilitate a merger 
process, it is crucial to communicate clearly and effectively with key stakeholders groups, 
which have been identified in the literature as being governors, staff, students and 
communities. Communication should focus on the academic case for merger and in line 
with best change management practice, should identify mutual benefits or ‘wins’ for 
institutions at an early stage in the process. There is a delicate balance for senior managers 
to achieve between the need to inform, consult, feedback and take account of views on one 
hand, and the need to direct and lead the project, which may require discretion, 
confidentiality and decisiveness, on the other. Locke (2007) argues that effective and 
targeted communication with staff, students and stakeholders is critical and that a clear 
communication strategy needs to be developed and implemented, being cognisant of the 
need to manage carefully stakeholder expectations and avoid rumour and conjecture, which 
can inhibit and damage the process. Brown et al (2004) identified that Senate/Academic 
Boards and Boards of Governors as two groups which require particular attention and 
convincing when it comes to merger, as they are often the most powerful voices within the 
HEI and may ultimately make the decision to merge or not. Again, the literature reviewed 




the merger process, despite the fact that they often hold decision making power within the 
institution. 
  Cartwright, Tytherleigh and Robertson (2007), Harman (2010) and Brown et al 
(2004) all highlight the importance of consulting and involving staff, who may be 
concerned about their job security. Such consultation, they stress, must be genuine and be 
reflected in the subsequent merger process to avoid heightening negativity towards the 
merger process. Harman (2000) recommends that to facilitate the process, guarantees be 
given as soon as possible in the process to staff about security of employment, where 
feasible.  
  In relation to mergers between large and small institutions, the identification of 
benefits such as opportunities of staff development and advancement, better research 
facilities and a more research orientated culture, to staff at the smaller institution has been 
identified as a factor which can facilitate the process and make the idea of a takeover more 
palatable (Brown et al, 2004). However, this can also create fears within the larger 
institution which may be concerned about dilution of expertise and resources and may 
question what benefits they will accrue from the process.  
  Finally, Brown et al (2004) found that handling local and national media interest 
is an important factor in the merger process. They found that if properly briefed, the media 
could build up external support and counter internal rumours. However, if the institutions 
did not engage effectively with the media, they found that that the media could serve to 
bolster opposition to the process.  
3.7.4 Processes & Project Management 
  There is a clear need to establish, resource, implement and review an agreed 
merger process, both on inter and intra institutional levels. Harman and Harman (2003) 
have identified that an effective merger planning and implementation process with realistic 
timescales and a strong framework for managing the change process post-merger is a 
crucial facilitatory factor in the merger process. Davies (2013) echoes this, and provides 
that the development and progressive implementation of a project action plan with internal 
and external monitoring is crucial to success.   
  On an intra-institutional level, the literature indicates that senior managers need to 
identify and accept at the outset the significant commitment required from them in terms of 




provision of a dedicated project manager has also been found to act as a facilitatory factor, 
although the absence of one has not been shown to be inhibitory (Brown et al, 2004).  
  On an inter-institutional level, the literature has identified the importance of 
having agreed and appropriate joint structures/committees/groups, with equal 
representation from the partners, regardless of institutional size. In addition, ensuring that 
key Governor/Council meetings/decisions take place at the same time was also cited as a 
facilitatory factor (Brown et al, 2004).  A merger ‘project management’ office also needs 
to be established by the institutions.  
3.7.5 Role of External Change Agents 
The role or influence of external change agents or brokers, with no vested interest 
or commitment to either institution, has also been found to facilitate the merger process 
by ensuring neutrality and promoting trust between partners, particularly at the early 
stages of the process (Brown et al, 2004). These change agents may be appointed by the 
merging institutions either jointly or separately, or may be appointed by the government 
or by the relevant Higher Education Regulatory/Policy Body. Unfortunately there is very 
little empirical evidence in the literature about the role or impact of these external change 
agents in the process, which is potentially very significant.  
These external change agents can provide a detached and independent perspective 
and can make a dis-partisan contribution to the merger process. There are numerous 
potential advantages to the use of external change agents, particularly if appointed jointly 
by the merging institutions. The external change agent can advise and assist the 
institutions on the merger process, particularly on its micro-political aspects. The external 
change agent can engage in research on behalf of the parties and can share his/her 
existing knowledge merger processes. The external change agent can perform an 
educative role, increasing the parties understanding of specific issues which may arise, 
such as financial and legal issues, etc. Finally, the external change agent can prepare 
positional papers for the partners to examine, discuss and adopt as required, and can 
assist in drafting other relevant documentation.  
It is of course crucial that the external change agent has the necessary expertise in 
in HE mergers to be of real benefit to the process. Otherwise, the external change agent 
might inhibit, rather than facilitate the merger. It is also important that the external 
change agent is supported and facilitated by the merging institutions. Therefore it is ideal 




will act impartially, and who may operate as an independent mediator between them at 
difficult stages during the process. On the other hand, an external change agent appointed 
externally (perhaps by the government or Higher Education Regulatory/Policy Body), 
and forced upon the parties, may in fact be counterproductive to the process. My research 
will examine further the manner of appointment, role and influence of these change 
agents on the merger process in the Irish context.  
3.7.6 Culture  
Culture within an organisation refers to the taken-for-granted values, underlying 
assumptions, expectations, and beliefs which describe organisations and their members 
(Cameron, 2007). Cameron (2007, p.430) notes that most discussions of organisational 
culture including those by Cameron & Ettington (1988), O’Reilly & Chatman (1996) and 
Schein (1996) agree that culture is a socially constructed attribute of organisations which 
serves as the social glue which binds organisations together and that it represents “how 
things are around here,” or the prevailing ideology that people carry inside their heads. 
Schein (1996) argues that in this way, culture affects the way organisation members 
think, feel, and behave. Schwartz and Davies (1981, p.3) define culture as a “pattern of 
beliefs and expectations shared by the organisation’s members. These beliefs and 
expectations produce norms that powerfully shape the behaviour of individuals and 
groups in the organisations.” Schein (1985, p.9) defines culture as  
a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal 
integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think 
and feel in relation to those problems.  
Peterson and Spencer (1991, p.142) opine that culture is the “deeply embedded patterns 
of organisational behaviour and the shared values, assumptions, beliefs or ideologies that 
members have about their organisation or its work.” Drennan, (1992, p.3) defines culture 
as “how things are done around here”. It is what is typical to the organisation, the habits, 
the prevailing attitudes, and the grown-up pattern of accepted and expected behaviour.  
The importance of understanding organisational culture is well documented in the 
literature. Schein (2010) argues that an understanding of organisational culture is crucial 
to illustrate the existence of sub-cultural dynamics within organisations and to understand 
how culture can act as a source of resistance to organisational learning, development and 




potentially an inhibitory factor to any change management or merger process undertaken 
within that organisation. 
Smerek (2010, p.381) notes that cultural analysis of HE organisations first began 
in the 1960’s, with Clark (1963) and subsequently Clark and Trow (1966). However, it 
was not until the late 1980’s that the importance of organisational culture was fully 
recognised and the cultural perspective on HE was developed (Denison, 1990; Weick, 
1985). Smerek (2010) argues that organisational culture in HEIs is the result of three key 
factors; the organisations unique history (Clark, 1970, 1972); its leadership (Schein, 
1985) and critical events (Pettigrew, 1979). The importance of understanding 
organisational culture, particularly in relation to change management, is well documented 
in the literature. Schein (2010) argues that an understanding of organisational culture is 
crucial to understand how culture can act as a source of resistance to planned change.  In 
HE, much of the research on organisational culture has focused on the link between the 
culture of the organisation and the attainment of its goals and vision. Davies, (2013) 
argues that policy formation in HEIs takes place within institutional frameworks, where 
culture is a factor, therefore an understanding of culture allows an insight into how and 
why an institution behaves in the way that it does, and allows that institution manage 
change and implement strategy more effectively. He argues that a university culture may 
have to evolve and shift in order to respond to and support internally and externally 
stimulated initiatives and that cultural change may be required before any strategic 
change is initiated. Wind and Main (1999) identified that culture is a major challenge in 
change management initiatives among HEIs because many faculty members consider 
knowledge as proprietary and are not willing share it freely, using knowledge as a source 
of power. Detert et al (2000) found that the prevailing culture of an organisation can 
sabotage management change efforts before they even begin. Ramachandran et al (2011, 
p.616) argue that for change management within HE to be effective, a conducive culture 
is required. They state that  
an investigation of the type of organisational culture in the HEIs concerned will 
create the platform for the planning and execution of organisation-wide change 
management efforts, including the adoption of innovative strategies and practices. 
Various models and frameworks have been developed to assist in the diagnosis, 
classification and explanation of organisational culture.  Clark (1983) developed a model 
of culture which differentiated between freedom, equity, loyalty and competence 
respectively. Handy (1993) argued that culture could be classified as being concerned 




culture for HEIs based on four organisational types – collegium, bureaucracy, 
corporation and enterprise. He noted that all four cultures exist in most universities, but 
are distributed differently. In relation the collegium culture, McNay (1995) noted that this 
typically involved institutional freedom from external controls and a focus on academic 
autonomy. Many traditional and long established universities, he argued, could be 
categorised as collegiate. In a bureaucratic culture, the focus is on regulation, 
consistency and equality. The organisation is characterised by demarcation of functions 
and decision making is often vested with committees and vertical cycles of approval. 
Stability and control are important, but may militate against change efforts. McNay’s 
research identified the 1970’s polytechnics in the UK as a model of bureaucratic 
hierarchy in HE, focused on output, autonomy and accountability. In a corporate culture, 
the executive asserts authority, with the vice-chancellor as chief executive. Decision 
making is often political. Handy (1993) argues that this is a culture for crisis, not 
conformity. Finally, McNay (1995) argues that an enterprise culture is one which is 
focused on market demands and meeting the needs of the customer. It has a clear strategy 
and leadership is devolved. Decision making is decentralised and there is an 
entrepreneurial ethos. McNay (1995) argues that this is the emergent culture in higher 
education due to the squeeze on public funding of universities and the consequent need 
for independent income generation. 
It is evident from the above that cultural issues can be a significant factor in 
change management efforts, and there is no larger change for an organisation to face than 
merger. Harman (2002) and Harman and Harman (2003) have identified the powerful 
influence which culture has in some merger situations. Buono and Bowditch (1989) note 
that the ‘thicker’ the culture and the greater the degree of shared beliefs and values is 
evident, the more potent the influence the culture’s influence will be. Brown et al (2004) 
found that differences in culture can surface during the merger process and may be 
identified in different communication strategies and practices between the two 
organisations.  In particular, they found that perceived differences in academic standing 
between two merging institutions can give rise to formidable opposition from academic 
staff based on concerns regarding academic reputation. Harman and Harman (2003) note 
that although merging cultures appears to be less of a challenge in horizontal mergers, it 
is a nonetheless a particularly difficult task for HE leaders to manage merging divergent 
cultures into coherent educational communities which display loyalty and commitment to 




appear to an external commentator to be straightforward, can internally be viewed as very 
difficult due to diverse cultures, histories, practices, structures and problems (Shaw 
2003). It is clear, therefore, that culture will have a significant impact upon the merger 
process, and warrants investigation as part of any empirical study in the area. 
3.7.7 Structures  
  The literature reviewed indicated that choices about future organisational 
management structures, policies, procedures and practices has a significant impact on the 
merger process. Reputation and branding are particularly important to HEIs and decisions 
regarding the name of the new institution, for example, can present difficulties in this 
respect (Brown et al, 2004), particularly when dealing with consolidations between 
institutions of roughly equal size. Harman (2000) recommends that a decision be made as 
early as possible about the name of the institution. However, Brown et al (2004) found that 
one institution employed a deliberate strategy of leaving the difficult issue of the name 
until the end of the process, until all other issues had been resolved and the decision to 
merger was made. While this worked in that case, it may be a risky strategy to recommend 
to others.  In addition to the name, deciding upon the location of the headquarters of the 
newly merged university may also be problematic to the process, and may be a bone of 
contention amongst the partners, particularly where the merger is being presented as a 
merger of equals. Although the literature is silent on this point, the location of the 
headquarters on either of the partners existing campuses might be perceived as something 
of a conquest and could lead to difficulties in the process, as is the case in one of the Irish 
Alliances. How these structural issues are dealt with will be critical to the process. 
Likewise, the adoption of one institutions policies, procedures, systems and practices over 
the others can be seen as a sign of a ‘victory’ and is often best avoided, particularly in 
consolidations. An additional factor identified by the literature which had a potential 
inhibitory effect on the merger process is the legal basis for the merger. Again, this was 
particularly an issue in consolidations, or ‘mergers of equals’, where any hint of one 
institution taking over the other could lead to a stand-off between the partners (Brown et al, 
2004). 
3.7.8 Trust and Understanding 
Trust has been defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of 




organisational change. Brown et al (2004) and Harman and Harman (2003) identified the 
level of trust and understanding between the key individuals in merging institutions as a 
key success factor in HE mergers. Indeed, Brown et al (2004) found trust to be the most 
critical factor during the process. They argue that establishing, earning and maintaining 
trust between the two organisations is crucial to facilitating and sustaining the process, 
and that it should not be assumed that trust will take care of itself. Indeed, wider studies 
by Mohr and Spekman (1994), Cullen et al. (2000), Abodor (2005) and Kale and Singh 
(2009), all support the proposition that trust is an essential ingredient in successful inter-
organisational collaborations and partnerships. The concept of trust is a complex 
phenomenon, in that it arises at different levels of analysis; individual or interpersonal 
trust; organisational or inter-group trust, and inter-organisational trust (Bachmann & 
Zaheer, 2006). In the context of HE mergers, trust at all three levels is required, with 
inter-organisational trust being particularly significant.  
It is therefore critically important for merging institutions to establish and 
maintain trust throughout any merger process. When it comes to establishing trust, 
research has found that a previous history of collaboration between the partners is 
particularly useful, as it establishes and develops a level of trust between the 
organisations before the formal merger process begins. Thomson and Perry (2006) found 
that a previous history of collaboration was an important antecedent to successful inter-
organisational collaborations, and that a positive history of successful joint initiatives 
between the partners can lead to greater confidence and willingness to take risks on new 
or larger projects, such as a merger. On the other hand, a history typified by negative 
incidents, failed projects, and misunderstandings can result in reluctance to commit to 
further joint work or even cause representatives of organisations to avoid contact and 
communication.  
However, in many instances, this ‘ideal’ prior history of successful inter-
organisational collaborations may not exist between potential partners. In such situations 
Huxham (2003) argues that the focus must be on building trust between partners. 
Huxham and Vangen (2005) developed a trust-building loop (see Figure 7 below), which 
can be used as a model to build and maintain trust between collaborating and/or merging 
organisations. It focuses on aiming for realistic and successful outcomes (which are 
initially modest), and using this as a base for reinforcing trusting attitudes and gaining 
underpinnings for more ambitious collaborations. It also identifies the need for the 




acknowledging that the partners form expectations about the future of the collaboration 




Figure 7: Huxham and Vangen's (2005) Trust Building Loop 
 
Huxham and Vangen (2005) also identify the need to sustain the development of 
the trust-building loop by maintaining continuous attention to the dynamics of 
collaboration and making adjustments in response to changes in the individuals 
representing the organisations. Indeed, a change in key personnel during a 
merger/collaboration was identified by Brown et al (2004) and Dyer & Chu (2000), in 
Zaheer & Harris (2006), as one of the critical factors which could lead to a loss of trust 
which had been established, as it is these key personnel/executives who shape alliance 
formation and issue resolution (Zaheer, Lofstrom, & George, 2002 in Zaheer & Harris, 
2006). Huxham and Vangen (2005) specifically identify a number of processes which 
can be used to sustain trust between organisations, including managing dynamics and 
power imbalances, and nurturing the collaborative relationship by paying attention to the 
management of communication, credit recognition, joint ownership, varying levels of 




It is clear from the above that a lack of trust or the loss of trust which has been 
built up is one of the potentially key inhibitory factors to HE mergers, although the 
literature does not provide many examples which might indicate how this occurs, 
particularly in the HE sector. There is less evidence still of how this trust, once lost, 
might be repaired (Zaheer and Harris, 2006). Curry (2015) provides some useful 
guidance for HEIs in this respect. She recommends that collaborating institutions should 
document and understand the history of their relationship, and the fact that there may be 
different interpretations of that history. She argues that prior negative incidents should be 
identified and addressed to the best ability of both parties so that each organisation is 
open to opportunities and responsive to the other institution. She identifies the need to 
accept and maintain a positive and respectful relationship between the parties and 
establish a culture of responsiveness and relevance. She argues that it is critical to 
identify a shared vision or purpose between the partners, and that this will build 
understanding and trust over time. She notes that repairing a relationship which has been 
damaged is different from starting a new relationship, and recommends that in such a 
situation, if both parties are committed to resetting the relationship, they should start with 
small projects to gain confidence. She also argues that in such situations, future conflict 
is likely and that a pre-agreed dispute resolution mechanism/process, such as an external 
or joint mediator, might be useful. Finally, Curry (2015) recommends that the partners 
should communicate regularly using a variety of approaches and venues and should 
encourage and develop multi-layer points of sustained contact. All of these steps may 
help build or re-establish inter-organisational trust which may have been corroded. 
3.7.9 Financial & Legal Issues 
  A key part of any merger process is the preparation of the business case for 
merger, incorporating a due diligence exercise and financial projections for the new 
institutions (Brown et al, 2004). This can raise a number of issues including the need to bid 
for or raise investment funding from the funding agency or external stakeholders and the 
need to justify additional short term costs/resources required to support the process. Such 
funding may be necessary to secure additional posts such as a project manager, or to align 
systems (such as IT, library, administrative, etc.) or conditions of employment in the two 
merging institutions. This may in some cases amount to a significant amount of investment 
and clearly, the non-availability of such funding or additional resources can be a significant 




required to demonstrate projected longer term recurrent savings and/or increased income as 
a result of the merger, and this can also cause difficulties. Brown et al (2004) found it is 
crucial to involve the relevant funding/government agency from an early stage of the 
merger process to ensure sufficient time to answer questions and secure funding. In this 
regard, Harman and Harman (2003) opine that merging institutions should be realistic 
about the likely costs of the merger process and the potential level of savings which may 
be realised. Fielden and Markham (1997) and Kyvik (2002) also warn that care must be 
taken with many of the claims made about potential economies of scale. Brown et al 
(2004) warn against ‘loading up’ initial proposals as this could result in unrealistic targets 
being set. HEIs, or indeed governments, may see mergers as a way of quickly reducing 
costs and may use cost saving arguments to strengthen the business case. However, 
mergers require additional costs and money to be spent in the short term and perhaps even 
medium term on people, property and technology (HEFCE, 2010). Longer term savings 
may eventually accrue, although there appears to be a lack of publically available 
information about the outcomes and financial impact of mergers amongst HEIs (HEFCE, 
2010).  
  Finally, institutions need to conduct a due diligence on the financial and legal 
risks involved in the merger. This should be undertaken by an independent party, and may 
unearth any number of potential financial or legal risks which may cast doubt over the 
attractiveness of the merger. The relative financial positions of the partner institutions are 
also an important consideration. Brown et al (2004) found that in cases where one of the 
institutions had financial difficulties, it was more difficult to avoid the perception that the 
financially stronger institution was coming to the rescue of the weaker one, thus 
undermining the ‘merger of equals’ which appears to be so critical to success during the 
merger process  
3.7.10 Support from Government and Government Agencies  
  System level factors which impact upon the merger process generally fall under 
this theme/category, and can have an enormous impact upon the merger process. Davies 
(2013) and Harman and Harman (2003) note the crucial role government plays in 
facilitating the collaboration and merger planning and implementation process through a 
variety of factors. Firstly, they argue that the provision of clarity on the overall shape of the 
system before inviting initiatives and clear articulation of merger terminology, concepts, 




advice, support, guidance and funding to participating institutions. Thirdly, a clear process 
for completing the initiative, in terms of a limited number of stages, a relatively short 
timescale to maintain momentum and avoid drift, and clear criteria (if any), are required. 
Davies (2013) also cites the provision of a range of legitimate and clearly articulated 
organisational options for HEIs to consider as a facilitatory factor. Clarification of 
contentious issues about staffing and salary levels, the enactment of enabling legislation 
and appointment of interim senior management and governance structures may also be 
required.   
  Government/government agencies should also understand the model/paradigm of 
the proposed new entity and of the system boundary conditions necessary to make it work 
in the national and local interest (Davies, 2013). For example, if the government wishes to 
create entrepreneurial TUs, as is the case in the Irish context, it must ensure that the 
necessary enabling conditions to achieve this type of entity prevail. In particular, 
institutions must be provided with the necessary degree of institutional autonomy which 
would usually be expected of entities of that type, particularly in relation to staff contracts, 
financial control, funding models, academic regulation, etc.  
  In this regard, Davies (2013) has developed a continuum of government/agency 
positioning on collaborations and mergers, adopted from Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s 
(1976) model (See Table 8 below). Davies (2013) argues that government/government 
agencies can adopt a variety of positions from ‘Tells’ to ‘Delegates’ when it comes to 
collaboration and merger activity, and this model can be used to analyse the role of 




Table 8: J.L. Davies (2014) Continuum of System/Institutional Behaviour, Adapted from Tannerbaum and Schmidt  
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  A variety of factors will dictate government positioning along this continuum 
including; assumptions regarding respect for institutional autonomy; patterns of 
accountability; perceptions regarding maturity and responsiveness; the strength of political 
imperatives and the severity of the perceived crisis/concerns; the interest of various 
ministries in the collaboration/merger and its potential; sustaining institutional 
commitment, momentum and motivation; and finally, the collaborative or adversarial 
nature of the process or dialogue. When these factors are applied to the Irish context, it is 
clear that government respect for institutional autonomy in the IoT sector appears low and 
that extremely high levels of institutional accountability are required. In this sense, the 
Irish IoT sector is heavily regulated by government/government agencies, and from an 
international perspective, more closely resembles a branch of the civil service than it does a 
paradigm of a TU. If this is to continue, it will clearly be problematic and discourse around 
this issue is critical. The IoT sector, although over 40 years in existence, has only relatively 
recently been given devolved authority in respect of granting academic awards and is 
perceived, particularly by government agencies, as relatively immature as a result. There 
are strong political imperatives/motivating factors to merge IoTs in the Irish context, 
namely the desire to create regional universities to attract investment and jobs, and to be 
seen to rationalise and save money in the wake of the recent economic crisis.  
  Taking these factors into account, along with evidence of the approach of 
government to the matter to date, the Irish government’s positioning on merger activity in 
the IoT sector is certainly closer to the ‘Tells’ rather than ‘Delegates’ end of the spectrum, 
with a high level of authority being exercised at system/political level, particularly in the 
case of some of the proposed alliances. It is of course, possible that this positioning may 
change over time and indeed, even during the merger process itself. For example, the 
political imperatives involved may become stronger or weaker, depending upon the 
particular context, and this may see a shift in government positioning. In Ireland, for 
example, another financial crisis, a change of government or even a change in regional 
political representatives, may possibly shift government positioning along the continuum.  
  Failure of government or government agencies to provide the requisite levels of 
clarity, support or institutional autonomy required could clearly be an inhibitory factor to 
the entire merger process, although there is little empirical research in the literature on this 
area. In the Irish context, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
government/government agencies have not provided the requisite level of clarity and 




rationale, process, criteria, financial supports and guidance. There is also clear evidence to 
suggest that the Irish government has not provided the level of institutional autonomy one 
would legitimately expect in order to create entrepreneurial TUs, and appear to be 
exercising a rather directive approach to the process. My research will investigate this in 
more depth, offering empirical evidence on the critical role of these system level factors on 
the merger process. 
3.7.11 Timescale 
  In relation to timelines, Harman and Harman (2003) opine that mergers work best 
if institutions that have agreed to merge can move as quickly as possible to merger 
implementation. Long delays increase anxiety levels and give opponents increased time to 
plot against the merger and can ultimately lead to the demise of the process. Research by 
Brown et al (2004) echoes this and found the shorter the time scale between the decision to 
merge and the legal implementation of that decision, the better, as it reduces the chances of 
unforeseen changes in key people, limits time for opposition to gain momentum and 
minimises the chances of external changes undermining the proposal.  Davies (2013) notes 
that the generation and maintenance of momentum in the process is crucial to its success. 
Davies (2013) also advocates the generation and maintenance of confidence, calmness, 
coherence and stability as a facilitatory factor, although the literature in general appears to 
be silent on this point. Therefore consideration of the impact of timelines, momentum and 
stability on the merger process is considered necessary as part of my research.  
3.7.12 Summary of Facilitatory & Inhibitory Factors from Literature 
Review 
  Table 9 below provides a summary of the key themes and related 




Table 9: Key Themes/Factors Impacting Upon the Merger Process in Higher Education 
Key Theme Related Facilitatory/ Success Factor(s) Related Inhibitory Factor(s) 




 Voluntary mergers driven by pull factors at institutional level 
(Goedegeburre, 1992; Harman, 1996; Skodvin, 1999; Harman and 
Harman, 2003). 
 Agreement on a shared vision for the new entity which is inspirational 
rather than operational (Davies, 2013).  
 Forced mergers driven by push factors at sectoral level 
(Goedegeburre, 1992; Harman, 1996; Skodvin, 1999,; Harman and 
Harman, 2003). 
 Failure to explore the full range of collaborative options before 
deciding to merge (HEFCE, 2010). 
 Failure to produce a compelling academic vision Brown et al (2004). 
Role of Key 
Individuals 
 
 Senior figures prepared to champion and lead the merger proposals 
(Brown et al, 2004). 
 Absolute commitment to the process from leaders (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Personal chemistry between the key players (including Chairmen of 
Councils or Boards of Governors and other key lay members, as well 
as an abundance of energy and commitment to the process  (Brown et 
al, 2004). 
 Agreement at an early stage on a new senior management structure 
(HEFCE (2010).  
 Failure to agree at an early stage on the position of the two heads of 
institution post-merger (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Lack of commitment on behalf of senior management (Brown et al, 
2004). 










 Clear, timely and genuine communication and consultation with staff, 
students and stakeholders (Locke, 2007; Cartwright et al, 2007; 
Harman, 2010; Brown et al, 2004). 
 Manage carefully stakeholder expectations and avoid rumour and 
conjecture (Locke, 2007). 
 Focus on the academic case for merger and identify mutual benefits or 
‘wins’ for institutions at an early stage in the process (Brown et al, 
2004). 
 Timely and considered communication with Senate/Academic Boards 
and Boards of Governors (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Guarantees to staff about security of employment, where feasible 
(Harman, 2000). 
 Proper briefing and handling local and national media interest (Brown 
et al, 2004).  
 Poor/ad-hoc communications with staff and stakeholders (Locke, 
2007; Cartwright et al, 2007; Harman, 2010; Brown et al, 2004). 













 Establish, resource, implement and review an agreed merger process 
(Harman and Harman, 2003; Brown et al, 2004; Davies, 2013).  
 The provision of a dedicated project manager (Brown et al, 2004). 








energy, and recognition that the whole process may take a number of 
years (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Establishment of agreed and appropriate joint 
structures/committees/groups, with equal representation from the 
partners, regardless of institutional size (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Ensuring that key Governor/Council meetings/decisions took place at 






 Appointment of an ‘independent’ external change agent, with no 
vested interest/commitment to either institution to lead 
discussions/chair groups (Brown et al, 2004), draft documentation and 
position papers, provide expertise, act as a mediator between the 
parties, etc. 
 External change agent appointed by the government or Higher 
Education Regulatory/Policy Body, and forced upon the parties, may 
in fact be counterproductive to the process. 
 External change agent without the necessary higher education merger 
expertise  
Structures  Early decisions making about name and legal basis of new institution 
(Harman, 2000; Brown et al, 2004). 
 Agreement at an early stage on a new organisational structure 
(HEFCE, 2010) 
 Disagreement about the name of the new institution or the legal basis 
for merger (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Disagreement about the location of the headquarters of the new 
institution 
 Adoption of one institution’s policies, procedures, systems and 
practices over and to the exclusion of the others (Brown et al, 2004). 
Culture &  
Mission 
 
 Similar/shared organisational cultures (Brown et al, 2004; Harman, 
2002; Harman and Harman, 2003, Shaw 2003).  
 Perceived or actual differences in institutional culture (Brown et al, 
2004; Harman, 2002; Harman and Harman, 2003). 
 Different academic standing of the two institutions, real or perceived 





 Establishing, earning and maintaining trust (Brown et al, 2004; Mohr 
and Spekman, 1994; Cullen et al., 2000; Abodor, 2005;   Kale and 
Singh 2009; Curry 2015). 
 Previous history of collaboration between the partners (Brown et al, 
2004; Thomson and Perry, 2006)  
 Document and understand the history of the partners’ prior relationship 
(Curry, 2015). 
 Accept and maintain a positive and respectful relationship and 
establish a culture of responsiveness and relevance (Curry, 2015). 
 Identify a shared vision or purpose (Curry, 2015). 
 Start with small projects to gain confidence, particularly if there is 
distrust between the partners (Curry, 2015).  
 Prior agreement on a dispute resolution mechanism/process, such as an 
external or joint mediator (Curry, 2015) 
 Lack of trust or failure to establish trust (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Loss of trust which has been built up (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Change in key personnel (Brown et al, 2004; Dyer & Chu, 2000 in 





 Regular communication between the parties using a variety of 
approaches and venues and develop multi-layer points of sustained 




 Availability of required funding and resources required (Brown et al, 
2004; Davies, 2013). 
 Relatively stable and secure financial position of both parties (Brown 
et al, 2004). 
 Due diligence carried out by an independent body/person (Brown et al, 
2004). 
 Realistic expectations about the likely costs of the merger process and 
the potential level of savings which may be realised (Fielden and 
Markham, 1997; Kyvik 2002; Harman and Harman, 2003; Brown et al, 
2004). 
 Non-availability of required funding or additional resources for 
process (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Difficulties demonstrating projected longer term recurrent savings to 
increased income as a result of the merger (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Significant financial or legal liabilities identified by due diligence 
(Brown et al, 2004). 
 Differences in the relative financial positions of the partner 






 Provision of clarity from outset on the overall shape of the system 
(Davies, 2013; Harman and Harman, 2003). 
 Advice, support, guidance and funding to participating institutions 
(Davies, 2013). 
 A clear process for completing the initiative and clear criteria, if any 
are required (Davies, 2013). 
 Clarification at an early stage of contentious issues about staffing and 
salary levels (Davies, 2013). 
 Enactment of enabling legislation if required (Davies, 2013). 
 Appointment of interim senior management and governance structures, 
if required (Davies, 2013). 
 Involvement of the relevant funding/government agency from an early 
stage of the merger process (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Government/government agencies should also understand the 
model/paradigm of the proposed new entity and of the system 
boundary conditions necessary to make it work in the national and 
local interest (Davies, 2013). 
 Lack of availability of finance from the funding councils and external 
organisations to deliver on key aims (Brown et al, 2004). 
 Failure of government or government agencies to provide the 
requisite level of clarity, supports or institutional autonomy (Davies, 
2013). 
 Failure of government/government agencies to understand the 
model/paradigm of the proposed new entity and of the system 
boundary conditions necessary to make it work in the national and 
local interest (Davies, 2013). 
Timescale  Short time scale between the decision to merge and the legal 
implementation of that decision (Harman and Harman, 2003; Brown et 
al, 2004).   
 Generation and maintenance of momentum confidence, calmness, 
coherence and stability (Davies, 2013). 
 Long delays (Harman and Harman, 2003; Brown et al, 2004).   
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3.8 Gaps in the Literature & Expected Contribution of the Study 
  While there is an existing body of literature on mergers in HE relating to drivers, 
variables and critical success factors, there are some clear gaps and limitations to what we 
already know on this subject. My research aims to make a theoretical, geographical and 
practical contribution to the existing body of literature on HE mergers, particularly in relation 
to the process of mergers in HE. 
  From a theoretical perspective, my research aims to test assumptions made in the HE 
literature relating to the impact of key merger variables upon the merger process. There appears 
to be limited empirical evidence to support these assumptions. In particular, I will test the 
assumption that single sector collaborations and mergers are easier to manage and that merging 
institutions with complementary missions and academic profiles is more straightforward 
(Harman & Robertson Cuninghame, 1995; Eastman and Lang (2001). I will also test the 
assumption that two partner mergers are generally easier to manage than multi-partner mergers 
(Harman & Harman, 2002; Kyvik & Stensaker, 2013). 
  My review of the existing literature identified some clear gaps in theoretical 
knowledge regarding the merger process itself. Research to date has focused primarily on what 
factors led to the successful implementation of an agreement to merge. The literature, with the 
primary exception of Brown et al (2004), has not focused in a significant manner on what 
happens during the actual merger process itself, during which crucial decisions about partner 
choice, vision and mission, due diligence arrangements and engagement with both internal and 
externals stakeholders take place. This phase, which sets the foundations for the actual merger, 
is neglected in the HE literature. Brown et al (2004, p.2) found that there is “not a great deal of 
information in the literature about process.” My study aims to make a significant contribution 
to the body of knowledge available regarding this crucial stage of proceedings. Indeed, much 
of the research conducted on HE mergers to date has taken place retrospectively (often five to 
ten years after the merger has taken place). This means that data gathered by researchers, 
particularly interview data, may not be as reliable as if the data was collected while the process 
was ongoing. Participants may find it difficult to recall the details and elements of positive or 
negative memory recollection may have influenced their account of their experiences. Also, 
staff members who were involved in the merger process may have left the institution or retired 
since the merger took place, and this could limit access to key participants at the data collection 
stage. My research will take place concurrently with the process itself, which will give a real 




  Finally, my research aims to make a theoretical contribution regarding the potential 
impact of additional factors, not yet explored in the literature, on the merger process. In 
particular, the importance of maintaining momentum and stability throughout the process, and 
the key roles which external change agents and government/government agencies/national 
legislators can play in the process, have not been explored to any significant extent in the 
literature. My research aims make a contribution by theorising and examining the impact of 
these factors upon HE mergers.  Additionally, while the literature on HE mergers has identified 
trust and understanding as a key success factor, there is little data to evidence how it is 
established or eroded in HE mergers. My research aims to make a contribution in this regard, 
providing empirical data on the key role of trust in HE mergers. Finally, my research aims to 
make a theoretical contribution to the macro and micro-political dimensions of HE mergers, 
which to date have been largely neglected by the literature.   
  In terms of a geographical contribution, my research will contribute in a significant 
way to our knowledge of HE mergers in the Irish context. At present, there is a complete 
absence of literature on HE mergers in the Irish HE sector, which due to its particular history, 
legislative and regulatory framework, structure, culture and wider environmental conditions, 
warrants investigation. My research aims to identify the facilitatory, inhibitory and success 
factors which are relevant and/or particular to the Irish context. In this sense, my research will 
make a practical contribution by providing guidance for governments, policy makers and 
legislators on what system level factors can facilitate or inhibit merger processes, thus 
contributing towards the achievement of national policy objectives. It will also provide 
guidance to HEIs themselves, who will no doubt come under increasing pressure to merge in 
near future, on what institutional level factors can contribute towards a successful merger 
process. 
  To address the gaps in our knowledge identified above, I have expressed my core 
research question as “what are the key factors which facilitate on one hand, or inhibit on the 
other the merger process in the Irish IoT sector?” My sub-questions, described below, are 
aligned with my literature review and the gaps identified therein.  
1. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main facilitators of the 
merger process?  
2. What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main inhibitors of the 




3. Do any of these factors differ from those identified in the literature as being 
facilitatory or inhibitory factors for HE mergers, and if so, what were the 
particular features of the Irish context that led to these differences? 
4. What are the micro-political/policy phases through which the proposed mergers 
may proceed? 
5. What critical success factors for HE mergers can be identified from these cases?  
  These research questions will frame the remainder of my study and will particularly 
guide my research design, data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 below sets out the methods 
























4. RESEARCH DESIGN - METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  When planning an empirical study, there are a number of alternative approaches 
which the researcher may adopt. The design, construction and execution of the research by the 
researcher will be dependent upon and determined by the epistemological and ontological 
stance of the researcher, the nature and aims of the study and the research questions 
themselves.  This Chapter sets out my research philosophy and approach in detail, explaining 
the methods and methodologies which will be employed, and explaining how the theoretical 
framework I developed in Chapter 3 will be employed to enable me to address my research 
questions.   
 
4.2 Research Philosophy - Epistemological and Ontological Considerations  
  Historically, the dominant research paradigm was positivism, which asserted that 
reality is independent of us as humans and that the goal is the discovery of theories based on 
objective, positive data which is verifiable. However, in recent decades, the emergence of 
social science as an academic discipline has seen the development of a second research 
paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), known as interpretivism. I have adopted the interpretivist position, 
which argues that the study of the social world differs from the study of the physical or natural 
world, and consequently requires “a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the 
distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order” (Bryman, 2008, p.15).  
  Interpretivism recognises that there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between 
natural sciences on the one hand, and social sciences on the other, a distinction based on the 
fact that humans act on the basis of meanings they attribute to their acts and the acts of others.  
An interpretivist position focuses on the understanding of human and organisational actions in 
order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects (Weber, 1946). It acknowledges 
that it is not possible to separate people from the social contexts in which they exist and that 
their perceptions of their own actions are key to understanding and explaining people 
themselves. This approach has influenced the nature of my proposed research study, which 
seeks to identify and understand what IoTs perceive as being facilitatory and inhibitory factors 




  From an ontological perspective, I have adopted a constructivist stance. 
Constructivism focuses on socially and historically negotiated subjective experiences of 
individuals, with research in this area often addressing the process of interaction amongst 
individuals or organisations, the historical and cultural settings of the participants and the 
contexts or environments within which they operate (Creswell, 2014, p.8). Constructivist ideas 
have been heavily influenced by academics such as Mannheim et al (1967), Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) and Crotty (1998). My research considers that social entities, organisations and cultures 
are not objective entities, but rather are constructed from the perceptions and actions of social 
actors. It focuses on the subjective experiences of the organisations, the people who work 
within them and the subjective meanings of their actions. My research focuses on the 
generation or induction of a theory, rather than starting with a theory or proposition. 
Researchers that ascribe to constructivist ontology recognise that their own backgrounds and 
experiences shape their interpretation of data, and acknowledge this in their research. They 
attempt to interpret or make sense of the meanings others have about the world.  
  Such a stance is most often associated with qualitative research, which is the approach 
I have adopted for this research, as it is the approach most consistent with my philosophical 
position and is best aligned to the research questions. Crotty (1998) identified a number of 
assumptions which apply to constructivist research. He stated that that qualitative researchers 
seek to understand context or setting of the research through visiting this context and gathering 
information personally; they tend to use open ended questions so that participants have the 
opportunity to share their views; they interpret what they find, shaped by their own experiences 
and background; and they generate meaning in an inductive fashion from the data collected in 
the field from interaction with a human community. All of the above assumptions are 
applicable to my research and have shaped proposed my research approach and strategy as 
outlined below. Creswell (1994) also identified the main assumptions of the interpretivist 
paradigm, and these are summarised and adapted to my research in the Table 10 below.
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Table 10: Influence of Philosophical Assumptions on Research Design (Adapted from Creswell, 1994) 
Philosophical 
Assumption 
Interpretivism Impact on my Proposed Research Design 
Ontological Assumption  
(the nature of reality) 
Social Constructivism - reality is subjective and multiple 
as seen by participants 
Qualitative approach to research adopted, focusing on understanding 
and explaining a phenomena within a particular context 
Epistemological Assumption 
(what constitutes valid 
knowledge) 
Researcher interacts with that being researched Conduct interviews and site visits to ensure necessary degree of 
interaction 
Axiological Assumption 
(the role of values) 
Researcher acknowledges that research is value laden and 
biases are present 
Research beliefs and biases will be specifically acknowledged and an 
appropriate degree of reflexivity shown in my research 
Rhetorical Assumption 
(the language of research) 
Researcher writes in an informal style and uses the 
personal voice, accepted qualitative terms and limited 
definitions 
Personal voice and accepted qualitative terms will be used 
Methodological Assumption 
(the process of research) 
Inductive process  
Study of mutual simultaneous shaping factors with an 
emerging design (categories or themes identified during 
the process) 
Research is context bound 
Patterns/theories developed for understanding 
Findings are accurate and reliable through verification 
Inductive approach to theory generation adopted 
Themes identified during data analysis process 
Theory aims to explain the phenomena 
Case study approach selected – bounds the context 




4.3 Research Approach & Strategy – Case Study Approach 
  As my research is investigating mergers as a contemporary, ongoing and dynamic 
phenomenon in the Irish HE sector; that the contextual conditions are highly relevant to 
understanding what is actually happening; and that as a researcher I have little control over 
behavioural events, I considered a case study approach to be the most appropriate 
methodology to employ for my research. 
  Case study research has become increasingly recognised as a valuable research 
method in recent decades (Yin, 2014). According to Yin (2014) a case study approach to 
research is the preferred method, compared to others, when the main research questions are 
how or why questions; the researcher has little control over behavioural events; and the 
focus of the research is an in-depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the contextual conditions are highly pertinent to the 
phenomenon of study.  Creswell (2014) opines that a case study is a methodology in which 
the researcher explores a real life, contemporary bounded system (the case) or multiple 
bounded systems (the cases) over time, through detailed, in depth data collection involving 
a variety of sources of information such as observations, documents and reports, 
interviews, etc. The researcher then reports a case description on each of the cases selected 
and identifies case themes from the data collected to answer the research question.  
  Yin (2014) states that case studies may be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. 
He also states that there are four applications of the case study; to explain, to describe, to 
illustrate and to enlighten – the most important is to explain the presumed causal links in 
real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies (Yin 
2014). My research will focus on both describing and explaining a contemporary 
phenomenon and so can be classified as a descriptive and/or explanatory case study. When 
designing case study research, Yin (2014) sets out a four stage process to be followed by 
the researcher. This is the approach to case study design which I will adopt for this 
research.  Firstly, Yin (2014) states you must identify the case(s) or unit(s) of analysis to be 
studied, as well as set some limits or bounds to the case. At an early stage, I identified that 
the cases to be studied would be the three Alliances of IoTs preparing to merge with the 
intent of achieving TU status. Secondly, Yin (2014) recommends the development of a 
theoretical framework at an early stage to guide the research. Through my literature 
review, I identified a theoretical framework (discussed in Chapter 3), to guide the 




advocates the adoption of a planned case study design. I will present and explain my 
planned design below. Finally, Yin (2014) recommends testing the proposed design against 
the four key criteria for maintaining the quality of a case study. Again, I address this issue 
below.  
 
4.4 Research Cases, Setting and Sample 
  Case study research may focus on a single case (a within-site study) or multiple 
cases (a multi-site or collective study). In a multi-site or collective study, the researcher 
selects one issue or concern and selects multiple case studies to illustrate the issue 
(Creswell, 2014). Yin (2014, p.26) argues that most multiple case study designs are likely 
to be stronger than single case study designs. He argues that multiple case studies should 
employ the logic of replication, rather than sampling logic. Replication logic occurs where 
each case selected either predicts similar results or predicts contrasting results for 
anticipatable reasons. The researcher replicates the procedures for each case, makes 
comparisons and draws distinctions between the various cases (Yin, 2014, p.57).  
  My research will be a collective or multiple case study, consisting of three cases;  
three Alliances of IoTs which are undergoing the merger process. These cases were chosen 
to allow me gather different perspectives on the issue in question and demonstrate and 
explain differences across cases. I will employ literal replication logic, where the cases 
selected, although at varying stages of the merger process, should elicit reasonably similar 
results, with one exception, where I would anticipate contrasting results. The three cases I 
have selected as the subject matter of this research are identified in the table below. 
 
Table 11: Cases Selected for Study 
Case Composition Merger Progress to Date 
Alliance A Two existing IoTs Successfully undergone stages one, two and 
three of the process but have not yet merged 
or completed stage four of the re-designation 
process. 
Alliance B Two existing IoTs Successfully completed stage one of the 
process but failed to submit a stage two 
application. One of the partners unilaterally 




from the process. The partners have since 
undergone a facilitation process to attempt to 
get the process back on track. 
Alliance C Three existing IoTs 
 
Successfully undergone stages one, two and 
three of the process but have yet to merge or 
complete stage four of the re-designation 
process.  
 
  I chose these three cases for a number of reasons. Firstly, because at the date of 
commencement of this research project, they represented the totality of merger activity in 
the sector and allowed an accurate picture of activity in the sector to emerge; secondly, 
because each case varies significantly in terms of progress made to date vis-à-vis all the 
four step merger and re-designation process, as prescribed by National Strategy for Higher 
Education to 2030, it will allow me compare and contrast the data gathered from the cases 
to explain those variations; and thirdly, because I work in one of the IoTs which is 
proposing to merge, the examination of the other two cases allows me provide a more 
objective assessment of the factors which are impacting either positively or negatively 
upon the process.  
 
4.5 Methods of Data Collection 
4.5.1 Introduction 
  Case studies generally involve the collection of data from multiple sources in 
order to develop in depth understanding (Creswell, 2012). Yin (2014) claims that as case 
studies typically rely on multiple sources of evidence, a variety of distinct methods of data 
collection are required when conducting case study research. Creswell (2012) notes that 
case study research is typically extensive, drawing on multiple sources of information, 
such as observations, interviews, documents and audio-visual materials. For this reason, I 
plan on utilising a number of data collection methods. The primary methods of data 
collection which will be pursued in this research are in-depth, semi structured interviews 
along with external and internal document analysis. The table below outlines the methods 










Table 12: Schedule of Data Collection Methods 
Method Indicative Data Case 
A 







Programme for Government 2011-2016 
National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 
Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape, 
2012 
Completing the Landscape Process for Irish 
Higher Education 2013 
Report to the Minister for Education and Skills on 
System Reconfiguration, Inter-Institutional 
Collaboration and System Governance in Irish 
Higher Education, 2013 
General Scheme of Technological Universities 
Bill, 2014 




Stage 1 ‘Expression of Interest’ Submission 
Documents  
Stage 2 ‘Business Plan’ Submission 
Documentation 
Minutes of meetings, reports, charts, 
presentations, e-mail and other correspondence 





Online Discussion Fora/Blogs 
Radio Interviews 
Websites of participating Institutions 
X X X 
Interviews In-Depth, ‘Elite’ Semi-Structured interviews 
focusing on key members of the Alliances  





4.5.2 Internal and External Document Analysis 
  Documentary analysis has the advantage of being generally an easy to access, 
unobtrusive method of data collection (Saunders et al, 2009), where the research subjects 
are not directly involved and issues such as possible altered behaviour of research subjects 
are eliminated. As identified above, a wide variety of external documentation is available 
and will be used in this research. Documentation produced by the Government, 
Government Departments, and the Irish HEA will be analysed.  This documentation will 
provide background and context to the cases and explain the environment within which the 
research is taking place. As noted earlier, this is particularly important in research which 
adopts a constructivist stance, and is critical to case study research where context is 
essential. Internal documentation produced by the Alliances in the form of formal 
submission documents, charts, presentations, minutes of meetings and correspondence on 
the proposed mergers and re-designation process will also be gathered. This documentation 
will assist me in understanding and explaining how the merger process is being managed 
by the Alliances. 
4.5.3 Audio & Visual Materials 
  I gathered and analysed newspaper reports and online blogs/discussion fora on the 
merger and re-designation process and proposals, which contained a large amount of data 
and opinion on the subject matter of my research. Some of the blogs and discussion fora 
were particularly useful, as they allowed participants and stakeholders in the process freely 
express their views in an anonymous manner, without fear of ramification or identification. 
In addition, radio interviews on the merger and re-designation process were also analysed. 
This material was be used to provide background and context to the cases. 
4.5.4 In-Depth, ‘Elite’ Semi-Structured Interviews 
  Yin (2012) opines that interviews are a particularly valuable source of evidence 
for case studies, as they can offer richer and more extensive material than data gathered 
from surveys. A key part of my data collection involved a number of ‘elite’ semi-structured 
interviews with key members of the three Alliances. The purpose of these interviews was 
to use conversation, discussion and questioning to provide insight into both the merger 
process itself and their involvement in that process, and to draw information from the 
participants on the key areas emerging from the theoretical framework identified in the 
literature review. Interviews were carefully planned and executed in order to provide bias-




  Semi-structured or open ended interviews can provide illustration of the 
participant’s true feelings on an issue (Chisnall, 1992). They are also particularly suited to 
the nature of this research project, and align closely to my philosophical research position. 
Semi-structured interviews have a fluid and flexible structure, are usually organised around 
an aide memoire or interview guide. This contains topics, themes, or areas to be covered 
during the course of the interview, rather than a sequenced script of standardised questions 
(Lewis-Beck et al, 2004). In preparation for the interviews, I prepared an interview guide, 
loosely structured around the conceptual framework identified in the literature review, but 
flexible enough to allow the interviewees to guide the direction of the interview. Too strict 
an adherence to an interview guide may have the effect of stifling the emergence of new 
data and theory. 
  Once the interview guide prepared, I pre-tested it with two participants to ensure 
that the participants and I share the same understanding of the questions posed and to 
ensure fluidity (Yates, 2004). Following this ‘pilot’, some questions were amended and 
some new questions added to the interview schedule. 
  The issue of who to include in the sample of interviewees is a critical decision. 
Yin (2012, p.12) notes that insights gain further value “if the participants are key persons 
in the organisations, communities or small groups being studied, not just the average 
member of such group”. These ‘key persons’ or ‘opinion formers’ can offer extremely 
valuable insights to a researcher, beyond what others in the organisation can provide. This 
is particularly the case when looking at organisational behaviour, motivation and response 
to external pressures.  
  Therefore, interviewees who were heavily involved in the merger process in each 
of the Alliances were chosen. In order to gain differing perspectives from the different 
actors in the process, I ensured that a mixture of Presidents, Project 
Steering/Implementation Group Chairs, Senior Executives, Internal and External Change 
Agents and Project Managers were interviewed. The interviewees were selected on the 
basis of their senior and influential role in the planning/leading/managing of the merger 
process. It is assumed that they had the requisite level of knowledge and opinion to inform 
the findings of my study. The interviewees were drawn from each the IoTs which 
constitute the Alliances to ensure representation from each of the individual IoT.  In 
addition, to gain a system level perspective on the merger process, I interviewed two 






Table 13: Selection of Interviewees 
Case Organisation Interviewees 
Alliance A IoT1 2 Senior Members of Project Steering Group  
 IoT2 2 Senior Members of Project Steering Group  
 Independent 1 External Change Agent/Chair 
Alliance B IoT1 3 Senior Members of Project Steering Group  
 IoT2 3 Senior Members of Project Steering Group  
 Independent 1 External Change Agent/Chair 
Alliance C IoT1 1 Senior Member of Project Steering Group  
 IoT2 1 Senior Member of Project Steering Group  
 IoT3 1 Senior Member of Project Steering Group  
 Independent 1 External Change Agent/Chair 
All Cases Higher 
Education 
Authority 
2 Members of the Higher Education Authority – 1 
from the Executive, 1 from the Board. 
 
  The interviews were conducted over a three month period, from November 2015 
to January 2016. Due to the sensitivity and the ongoing nature of the subject matter of my 
research, it was essential to assure the interviewees from the outset of the voluntary, 
confidential and anonymous nature of the interviews. All interviewees were assured that 
they would not be named or in any other way identifiable or associated with any institution 
in my research. Additionally, because of my role in one of the IoTs involved in the merger 
process, it was essential to establish trust of the interviewees so that they could offer free 
opinions in spite of the author being an ‘insider researcher’ for one of the cases. 
Interviewees were all contacted in writing in advance of the interview and asked for their 
consent to engage in the interview and record the data. The interview guide in Appendix 1 
was used during the interviews and was also emailed to participants in advance of the 
interview so they could prepare answers if they wished, or veto any questions they did not 
wish to answer.  
  Interviews took place on site and each interview lasted for approximately 60 to 90 
minutes in duration. Interviews were digitally recorded and then transcribed as promptly as 




the interview to record data on the interviewee’s expressions, emotions, body language, 
etc. Although I had anticipated that some interviewees may prefer not to have the interview 
recorded, this issue did not arise. Interviewees were assured that the full verbatim 
transcripts would not be published in my thesis. However, they were asked to confirm if 
they consent to anonymised verbatim extracts being quoted by me in the findings.  
  Because the interviewees are members of their organisations executive team, and 
all hold more senior positions than I, there was no potential for coercion (Mercer, 2007).  
However, as I was interviewing more senior staff, a power imbalance naturally arose, and 
it is possible that some responses to my questions may be biased because, perhaps, senior 
management want to portray a more positive view of the process than may be the case. In 
order to minimise the potential effect of this, I will consider validity testing of responses 
throughout the research process and when analysing results.  
4.6 Data Analysis 
  Creswell (2012, p.100) opines that when analysing data collected during case 
study research, it is possible to engage in a holistic analysis of the entire case, and/or an 
embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case. I chose to conduct a holistic analysis of 
the data, focusing on the entire case as the unit of analysis. Given that research conducted 
in this area to date is of a holistic nature, and that many of the issues likely to arise are 
interlinked, I chose this as the most appropriate method to adopt.  
  Stake (1995) recommends that when analysing case study data, the researcher 
should firstly to provide a detailed description of the case such as the history, chronology 
of events and activities, etc., and secondly focus on the key themes or issues which arise 
from the case. Creswell (2012, p.101) provides that a typical format in multi-case research 
is for the researcher to provide a detailed description of each case and themes within the 
case (known as a within case analysis) and then to provide a thematic analysis across the 
cases (a cross case analysis). This is the manner in which I will present the findings from 
this research.  
  For each case selected, I will provide a within case description (see Appendix 2 -
Within Case Description Outline) and analysis of key or unique themes. This will be 
followed by a cross case analysis of the data, along with an interpretation of the cases 
and/or assertions in respect of my findings. The process will be inductive, rather than 




  As stated above, I will analyse the data gathered on both on a within and cross 
case basis. Given my philosophical position and assumptions outlined above, I 
acknowledge that the interpretation of my data naturally involves the exercise of a degree 
of judgement on my part in relation to the themes and issues under review.  The theoretical 
framework identified in the literature review was used as an initial guide around which 
themes will be developed. However, it should not and did not serve to limit the generation 
of additional themes which emerge from the data. 
  It is critical that qualitative research is systematic in its approach to data 
collection and analysis. The semi-structured, open ended interviews conducted allowed 
participants to freely articulate their perceptions and experiences. In analysing the data 
from the 18 interviewees, responses were grouped thematically and categories of meaning 
and relationships between categories were derived from the data itself through a process of 
inductive reasoning, known as coding. This was done with reference to the conceptual 
frameworks identified by the literature and the research questions posed in the study. 
Responses were not grouped according to pre-defined categories or questions. This 
thematic analysis approach offers the means whereby by the researcher can analyse 
articulated perspectives of interviewees so that they may be integrated in a model that 
seeks to explain the social processes under study.  
  Braun and Clarke (2006, p.79) define thematic analysis as “a qualitative analytic 
method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.” Thematic 
analysis, they state, aids the interpretation of various aspects of the research topic. In the 
context of this research, I adopted the six step approach to thematic analysis advocated by 
Braun and Clarke (2006). This involved searching for themes or patterns across a data set 
(i.e. documents, reports and interview), rather than within a data item, (e.g. an individual 
document).  According to Braun and Clarke (2006, p.79) a “theme captures something 
important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of 
patterned response or meaning within the data set”. The six steps are outlined in the 












In order to assist with this process, ‘NVivo 11’ qualitative data analysis software 
was used. This software was used as to organise and manage the large volume of data 
which was acquired over the course of the study. NVivo was used as a tool of efficiency, 
and is not a tool which in and of itself conducts analysis and draws conclusions. As 
Fielding and Lee (1998, p.167) explain, qualitative researchers “want tools which support 
analysis, but leave the analyst firmly in charge”. Another key advantage of NVivo 
software is that it serves as a tool of transparency and provides an audit trail to 
demonstrate the steps taken during the data analysis stage, and to provide confidence in 
relation to validity and reliability of the research in question. By logging data movements 
and coding patterns, and the mapping of conceptual categories and thought progression, 
all stages of the analytical process become traceable and transparent, facilitating the 
researcher in producing a more detailed and comprehensive audit trail than manual 
mapping of this complicated process can allow, particularly when dealing with a large 
data set. The cycles of analysis used in my study are presented below. While they are 
presented as discrete phases, the practical application was more iterative in nature than 
this suggests.  
Phase 1: This involved transcribing all 18 interviews, reading and re-reading the 
interview data, and noting down initial ideas, concepts and frameworks to familiarise 





myself thoroughly with the data. This took place simultaneously with the data collection 
phase from November to February to 2016. Please refer to Appendix 3 for evidence of 
initial ideas and concepts generated at this stage of the data analysis. Once this was 
completed, the interview transcripts and related filed notes and observations were 
uploaded into NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 11, 2015). 
Phase 2: This phase involved open coding to generate initial codes in the data in 
an inductive manner. This involved broad participant driven open coding of the interview 
transcripts supported with definitions so as to deconstruct the data from its original 
chronology into initial non-hierarchical codes. This phase of data analysis took place in 
March 2016, and resulted in the generation of 53 initial codes (See Appendix 4). These 
53 codes were allocated clear titles and definitions to serve as rules for inclusion (Maykut 
& Morehouse, 1994).  
Phase 3: This phase involved re-ordering and categorising the initial codes by 
grouping related codes and reconstructing the data by organising the open codes into a 
framework that made sense to further the analysis for this particular study. This phase 
also included distilling, re-labelling and merging similar codes generated in phase 1 to 
ensure that titles and rules for inclusion accurately reflected coded content. This resulted 
in the initial 53 codes being categorised into 5 key overarching themes, linked to and 
inspired by theories derived from the literature review and from the initial phase 1 coding 
(See Appendix 5). This phase took place in April 2016. 
Phase 4: This phase involved ‘coding on’ – that is breaking down the now 
restructured categories into sub-categories to offer more in depth understanding of the 
highly qualitative aspects under scrutiny. This allowed for the emergence of divergent 
views, negative cases, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours coded to these categories and 
provided clearer insights into the meanings embedded therein. This phase took place in 
May and June 2016. (See Appendix 6 for examples of coding on in the project). 
Phase 5: This phase involved data reduction - consolidating codes from all four 
phases to date into more abstract, philosophical and literature based themes to create a 
final framework of themes and explore their inter-relatedness for reporting purposes. The 
initial framework of 5 key overarching themes identified in Phase 2 was further explored 
and tested, and selected as the most appropriate framework around which the complex 
range of themes identified would be structured and presented. This phase took place in 




Phase 6 – the final phase involved writing analytical memos against the higher 
level themes to accurately summarise the content of each category, propose empirical 
findings against such categories and synthesise these into individual case study reports 
and finally, a cross case report. This phase took place from June 2016 to September 2016 
and forms the basis for my findings in Chapters 5 and 6. 
  Figure 9 below, adapted from Yin’s multiple case study procedure (2014) 
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Figure 9: Planned Case Study Protocol (Adapted from Yin, 2014) 
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4.7 Role of Researcher & Reflexivity 
  I currently hold a management post in one of the IoTs which forms part of one the 
Alliances under investigation. In my role, I regularly attend management meetings and 
briefings on the merger process within my own institution and I was a member of the 
group which prepared the stage one submission for our Alliance. As a result I have first-
hand experience of the people, process and dynamics involved in that particular case and 
so will necessarily bring that knowledge, along with my own assumptions and beliefs to 
the research. 
  As I am effectively an ‘insider researcher’ (Costley et al, 2010) in respect of one 
particular case, I must consider the complexities which may arise as a result of my dual 
role of manager and researcher. Being an ‘insider researcher’ often brings with it an 
enhanced sense of trust and responsibility which I must recognise. Raelin (2008) 
recommends that the ‘insider’ should develop a sense of self reflection and gain a 
realisation that the project being undertaken is likely to have worth to the organisation 
and/or the professional field of the researcher.  Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence 
proposing that work based research projects may prove beneficial to the long term success 
of organisations (Raelin, 2008). The research which I am conducting will be of benefit to 
my own organisation and others in the sector who plan on merging in the future. I am 
cognisant of the fact that I have a responsibility to ensure that my research can contribute 
in a meaningful way to the success of future merger efforts in the sector.  
  Because of my dual role as researcher and manager, some of the interviewees 
may have been wary of fully disclosing their real opinions about the merger process to me. 
Therefore it was particularly important for me to establish the trust of the interviewees so 
that they could offer free and honest opinions in spite of me being an ‘insider researcher’.  
   Power relationships are also an important consideration for me in this context. 
Given that all of the interviewees will hold more senior positions than I, there is no real 
potential for coercion on my part (Mercer, 2007).  
 
4.8 Validity and Reliability  
  Although case study research is now a well-recognised form of empirical enquiry 
in social science, education and business research, some researchers traditionally viewed 
case studies as lacking rigour and objectivity (Rowley, 2002, p.16). Therefore, it is 




case study and to test the proposed design in relation to the ‘quality’ hallmarks commonly 
used in social science research – construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. Threats to validity can occur during data collection, data analysis and data 
interpretation stages of the research project and the researcher must be careful to identify 
these threats and plan to overcome them to ensure trustworthiness, credibility, 
conformability and data dependability.  
  The first of these ‘quality’ hallmarks involves construct validity, which involves 
identifying correct operational measures for the concept being studied to ensure that the 
study measures what it is supposed to measure and that there is sufficient objectivity in the 
study (Yin, 2014). This can be particularly challenging in case study research and Yin 
(2014) suggests that three tactics can be employed to increase construct validity when 
doing case studies. Firstly, the researcher should use multiple sources of evidence during 
the data collection phase to encourage convergent lines of enquiry. Secondly, the 
researcher should establish a chain of evidence during the data collection phase. Thirdly, 
the draft case study report should be reviewed by key informants.  Additionally, to further 
ensure construct validity, the constructs for the case study should be developed through a 
literature review. I have employed all of these tactics during my study to ensure construct 
validity.  
  The second test of quality concerns internal validity, which is mainly a concern 
for explanatory case studies, where the researcher is attempting to attribute causation 
between two factors, i.e., event x led to y.  My research is not primarily concerned with the 
causal relationships of independent and dependent variables but rather is focused on 
‘generative mechanisms’ (Guba & Lincoln 1995), i.e. establishing a phenomenon in a 
credible manner. In case study research, internal validity and credibility can be established 
by the use of case analysis, cross case analysis, pattern matching, assurance of internal 
coherence of findings, expert peer review, and the development of diagrams, illustration 
and data matrices to demonstrate the internal consistency of the information collected. I 
have used case and cross case analysis, expert peer review and the development of 
diagrams, illustrations and data matrices to ensure the internal validity of the data 
collected.  
  The third test concerns external validity and the extent to which a study’s findings 
are generalisable beyond the scope of that particular study. Generalisability has been 
defined as “the extent to which you can come to conclusions about one thing based on 




research is that is not generalisable across a population. However, when choosing a 
research design, it is always necessary to acknowledge and accept that whatever design 
you choose will necessarily have a limitation and the researcher should be mindful of the 
conflicting desiderata of generalisability, precision and realism when adopting a particular 
research strategy. By choosing to undertake case study research, I acknowledge that while 
my design has the advantage of offering precision in control and measurement of 
behaviours of interests and realism of the context in which behaviours are observed, it is 
not widely generalisable outside of its context. Indeed, the crucial question, according to 
Bryman and Bell (2003, p.56) is not ‘whether the findings can be generalised to a wider 
universe, but how well the researcher generates theory out of the findings’. Therefore my 
focus in this study will be on generating theory from my findings on the cases which will 
generate local knowledge related to the particular context within which the cases are 
bound, rather than attempting to generalise those findings. Yin (2014) proposes a number 
of tactics to enhance external validity in case study research and in particular, recommends 
that replication logic be used in multiple case studies. I have incorporated this 
recommendation into my research design.  
  The final quality hallmark is reliability, which is primarily concerned with 
minimising errors and biases in a study. It aims to ensure that if a later researcher follows 
the same procedures and conducts the case study all over again, the same findings and 
conclusions would be reached.  At first glance, this does not appear to sit easily with the 
social constructivist position I have adopted in my research, which acknowledges that my 
role in one of the organisations being studied may influence the outcomes, findings and 
conclusions which I might draw from the study. However, in a constructivist study such as 
this, reliability is achieved primarily through the verification of data collected. 
Consequently it is essential that I keep accurate records of the data I collect and that my 
data is collected, analysed and stored systematically. To this end, during my research, I 
developed and maintained a database for each case, and followed systematic data 
collection and analysis protocols as outlined above. Yin (2014, p. 25) suggests that using a 
case study protocol also ensures reliability, and I have developed and described this 
protocol above.  The table below indicates the quality hallmarks I have built into my 






Table 14: Tactics Employed to ensure Validity & Reliability - Adapted from Yin, 
2014 
Test Tactic Employed Phase of Research 
  Construct Validity 
 
  Develop constructs for case 
  study through literature review 
  Use multiple sources of evidence 





           
  Internal Validity 
 
  Case and cross case analysis 
  Expert peer review   
  Diagrams, illustrations and data     
  matrices 
  Data Analysis 
  Writing Up 
  Writing Up 
External Validity   Use replication logic in multiple            
  case studies 
  Research Design 
 
  Reliability 
  Develop case study database 
  Use case study protocol 
  Data Collection 
  Data Collection 
 
 
4.9 Ethical Considerations & Access to Data 
  Ethical issues may arise at all stages of the research process, and these must be 
anticipated by the researcher (Berg, 2001; Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011; Punch, 2005; 
Sieber, 1998). Various codes of ethics for research have been developed over the years to 
guide and ensure ethical research practice. My research follows the ‘Framework for 
Research Ethics’ (2012) introduced by the Economics and Social Research Council 
(hereinafter referred to as the ESRC). This code establishes six key principles of research 
ethics which guide my research. These principles have been set out below, along with the 
steps I took to ensure all ethical issues are addressed in my research. In addition, before the 
planned research commenced, ethical approval was sought and secured from the University 
of Bath in line with its approved research ethics policies and procedure.  
  The first principle in the ESRC code provides that research should be designed, 
reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity, quality and transparency. These principles 
underpin my research project from inception to conclusion. While conducting my research, 
I acted with integrity and honesty at all times. I have given credit to the work of others and 




that I reported multiple perspectives and contrary findings. I have also assigned credit to 
other academics whose work I cited and referenced during my study.    
  The ESRC code requires that staff and participants must take part voluntarily, free 
from any coercion and should normally be informed fully about the purpose, methods and 
intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research entails and 
what risks, if any, are involved. Before conducting my research, I ensured that I had gone 
through local approvals, as required, in the different institutions which form part of my 
research. Once possible interviewees were identified, all were contacted and informed in 
writing about the general nature and purpose of the study, the methods I intended to use, 
any risks involved and intended possible uses of my research. This was done in accordance 
with the substantive provisions of the Data Protection Acts 1998-2003. Following the 
provision of the above information, I asked all participants if they consented voluntarily to 
participate in the study and asked them to sign a consent form to that effect. As I noted 
earlier, there is no possibility for coercion in my own institution as the participants will all 
hold more senior posts than I. In the other institutions, I ensured that the participants were 
acting freely. The issue of capacity to consent does not arise in my research proposal.  
  Confidentiality of data supplied by research participants must be maintained and 
anonymity of respondents must be protected. Participants were be assured of anonymity 
and confidentiality and data collected from participants was and is stored in a safe and 
secure manner (double password protected) to ensure confidentiality. To protect 
anonymity, individual alliances, institutions and participants are anonymised in my thesis. 
Although I have anonymised the three Alliances, it may be possible for an informed reader 
to identify them from certain features of the case. However, I have at all times ensured that 
individual anonymity within those alliances is ensured and protected, and that no 
interviewee will be identifiable either individually or in association with any particular 
institution. Once my research is completed and the data is no longer required for the 
purposes of any associated examination, the data will be destroyed, again in accordance 
with the Data Protection Acts 1998-2003. 
  The final principles of the ESRC require that harm to research participants must 
be avoided in all instances and that the independence of research must be made clear and 
any conflicts of interest or partiality must be explicit. I have ensured that my research has 
made clear the independent nature of the study and specifically acknowledged any possible 





4.10 Methodological Assumptions 
  I have made a number of methodological assumptions. Firstly, I assume that cases 
selected are appropriate relative to the research questions. Secondly, I assume that 
documentary and other evidence which was gathered is accurate. Thirdly, I assume that the 
open-ended questions used in the semi-structured interviews are appropriate relative to the 
research questions. Fourthly, I assume that the interviewees have answered the questions 
honestly. Finally, as the merger process is ongoing and not yet complete I am making 
assumptions about the link between the perceived facilitatory and inhibitory factors and the 
likely success of or outcome for the Alliance, particularly in research question 5.  
 
4.11 Methodological Limitations 
  There are a number of limitations to my research design.  Firstly, my use of a case 
study approach may raise issues in relation to external validity and means that caution 
should be exercised when generalising based on the results outside of the particular context 
of the study (Bryman and Bell 2003).  Secondly, due to the fact that I have selected three 
cases, the depth of overall analysis possible in any one case was necessarily diluted. The 
selection of one case would have allowed greater depth, but would have limited my ability 
to compare and contrast findings across the cases and indeed the sector. Thirdly, due to the 
relatively short time period within which the research was conducted and the fact that the 
research was be carried out by me individually, it was not possible to conduct a large 
number of interviews. Consequently the data gathered from the interviews I conducted 
with management in the various Alliances may not be representative of all members of the 
organisations under investigation. If time and resources allowed, a larger number of 
interviews would be conducted which would perhaps be more representative of the 
organisations. A fourth limitation is the fact that as the merger and re-designation process 
is on-going, it is a sensitive subject and participants may not speak as freely as they would 
if the process was completed. In addition, flux and change in the sector is occurring as the 
research is being conducted, which might mean that emerging factors impacting upon the 
process have not been captured in the interview data. Additionally, it is not possible to 
assert that the factors perceived by management in the Alliances are definitively 
facilitatory or inhibitory, as no Alliance has reached a final outcome. In regard to one of 
the Alliances, there has been also a high degree of friction between the partners regarding 




interviewees than would otherwise be the case. A final limitation is that as I hold a 
management post in one of the IoTs which forms part of one the Alliances under 
investigation, I am effectively an ‘insider researcher’ (Costley et al, 2010) in respect of that 
particular case. As a result, the interviewees may have been wary of fully disclosing their 
real opinions about the merger process.  
 
4.12 Summary 
  This Chapter has presented the research approach and design that I have adopted 
when gathering and analysing my data, and has reflected upon the strengths and limitations 
of my design, along with ethical considerations and methodological assumptions and 
limitations. I will further reflect upon and evaluate my experience in implementing my 
chosen research design in Chapter 7 – Conclusions & Recommendations. The next two 
chapters present the findings of my study, offering firstly a within case analysis providing a 
detailed description of each case and key themes within that case and secondly, providing a 





















5. WITHIN CASE FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a detailed within-case analysis of each of the three Alliances 
which form part of my research. The background and context for each merger is discussed, 
along with details of the progress of the Alliance to date. Findings from the data which 
identify the particular facilitatory and inhibitory factors which each Alliance has faced/is 
facing during the merger process are identified and discussed, along with a conclusion on 
and recommendations for each individual Alliance. 
5.2 Alliance A 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This case study examines the efforts of two regional Irish IoTs to merge and be re-
designated as a TU under the process set out by the Irish HEA. The Alliance has been slow 
to make progress, and almost six years since discussions began, have yet to establish a firm 
date for merger. This study investigates the factors which are perceived to be impacting 
upon the merger process in this context, and identifies the key inhibitors which have 
caused many of the difficulties faced by the partners.  
5.2.2 Background & Context 
Discussions regarding a potential merger and eventual creation of a TU had their 
origins in this case as early as 2009, when a tentative Alliance, consisting of three existing 
IoTs, was formed. After some preliminary discussions, a formal alliance was created and 
the parties began the process outlined by the HEA. However, one of the purported partners 
decided to withdraw from the Alliance in December 2012, leaving the other two partners 
to continue on with the process. The two current partners are briefly described below. 
IoT 1 was founded in the early 1970’s, and is currently one of Ireland’s largest 
IoTs, with a student and staff community of community of 15,000 approx. It is based in a 
large city, where another traditional university is situated. It offers a full range of 
programmes from level six to ten of the NFQ, across a wide range of discipline areas, 
along with a number of specialist colleges which are located in campuses around the 




configuration, had also been in talks with another large IoT about the possibility of merger 
and university designation. 
IoT 2 is located approximately 120kms away from IoT A, in a relatively small 
regional town. It is a much smaller institution, consisting of approximately 3000 students 
and staff. It is currently located over two campuses in the town. Established in the late 
1970’s, it now offers a broad range of programmes from level six to ten of the NFQ. In 
recent years it has come under considerable financial pressure and its long term viability, 
should it not merge, has been questioned. The table below presents the key points of note 
from Alliance A. 
 
Table 15: Alliance A - Key Points 
Alliance A – Key Points 
Number of Partner 
IoTs 
Two 
Relative Locations All located within a clearly defined province/region – however 
the main campuses approximately 120 kms apart, with a journey 




No real history of collaboration until late 2009. Alliance lost one 
prospective partner in 2012. 




Broadly similar programme profile, with both Institutes       
offering programmes from level six to ten (Doctoral level) of     
the NFQ. The larger IoT has a significantly stronger research 
profile. 
Ethos/Missions Broadly similar- both IoTs have strong ties to their local 
communities and regions, from which most of their students 
come.  
Projected combined 
student numbers (as 
per published HEA enrolment 
figures 2014/15) 
 






5.2.3 Progress to Date 
From 2009 to 2012, this Alliance consisted of three existing IoTs, located within a 
quite a wide geographical region, stretching to approximately 100 square kilometers and 
with a population of approximately 900,000 people. This period of time involved extensive 
discussions between members of the Alliance themselves, and between the Alliance and 
the HEA with a view to establishing the future higher education landscape. However, in 
December 2012, (six months after the initial HEA deadline for expressions of interest had 
expired and two months before this Alliance eventually submitted its expression of 
interest) one of the purported partners decided to withdraw from the Alliance, blaming a 
change in the landscape and the lack of policy or political support for the move, citing 
mixed messages since the publication of the Hunt Report. This withdrawal left the other 
two partners to continue on with the process, and certainly caused some uncertainty and 
disruption within the Alliance.  
However both remaining partners were clearly motivated by the opportunity for TU 
designation and the perceived benefits which the university brand brings, particularly the 
larger partner, which had been seeking university designation for some time. The smaller 
partner, which was facing financial challenges, was also clearly trying to ensure financial 
stability and future viability. In early 2013, a mere two months after the third partner 
withdrew, a submission from the Alliance containing an expression of interest as per Stage 
1 of the TU process was made to the HEA. This submission followed on from the original 
individual submissions of both IoTs in response to the HEA on Towards a Future Higher 
Education Landscape documents. In May 2013, the HEA published its Completing the 
Landscape Process for Irish Higher Education document in which it acknowledged receipt 
of the formal expression of interest from the Alliance and indicated that the proposal could 
proceed to stage two.   
The Alliance then began work on Stage two of the process – Preparation of a 
Business Plan. This involved the preparation of a detailed plan by the Alliance to address 
how it proposed to meet the criteria for a TU and the process requirements and timelines. 
Key project governance structures and project managers were put in place to assist with 
progressing the work associated with the merger, and the services of a number of external 
consultants and a project chair, to oversee the process, were secured. A very tight working 
group were tasked with putting together the proposal and the Alliance, at this stage, made a 
deliberate decision not to cascade work on the merger through the organisation until it got 




series of consultations were held with a number of external stakeholder groups including 
HEIs, enterprises, development authorities and public representatives as well as an 
ongoing constructive dialogue with the HEA and the Department. Before the submission 
of the Stage Two Business Plan, the Alliance engaged a peer review panel of international 
HE experts to review the draft submission in the context of the national and international 
HE landscape, and incorporated the feedback into its final submission. 
Once the Alliance submitted its Business Plan to the HEA, as per Stage Three of 
the designated process, the plan was subjected to scrutiny and review by an external 
international expert panel. This review took place in 2014. The Stage Three International 
Panel found that the Alliance was likely to meet the criteria for designation as a TU within 
the proposed timeframe, and that it had the capacity to achieve the objectives of 
consolidation, subject to a number of considerations. The panel commended the Alliance 
on the substantial work already done and the evident commitment of the partners. 
However, they noted that they were surprised not to be presented with a more nuanced 
discussion of the mission of the new institution as appropriate to meet expectations around 
TU designation and that attention needed to be given to articulating a more profound sense 
of the characteristics expected of a TU. They stated that the proposed timeframe appeared 
to be lengthy in comparison with other cases with which they were familiar. They 
recommended that the Alliance reflect on the proposed timescales, including the 
disadvantages of moving at such a slow pace. They also recommended that the Alliance 
reconsider its proposed organisational design for the new institution, being cognisant of the 
need to provide solutions to the geographical separation of the campuses, and that they 
continue to work to diversify and develop new income streams. The International Panel 
report recommended that the Alliance move to the next stage of the merger and TU 
designation process, and also made a number of recommendations for the Alliance.  
However, it appears that this Stage Three International Panel report caused real 
difficulties. Although the HEA executive commissioned the International Panel, it has 
been reported that the Board of the HEA were unhappy that the panel had recommended 
the Alliance for progression. The Minister for Education & Skills allegedly indicated to the 
Board of the HEA that they would have to accept the International Panel’s 
recommendation, which they did, although subsequently the HEA issued a strongly 
worded letter to the Alliance setting out the challenges ahead.  
Following on from this, the Alliance has, for a variety of reasons, which are 




the International Panel Report or by the HEA. While both partners still purport to be 
committed to the merger, the Alliance has yet to merge, and yet to set any clear date for 
merger. 
5.2.4 Key Factors Impacting upon the Merger & Re-designation Process 
The data gathered and analysed has highlighted that the following key issues and 
factors are perceived as impacting in particular on the progress of Alliance A through the 
merger and re-designation process. These are summarised in the table below and 
subsequently discussed in detail.  
 
Table 16: Key Factors Impacting upon Process - Alliance A 





Project Planning, Process & Stages 61 5 
Lack of Government, HEA & Department Support, 
Commitment, Understanding & Clarity   
52 5 
Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration 38 5 
Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging 
Institutions 
36 5 
Communicating with Staff & IR Issues 34 5 
Relationships between Key People 32 5 
Role of External Consultants & Facilitators 26 5 
Trust, Honesty & Understanding 24 4 
Resources 24 4 
Building & Maintaining Momentum & Stability 24 4 
   
 
5.2.4.1 Project Planning, Process & Stages 
As would be expected, the issue of project planning, merger processes and stages 
is one which has played a significant role in this Alliance. Interviewees stressed a number 




Firstly, they highlighted the criticality of getting the right project leaders in place, 
stressing that it is important that these people are chosen for the right reasons and that 
they are committed to championing the merger project. One interviewee commented:  
“It is very important for you to get, let's call them project leaders identified...it is 
important that those people are not the sort of spare bodies that happen to be 
hanging around…You actually need somebody who (a) has generated some 
degree of respect amongst his colleagues, senior and junior (b) They have got to 
understand something about higher education at least in the Irish context. It would 
help if they knew something about it in other contexts as well. (c) They have got 
to understand how organisations operate, both at a formal level and an informal 
level, and (d) they have actually got to want their merger to occur. And fulfilling 
all of those criteria is blooming difficult.” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3) 
 
Secondly, interviewees spoke of the difficulty of project planning in the absence 
of clear timelines, commenting “the difficulty is we don’t have a date for merger” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 2). The absence of long overdue enabling legislation has meant 
that the Alliance has found it very difficult to formulate and implement a project plan. 
This in turn has given rise to a number of difficulties, including frustration with the 
process and a loss of momentum, which will be discussed later.  
Thirdly, it is clear that the HEA criteria, process & stages for merger and re-
designation as a TU have played a critical role in the process. Interviewees in the 
Alliance spoke of their disagreement with the published criteria, commenting  
“we would disagree with a lot of the criteria. The staff quals [qualifications] for 
example. They drafted it and then found that actually a lot of the traditional 
universities didn’t meet the criteria, even in terms of percentage of postgrad 
students and so on. So I think there are a lot of difficulties there” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 2). 
Others expressed the view that the criteria  
“are not conducive to establishing the type of institutions that you would expect 
to be the lookout of the IoT sector, which should be very different to universities 
which are of the older variety. So these are not the traditional types of 




rather than universities gives the feeling that these are going to be allowed to be 
second-class institutions.” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3). 
This demonstrates the level of confusion and ambiguity felt by interviewees regarding the 
process.  
While Alliance A went reasonably smoothly through stages one and two of the 
process, it was stage three, the International Panel Review, which caused major 
difficulties and appears to have contributed to some of the industrial relations issues now 
being faced by the Alliance. Interviewees expressed concern that the review was 
“perfunctory” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2), and conducted “in too much haste” (Alliance 
A, Interviewee 1), without any site visits to the merging institutions. One commented:  
“Definitely I think the process is imperfect.  I would have thought site visits, 
meetings with the executive teams of both organisations, and demanding to meet 
them, and demanding to meet students and staff would have been appropriate” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
Interviewees questioned how well briefed the panel were by the HEA, particularly in 
relation to boundary and operating conditions in the Irish context, commenting  
“the degree to which they were given sufficient time to get into their brief 
probably prevented them from fully understanding the limitations under which we 
operate e.g. they challenged us about our statement that there would be no 
compulsory redundancies and no compulsory redeployment.  To their eyes, that 
was madness because it immediately undermined every gain you may get from 
the merger” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1). 
Another commented:  
“I think there was a real issue with the panel and their understanding of the Irish 
context and that was quite obvious” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2). 
That interviewee felt that at this stage the HEA were merely reacting, commenting  
“they had given a commitment to responding to the submission within 6 months, 
and I think they were surprised by how quickly the institutions got that together. 
They had to establish an international panel in quite short order and the review in 




interview. No visits to any of the institutions or anything like that” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 2). 
As discussed above, once the International Panel issued its report, there was some 
internal wrangling by the HEA, who then issued a covering letter with the report. The 
reaction from interviewees to the Stage Three process was clearly quite negative, and 
seems to have generated resentment on the part of some of the interviewees. In relation to 
the HEA covering letter, one interviewee stated that it   
“had a huge number of what seemed to be constraints and conditions and so on 
attached to it. So we felt there was quite a bit of a level of interference from the 
HEA in their own process and I’m not sure they have it well defined 
themselves…I think what the HEA need to be careful to be doing is not to be 
second guessing processes - you put an International Panel in - they make a 
recommendation - it then goes to the board of the HEA - to be honest with you, 
you either empower people to do a job and you take the recommendation or you 
don't” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2). 
Interviewees also discussed the fact that the Alliance did not invest significant 
resources into the merger project until Stage Three was completed. One commented  
“we were not going to do anything concrete until after we completed Stage Three. 
It was only then that the merger was authorised if you want. We took the view 
that if you did a lot of work before that, either putting in a structure or big 
interactions or whatever you might get people all worked up for nothing for 
something that didn’t ever happen. That was the rationale” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 2).  
However, this decision appears to have had implications for the Alliance, particularly in 
terms of communicating with and engaging staff, and there are now hugely significant 
industrial relations difficulties associated with this merger which have precluded any real 
progress over the past 12 months. 
It is clear, therefore, that there appears to be difficulty and uncertainty in relation 
to the merger and re-designation criteria and process which is having a considerable 
impact on the merger process. One interviewee, who has considerable experience of 




“there will be an unholy mess…If you want an example of how to develop a 
national process for doing mergers or for designating institutions, get as far away 
from Ireland as you possibly can. Because, quite frankly, it is absolute nonsense. 
We don't even know that is going to be the same panel, so we're not even sure it is 
going to be the same continuity. We know it is not going to be the same Board. 
We don't know if it is even going to be the same HEA executive, and there are so 
many unknowns in the next stage. We can only assume that is the stage that they 
will get it wrong” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3). 
 
5.3.4.2  Lack of Government, HEA & Department Support, Commitment, 
Understanding & Clarity   
A significant theme which emerges from the data collected centres around a 
perceived lack of Government, Department and HEA support, commitment, 
understanding and clarity around the process. The difficulties around process have been 
highlighted above, but a range of other system level issues have also arisen. These centre 
around three main areas. Firstly, the failure to enact the legislation necessary for merger; 
secondly, the perceived failure of HEA to provide funding or facilitation mechanisms for 
the Alliance; and thirdly, a perceived lack of alignment between HEA and Department 
and Government Objectives. 
Despite the fact that the merger and re-designation process was first outlined in 
the Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape document in 2012, and the Heads of 
the draft Technological Universities Bill published in 2014, the legislation required for 
IoTs to merge has yet to be enacted. This has played a critical part in delaying the merger 
process and causing unnecessary uncertainty for the merging institutions and their staff. 
Interviewees stated “the delay in legislation has been massive. It's a key enabler in 
facilitating the project in moving forward” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). Another likened 
it to “waiting on the platform but with no sign of the train” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1).  
This delay in enacting legislation has also led to increasing frustration and has 
made it extremely difficult to try to build and maintain momentum through the merger 
process. One interviewee commented “now I think the delay in the legislation again 
introduced a degree of doubt - was it ever going to happen?” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). 




dilemma – should it move on regardless or wait until there is clarity and certainty? One 
interviewee commented 
“I think…the challenge is do we still drive on with things and just view the 
legislation as an enabler, or do we actually say, until we are actually clear on the 
legislation - we won't be doing too much?” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). 
 
There has also been a perceived failure by the HEA to provide the necessary 
funding or facilitation mechanisms for the Alliance. Whether this is due to a lack of 
resources at their end, a failure to prioritise the merger project, or other reasons, is a 
matter for debate. Interviewees noted that “the HEA’s unwillingness to fund the project 
has been a huge limiting factor” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). Funding equated to support 
and confidence for that interviewee, who stated 
“funding equals support, funding equals them being willing to back a programme 
of change and a programme of activity. The fact is if they have visibly not been 
funding a programme of change [it] would lead the detractors to say if you are not 
getting funded why are you doing it?  If you are not getting funded obviously the 
HEA don’t want you to do it.  There is that argument and I would absolutely sign 
up to that argument” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
Another stated  
“comments for example from the HEA like ‘this process will have to be managed 
within existing resources - there is no money for this’ - this has not been helpful 
to us but there seems to have been change in that attitude - money was 
forthcoming last year” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5).  
 
Interviewees also criticised the HEA’s perceived disinterest in the process, 
accusing it of “paying lip service to the change agenda” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5) and 
failing to take a firmer line on how they wanted to structure the country in terms of HE 
provision. Interviewees felt that more could be done at system level by way of facilitation 
between the various Alliances that are ultimately working together towards merger and 




Finally, there is a perceived lack of alignment between the HEA and Department 
and Government objectives, and this is having a negative impact on the process.  One 
interviewee commented  
“there seems to be a discontinuation between the policymakers and those 
implementing the policy. The government appears to want one thing, and [the] 
HEA is not necessarily totally signed up to it” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3). 
This perceived disconnect between policy and strategy formulation and implementation 
is a point to which I will later return. 
 
5.2.4.3 Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration 
Within the Alliance, there are considerable feelings of uncertainty, fear, 
frustration and insecurity in relation to the merger process. Much of this uncertainty and 
fear appears to be due to a perceived lack of clarity around the process, and the absence 
of legislation. One interviewee commented  
“I think what has happened is that the uncertainty, particularly around the 
legislation has created these vacuums that have enabled that questioning - that 
instability - that sort of concern - those negative aspects of it actually fester” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 5).  
Another stated  
“I think people are afraid of what the future holds and afraid of what they don’t 
know. During the consultation we weren't able to give people definitive answers 
in terms of what's going to happen to my job and how is this going to work and 
how is that going to work? And that is what they wanted to know (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 4).”  
 
Uncertainty around the process itself is also causing difficulty, particularly the 
prospect of the parties merging, yet failing to successfully complete Stage Four and 
secure re-designation.  One interviewee commented  
“what if we do all this, we get merged and they don’t make us a university?” How 
do you answer that? Because what could go wrong? Well what could go wrong is 
they change the government, we get a HEA visit that is bad, for good reasons or 




guarantee. So that’s a real problem…when that merger occurs, there is 
uncertainty and the staff can use that and anyone who is anti can use that, and I 
can’t think of a countervailing argument” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3). 
 
There is also a heightened level of uncertainty and fear, caused perhaps by a lack 
of consultation or engagement with the wider staff body at the earlier stages of the 
process. One interviewee stated,  
“once we did get past Stage Three, all hell broke loose because people thought -
this was going to happen tomorrow and we don’t know anything about it because 
we have not been included” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1).  
This uncertainty and fear has manifested itself in a range of complex industrial relations 
issues, alluded to earlier, which are now effectively paralysing the process within the 
Alliance.  
 
Feelings of insecurity and fear, particularly around the possibility of losing 
identity or autonomy, also manifest themselves within the Alliance, and are particularly 
evident in interviews with participants from the smaller partner, who are concerned about 
being ‘taken over’. As one interviewee commented, some academic staff within the 
smaller institution see the merger  
“as a huge threat, and have real fears that a lot of the programming will move 
towards (the larger institution) and that’s something that we haven’t really 
addressed” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2).   
              
             In addition to feelings of uncertainty and fear, there is also a considerable amount 
of frustration with the process from those at a senior level within the Alliance, who are 
frustrated and tired of the blockages caused due to the failure to enact the necessary 
legislation, industrial relations (hereinafter referred to as IR) issues and the lack of 
funding and resources. One interviewee commented “energy saps, you do over-think 
things and you do get a bit cross and paranoid and frustrated with the lack of 
progress…the project is energy draining…it is hard going” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
Another stated that “I do feel the Presidents are getting a bit weary from the whole thing, 





5.2.4.4 Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging Institutions 
Originally, this Alliance consisted of three individual IoTs, before one of the 
purported partners withdrew in 2012. According to interviewees, while this may have 
caused some disruption and uncertainty at the time, it actually facilitated the process, 
with one of the interviewee’s stating “it was definitely more difficult with three” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 3), and went on to say “in fact I think it is much easier to merge 
two partners than it is to merge three” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3).  
 
However, differences in size and academic reputation between the two remaining 
partner IoTs has proved to be a significant issue throughout the merger process. One of 
the interviewees commented  
“I guess one of the advantages we have in some ways is the size relationship… 
(they) are much smaller, so I think it is much easier. There is a real disadvantage 
to that too also obviously, as they see themselves as much smaller and see us as 
much more threatening to them, and that is a real problem we have to overcome” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 2).  
 
There is certainly a perception of a degree of arrogance or superiority on the part 
of the larger partner. One interviewee states  
“culturally while there is massive esteem at the higher levels where there is 
mutual respect, I wouldn’t be surprised amongst the lecturer levels and even the 
administrative grades there might by a slight superiority perspective in (the larger 
partner institution)” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4).   
Another commented  
“I suppose the other thing as well is that I understand this is only anecdotally –is 
that there's a bit of looking down their nose at the smaller partner” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 5).   
 
The smaller partner also expressed concern about losing autonomy and power by 




“certainly there would be a lot of concern, as the smaller party, that we would 
merge and that we would lose all of our identity our autonomy - we would 
become an outreach centre - we'd only be offering Level 6 programmes - we'd 
only be offering them in a small number of areas or whatever, and I suppose - we 
tabled that very early with them - we said this is a real fear and concern for 
people” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5).   
 Another added, that the worry of the smaller partner  
“is always that they are going to be swallowed up by the big fish. So they are 
constantly trying to defend a position, which is frankly not helpful” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 3).  
Indeed, this concern about power imbalance and being swallowed up became so 
problematic that it threatened to undermine the entire merger process. In order to prevent 
this the two partners entered into an ‘integration agreement’, which was negotiated and 
agreed to reassure the smaller partner of its place post-merger and to allay specific 
concerns of and provide reassurances to the smaller partner, particularly in relation to the 
type and range of programmes which would be offered on the smaller campus, and 
representation on the senior executive team of the new institution. This was done before 
the mandate to merge was given by the Governing Body. Interviewees reported that the 
lead up to and negotiations around this integration agreement was the most difficult part 
of the process, with one interviewee commenting “there were some very difficult and 
challenging conversations around that, but they had to be had and I think all of the parties 
respected that” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). Another commented  
“we went into an integration agreement this spring which was the greatest 
challenge that we had. The people in (the larger institution) did not see the merit 
in it as much as we did. When you are the bigger party you are not going to see 
the same risks, you are not going to see the same worries.  We (the smaller 
institution) drove the requirement for it from here. I still think it was the right 
thing to do” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4).  
This integration agreement had the effect of allaying many of concerns of the smaller 






5.2.4.5 Communicating with Staff & IR Issues 
A key factor which interviewees cited as having impacted upon the progress of 
the Alliance through the merger process concerns a perceived lack of communication and 
consultation with staff, which has culminated in a series of IR issues which have plagued 
the project in recent months.  One interviewee commented that  
“communicating with our staff was a problem. Not only do we not have our 
academic staff engaged, we don’t really have our senior managers engaged either, 
and they haven’t had that involvement” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2).  
 
This is in part attributable to the fact that work on the initial three phases of the 
project was done by a small group of people, and did not involve the wider staff 
community. One interviewee noted  
“we kept it very tight in that it was the two Presidents, with effectively an advisor 
each and perhaps a Head of Strategy. So there were three individuals engaged 
from each institution initially. That worked very well to an extent in that it made 
it easier but in hindsight looking at it now it probably stilted somewhat the 
progress, in that it was seen to be a very central process, it didn’t really get an 
engagement and a buy in from the wider community in terms of senior 
management, staff and so on in each institution and that’s a big problem for us 
now” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2). 
  
 In addition, the delay in the process has allowed those in opposition to the merger 
to gain momentum. One interviewee commented “we have enabled the union to get 
frustrated and angry” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4) and added that  
“we put great structures in place but never got round to filling them properly 
because there was always a road block.  Theoretically I could show you some 
wonderful paperwork with fantastic structures and you would be thoroughly 
impressed by it, but we have never been able to put them in place because we 
didn’t move quickly enough when the TUI [Teachers Union of Ireland] decided to 
have industrial action with respect to the merger. We hadn’t the people in place 




structures because we didn’t move in a timely fashion” (Alliance A, Interviewee 
4). 
Clearly these IR issues are a serious problem for the Alliance going forward, and need to 
be addressed as a matter of priority. 
 
5.2.4.6 Relationships between Key People  
One of the key perceived facilitatory factors in the merger process with this 
Alliance has been the establishment of strong formal and informal relationships between 
key people in both institutions. Interviewees commented on the importance of the strong 
relationship between the two respective Presidents, which is based on trust, respect and 
parity of esteem, and on the importance of the Presidents putting up a united front. 
Interviewees commented “the President’s relationship is central to success” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 4) and another that 
“I suppose at a Presidential level, there's a good dynamic there, so I suppose 
people see that as well, you know like when we shared the Mission & Vision - 
both Presidents addressed both sets of staff in both organisations together.  We 
have done a good few initiatives like that whereby for example our Governing 
Bodies at key points - both Presidents went to their respective Governing Bodies 
and even that show of unity makes a difference - I think that's important” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 5). 
This strong relationship has no doubt been aided by the fact that there has been 
agreement about their individual futures. As one interviewee stated  
“if you have got two Presidents vying for the same job at the end of the day, it 
just ain't going to happen. If you can get the two presidents to agree what their 
futures are, then it is going to happen” (Alliance A, Interviewee 3).  
 
The data also suggests that the development of strong working relationships 
between the Steering Groups, Implementation Teams and Project 





“certainly we would have a strong interpersonal relationship in terms of being 
able to be honest with other. We are certainly not only interested in fighting only 
our own institute’s corner” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1). 
Another added  
“what worked well is we have people who can work well together and it comes 
down to the selection of individuals to work on the project, [which] was almost 
accidentally good” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
In particular, interviewees commented on the commitment of the Project 
Managers/Coordinators to the project outcome and strong working relationship between 
them, which had helped to overcome impasses along the way. 
 
5.2.4.7 Role of External Consultants & Facilitators  
 Both partners in the Alliance appointed their own external consultants, along with 
an Independent Chair, at an early stage in the merger process, and this has been perceived 
by interviewees as a facilitatory factor in the process. Internally, these consultants have 
had the benefit of providing comfort and confidence internally to the Project 
Steering/Implementation groups, with one interviewee commenting “I do think the 
external advice to us was hugely influential in giving us the confidence to say look this 
has been done before…” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2). 
  
In addition, they provided specific expertise and knowledge not available within the 
institutions themselves. One interviewee highlighted the benefits in this regard, 
commenting  
“there was the higher level aspect of design if a new institution, and design of a 
new TU, and what it meant, how it should be structured and so on, so those 
consultants were higher education experts who gave that expertise. They also 
carried an authority with them in that they had done it before and I think that 
worked very well with people in that they had the real life experience, they could 
put up front a lot of the issues that they probably knew were coming, they were 
both quite good in terms of structures also, so there was a lot of useful advice 





The external consultants have also acted as mediators during the process, and this has 
been beneficial. One interviewee noted  
“having people involved in the process who would act as mediators – not with the 
formal role as a mediator – but act as a mediator and help smooth over the bumpy 
times has been very helpful as well” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
 
Externally, the consultants appointed have been seen to provide confidence and 
credibility to the process, particularly in relation to key external stakeholders, such as the 
HEA. One interviewee stated  
“we have enough expertise in our own organisation to do this but the problem is 
perspective and the problem is what people think.  You know when you are 
funded by a government agency, or a government organisation they want to see 
external influence, and they want to see external input” (Alliance A, Interviewee 
4). 
 
5.2.4.8 Trust, Honesty & Understanding 
As noted above, this Alliance has developed strong working relationships 
between key people in both partner institutions, and this has enabled the development of 
trust, honesty and understanding between the partners, which is perceived as being 
facilitatory. Trust at leadership level is perceived as being critical, and the two Presidents 
appear to have led by example in this regard, with one interviewee noting “the trust has 
been very good between the Presidents. Even though, like a marriage, there have been 
ups and downs, they have been generally quite good” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
Another commented that “a lot of the early relationship building and trust happened 
pretty much on a bilateral basis between the two Presidents” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1).  
This appears to have set the tone for the subsequent process and has cascaded 
down to others in the Project Team, with one commenting “you have to have that degree 
of trust and you have to take people at their word” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4) and 
another that “I think there was definitely trust, and there is trust” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 5). 
In addition to trust, the parties have acted in a manner that is open and honest, 




strong interpersonal relationship in terms of being able to be honest with other” (Alliance 
A, Interviewee 1) and another “I suppose to give comfort to both partners, and I have to 
say in fairness, both partners are very open - there are no skeletons in closets - we do talk 
openly and so on” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). 
 
Honesty, it appears, is key to the process, with one interviewee stating “honesty 
has been central to the whole thing…people’s willingness to say what they think in a 
very frank manner and blow up every now and again” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
Indeed, this ability to be frank, have a disagreement yet move on is perceived as 
being key to success. There will naturally be ups and downs during the process, and there 
may be difficult periods which test the determination of the Alliance to succeed. In this 
case, it was the period before and during the negotiation of the Integration Agreement, 
which caused the most difficulty and led to trust been damaged, but not eroded. As one 
interviewee commented,  
“there is trust there and even though it was bruised for a period of time we are all 
right again…trust had to be built up, trust was broken and trust has been rebuilt 
again… learning how to have a row and make up and move on has been a huge 
challenge and they are getting there but it has been tough. That slowed progress 
but did it as we were going nowhere anyway so we may as well have the row and 
get it out of our systems and we did” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
 
5.2.4.9 Resources 
Based on respondents perceptions, a lack of resources is another inhibitory factor 
for Alliance A. As discussed above, there was a lack of external funding from the HEA to 
support the institutions during the process, although there is acknowledgement that this 
has begun to change. One interviewee commented  
“even the funding, and we all recognise that merging institutions requires 
funding, it’s almost begrudgingly been granted now by the HEA in response to 
demands from the institutions” (Alliance A, Interviewee 2). 
 
In addition to the perceived failure of the HEA to provide the necessary funding 




commit the necessary human and financial resources to the merger project. As one 
interviewee commented  
“no extra staff was employed.  The work and documents were fitted in between 
our (myself and a colleague’s) full time jobs, sometimes working on the 
documents at 4.00 a.m.” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1). 
There is acknowledgement from the interviewees that this has been problematic. One 
commented  
“we have not resourced the project properly at all. We did not resource it and we 
have failed to resource it. Not to make an excuse for ourselves but we planned 
good structures, we planned good organisation around the project, we have not 
resourced it” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4). 
 
 Almost all interviewees referred to the fact that the project was being done “on a 
shoestring” (Alliance A, Interviewee 1), with one commenting “it’s just that there is so 
much going on and it's the time and the resources to put into it, when you're also trying to 
do the day job” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). The interviewee added:  
“to be honest with you, because of the absence of appropriate funding to support 
it, it is being run on a shoestring and it is challenging because there is a 
significant body of work to be done around it” (Alliance A, Interviewee 5). 
 Interviewees referred to the fact that the project is “energy draining” (Alliance A, 
Interviewee 4) and “hard going” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4) and that they would like 
people to sub in and out of the project to give them a break. This is clearly an issue the 
Alliance needs to address if it is to succeed on the road ahead. 
 
           5.2.4.10 Building & Maintaining Momentum & Stability 
The data collected indicates that the merger process has been perceived as very 
stop/start in nature, due to a variety of factors, both internal and external. External factors 
include delays with the process on the part of the HEA, the lack of necessary legislation, 
the lack of external funding to support the project. Internal delays include IR issues and 
the failure to commit the necessary human and financial resources to the project. This has 
made it extremely difficult to build and maintain any real momentum throughout the 




have been more lethargic” (Alliance A, Interviewee 4) and another, that “we have almost 
ourselves contributed to kind of ‘this will never happen’ out there - this is ridiculous - all 
the time and effort and it will never happen, and those delays haven't helped us” 
(Alliance A, Interviewee 5). This has clearly inhibited the progress of the Alliance. 
 
5.2.5 Conclusion & Recommendations 
From the above, it is clear that there are a number of key factors, arising both at 
institutional and system level, which are perceived as having facilitated or inhibited the 
progress of this Alliance through the merger and re-designation process. These are 
summarised below: 
 
Key Facilitatory Factors 
 At Institutional Level: 
o Establishment of strong formal and informal relationships between key people 
in both institutions, particularly at leadership level. 
o Development of relationships based on trust, honesty, openness and 
understanding. 
o Ability to be honest and frank, and to have a disagreement and move on. 
o Providing necessary reassurances to the smaller partner through an integration 
agreement. 
o Appointment of credible and knowledgeable external consultants to provide 
advice, comfort, confidence and credibility, internally and externally. 
o Getting the right project managers in place, who are committed to the merger 
and have a strong working relationship. 
 
Key Inhibitory Factors 
 At System Level 
o Uncertainties within and difficulties with the HEA criteria and process for 
merger and re-designation, particularly at Stage Three. 
o Failure of government to enact necessary legislation and the resultant 
uncertainty regarding timelines for merger, staffing concerns, etc.  





o Perceived failure of HEA to provide necessary funding mechanisms. 
 
 At Institutional Level 
o Failure to engage staff in the process and resultant IR issues. 
o Failure to commit the necessary human and financial resources. 
o Feelings of uncertainty, fear, frustration and insecurity in relation to the 
merger process. 
o Concerns about power imbalance, the possibility of losing identity or 
autonomy and being ‘swallowed up’. 
o Inability to build and maintain momentum throughout the process. 
 
It is evident from the above the while all of the perceived facilitatory factors in 
this case are internal, many of the factors which interviewees perceived as being 
inhibitory are external. This is problematic for the Alliance in that many of these are 
outside of its control, or at least perceived to be, and will require continued lobbying and 
pressure to be put on key system level actors to redress the difficulties in relation to 
legislation, funding and advice/facilitation. However, there are a number of key actions 
which the Alliance itself can take to facilitate the process. These are summarised below: 
 Form a coalition with other Alliances of IoTs who are merging to lobby at system 
level for legislation, funding and facilitation mechanisms. 
 Continue to work to address the IR issues. Ideally, this should be facilitated at 
national/system level, as similar issues arise in all of the Alliances. However, at 
institutional level, the Alliances need to focus on communicating with, consulting 
and engaging staff with the project where and when possible in the interim. 
 Set a date for merger and work to that date, despite the lack of legislation. This 
will allow the Alliance build momentum, gain confidence and put increasing 
pressure on system level actors to resolve issues at their end. 
 Commit the necessary human resources to the project. People who are committed 
to the project must be chosen to work on a dedicated project team, on a full time 
basis. 
 Consider bringing new people into work on the project to ‘freshen up’ the 
existing project steering/implementation teams, as fatigue and frustration will 




 Secure and commit the necessary financial resources to the project and seek 
alternative sources of funding to address any shortfall in exchequer funding, as 
per the International Panel recommendations. The Alliance should have a joint 
budget for the project, out of which project specific expenses are paid.  
 Review the suitability of the proposed governance and management structure for 
the new TU in line with the International Panel recommendations. 
 Reconsider the distinctiveness and relevance of the proposed mission and vision 






5.3 Alliance B 
5.3.1 Introduction  
This case study examines the proposed merger between two Irish IoTs, which 
began in 2011, but from which one of the partners unilaterally withdrew in late 2014, 
following a series of delays, setbacks and a very public fall out between the partners. 
Since then, efforts have been made to get the Alliance back on track. This case study 
examines the background and context to this Alliance, along with the particular factors 
which are perceived as having impacted upon its progress to date, particularly those 
which caused a breakdown in the process and led to the withdrawal of one of the 
partners. 
5.3.2 Background & Context 
Alliance B consists of 2 IoTs, both of which were established in 1970. The two 
institutions are briefly described below. 
IoT 1 is a multi-campus institution, consisting of one main campus and two 
smaller campuses, (which primarily provide for part time HE students), located around its 
region. Its main campus is based in a regional town. It is currently the sixth largest of 
Ireland’s 14 IoTs, catering for approximately 7,000 students and staff.  
IoT 2 is situated approximately 75 kilometers from IoT 1, in the largest city in the 
region. It is the third largest IoT in the State, catering for approximately 9,000 students 
and staff. It is the larger of the two institutions, although not significantly. It has 
extensively campaigned for re-designation as a university under the Universities Act 
1997, without success.  
Historically, there has been very little collaboration between the two IoTs, despite 
their close geographical proximity to each other. In fact, the past relationship between the 
two institutions could be described as competitive rather than collaborative. The table 












Table 17: Alliance B - Key Points 
Alliance B – Key Points 
Number of Partner 
IoTs 
Two 
Relative locations All located within a loosely defined region – main campuses 
approximately 75 kms apart (journey time of 1 hour approx.) 
with various outreach campuses spread widely across the 
region 
Historical Context One partner had been seeking re-designation as a University 
for a number of years, the other had not. There is no existing 
university in the region. 
Size and Scale The two partners are relatively similar in size and scale, 
although one is slightly larger with 8200 students, while the 





Broadly similar programme profile, both in terms of level of 
awards and discipline areas. The larger IoT has a stronger 
established research profile than its smaller partner. 
 
Ethos/Missions Broadly similar- both IoTs have strong ties to their local 
communities and regions, from which most of their students 
come. 
Projected combined 
student numbers (as 




5.3.3 Progress to Date 
Following the publication of the National Strategy in 2010, an approach was 
made by IoT 2 to IoT 1 to enter into discussions around the possibility of merging and 
making an application to be re-designated as a TU. Shortly thereafter both IoTs met to 
discuss potential collaborative arrangements. The subsequent publication of the 




to “explore the establishment of a multi campus Technical University” in the region, was 
a clear signal of support, and perhaps even dictat, for the two IoTs to ‘ramp up’ the 
merger process with a view to securing TU status. This is the only region in which the 
Government specifically and publically committed to exploring the establishment of a 
TU and it is the only geographical region in Ireland which does not have a traditional 
university, despite a long standing campaign by IoT 2 to be upgraded. 
The discussions, however, were interrupted shortly after their commencement, 
due to a change of President and Chair of Governing Body in both institutions. The term 
of office of the Chairs of both IoTs ended and they were replaced. Amid some 
controversy, the then President of IoT 2 was not re-appointed by the Governing Body 
when his term expired, and that post had to be filled. It took until early 2012 to appoint a 
new Chair and President to IoT 2. To complicate matters further, the new President 
appointed to IoT 2, had been the President of IoT 1 up to that time. In fact, at the end of 
2011, following discussions with the relevant Minister, Department Officials, the HEA, 
and IoT 2, an effort was made to fast track the process of merger. It was proposed that the 
then President of IoT 1 be appointed joint President of both IoTs, with a Vice President 
appointed in each Institute.  This was subsequently rejected by the Governing Body of 
IoT 2. IoT 1 had then to find a replacement President and this appointment was made in 
2012. Undoubtedly this caused significant difficulties which will be discussed later.  
Once the new Chairs and Presidents were in place, a project structure was 
established, a MOU signed and a joint submission made to the HEA in July 2012, 
containing a formal expression of interest as per stage one requirements. The HEA had 
indicated that it would advise the institutions within a reasonable period (no longer than 
six months) as to whether or not the proposal may proceed to the next stage. 
Unfortunately, the HEA did not adhere to its own timeline. In parallel to this process, the 
HEA commissioned an international expert panel to draw up a new, ‘ideal’ configuration 
of the Irish HE landscape. When the findings of this internal expert panel proved to be 
unpalatable, the HEA then completed its own system configuration exercise, based on the 
submissions made to it by the universities and IoTs in July 2012. This resulted in 
considerable delay and it was not until May 2013 that the HEA acknowledged receipt of 
the formal expression of interest from the Alliance and indicated that the proposal could 





Nonetheless, from July 2012 the partners continued to make some progress, 
agreeing to scope out the due diligence exercise and agreeing dates for joint meetings of 
the Governing Bodies of both IoTs. However, progress came to a halt again at the end of 
2012 when the Chairs and Presidents of both Institutes postponed a planned joint meeting 
of both Governing Bodies following a report by the Controller & Auditor General in 
relation to the accrual of expenses and financial expenditure at IoT 2. Following that 
report, the Minister issued an order for a statutory inspection of the arrangements in IoT 
2, and this resulted in the proposed merger process being effectively put on hold until the 
investigation was completed and the report published in July 2013. During this period 
there was little to no communication between the partner institutions. 
Following this report, the Governing Body of IoT 1 agreed that the completion of 
a due diligence process on IoT 2 was a critical element of the preparation of a business 
plan for merger and that it must form an integral part of the HEA Stage Two application 
process.  At this stage, there continued to be a low level of engagement between the 
partners, and as progress was particularly slow, a regionally based government Minister 
announced in September 2013 that an independent external coordinator would be 
appointed to Chair the Steering Group, and to assist the Alliance.   
Despite the appointment of a new Project Chair, and the partners having agreed in 
principle to due diligence, from August 2013 until January 2014 there was a failure to 
agree on the terms of reference for the actual due diligence process and on various other 
issues. In particular, difficulty appeared to arise in relation to the execution of the due 
diligence process. Following a public procurement process, (which took a number of 
months to agree on and resulted in bickering between the partners), the due diligence on 
IoT 2 on behalf of IoT 1 began in July 2014. However, difficulties and delays continued, 
and intervention from the HEA and two government Ministers was required to unblock 
the impasse. It appears that this intervention had an immediate impact and dates were 
agreed for the first phase of the fieldwork in IoT 2.  
In parallel to this process, in early 2014 IoT 2 commissioned an international HE 
academic to conduct a ‘High Level Assessment of the Future Potential of a new Higher 
Education Institution’ created from the Proposed Merger of IoT 1 and IoT 2. Again, there 
was some disagreement between the parties regarding the need for this exercise but 
nonetheless the report was commissioned, with the external academic visiting IoT 1 in 
the summer of 2014 and later drafting his report. In October 2014, the President of IoT 2 




the document concluded a significant risk to IoT 2 by IoT 1 that could end the TU 
project, or could at the very least result in a significant delay to the project.  IoT 1 felt 
that this was in contradiction to feedback they had been given directly by the report’s 
author. Some correspondence ensued between the President of IoT 1 and the author of 
the report. Following a meeting with the President of IoT 1, the author wrote to the 
Presidents of both institutions advising them of his decision to withdraw the draft report, 
and withdrawing himself from the process. 
Less than a week later IoT 1 received email communication from the President of 
IoT 2 informing it of its decision to suspend activities on the TU project, expressing 
concerns about the potential of the Alliance to meet the TU criteria, based on the disputed 
report. This announcement was followed by a public announcement by IoT 1 detailing 
their surprise at the statements, as they thought they had reached agreement on key 
management and organisational issues and could move forward. Following this 
statement, IoT 2 announced that its Governing Body was suspending its engagement with 
the project including planning and all related activity, in addition to the completion of 
due diligence exercises.  
The events of this time are subject to a vast amount of disagreement between the 
parties. Much negative local and national media coverage followed, and the common 
theme in much of the discourse at that time related to the research metrics around at each 
IoT and proposed governance and management structures for the new institution. The 
State’s Public Accounts Committee, a body set up to investigate the expenditure of public 
finances, also became involved at this stage, asking questions about expenditure on the 
project to date and requiring the Presidents of both IoTs to make submissions and appear 
before them. Again, the intervention of a Government Minister was required to get the 
process back on track, and in November 2014 the Minister appointed another external 
person to lead a new process of consultation with both IoTs in order to develop a shared 
vision for the proposed TU, to report on the feasibility and best structure to implement 
the project and the potential timescale.  
Also at this time, following much debate and apparent confusion around whether 
or not governance and management structures had been agreed, and apparent difficulties 
in communications between the Chair, President, Executive and Board of IoT 2, the 
Chair of IoT 2’s Governing Body stepped down and a new Chair was appointed in 




was being seconded by the HEA to work on another project, and would be replaced by a 
new President.  
During this time the external expert appointed by government continued to 
engage in the process of consultation and in July 2015, published his report (noting that 
due to the position taken by IoT 2, it did not prove possible to have any round-table 
engagement involving both Institutes as part of the process, nor was it possible to 
produce a validated set of aggregate data addressing TU metrics, combined across both 
Institutes). He re-confirmed the commitment of both Institutes to the development of a 
TU for the region and articulated the strength of conviction by regional stakeholders 
about the imperative to progress this without further avoidable delay. He recommended 
that any substantive re-engagement could only follow a preliminary engagement process 
which would involve Chairs and Presidents in the first instance, to ventilate the 
underlying reasons for the current state of relationships and create a framework within 
which mutual trust and respect can be re-built, as a stepping stone to substantive 
engagement. He stated that while it would not be easy, it was achievable.  
Following the publication of this report, the Presidents and Chairs of both IoTs 
met with relevant Ministers and agreed to enter into a process of facilitation, which came 
to a successful conclusion in January 2016, when the Governing Body of IoT 2 agreed to 
re-enter TU talks with IoT 1. Since then, the Alliance made a joint application for 
funding to the HEA and has secured almost €1.6 million in funding from the HEA to 
further progress the merger and re-designation project. This is seen as a clear signal of 
support for the project, although little further progress has been evident. Recently, the 
publication of the Programme for Partnership 2016 (an agreement for government 
between the largest party and independents which support the minority government) 
which states that if an argument could be made that a merger is not feasible for 
geographical reasons, then an IoT could apply for TU designation alone, has also caused 
unnecessary uncertainty.  
5.3.4 Key Factors Impacting upon Merger and Re-designation Process 
The data gathered and analysed has highlighted that the following key factors are 
perceived as impacting in particular on the progress of Alliance B through the merger and 






Table 18: Key Factors Impacting Upon Process - Alliance B 




Distrust, Suspicion, Hostility & Resentment  75 7 
The Political Landscape 68 7 
Securing the Support of the Senior Executive Team 49 6 
Lack of Government HEA & Department Support, 
Commitment, Understanding & Clarity  
44 6 
Blocking, Delaying Tactics and ‘Game Playing’ 41 7 
Power Dynamics & Negotiations between Merging 
Institutions 
34 7 
Role of External Consultants & Facilitators 33 6 
Lack of Commitment, Belief & Passion 32 7 
Leadership & Charisma 32 6 
Cultural Issues, Values & Identity 31 7 
 
5.3.4.1 Distrust, Suspicion, Hostility & Resentment 
The data highlights considerable levels of distrust, hostility, resentment and even 
at times, paranoia between the partners. This is likely both a cause of and a result of the 
considerable difficulties which the Alliance has encountered during the process to date. 
There is an enormous amount of distrust, which manifests itself between the partner 
institutions themselves, within the individual merging institutions, and between the 
institutions and system level actors in the process. One interviewee commented “I think 
that the global phrase was that there was a lack of trust” (Alliance B, Interviewee 3). 
Distrust appears to have sprung from a variety of sources. Firstly, as one 
interviewee commented, that “there was a history of lack of trust and lack of working 
together between the two institutes” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2), and certainly this had an 
impact on the process. However, this alone does not explain the levels of distrust 
generated throughout the process, which is universally acknowledged as a key inhibitory 





“if the two Presidents clearly aren't showing trust, then the next level [of staff] is 
clearly going to behave in a way in which they're watching themselves and watching 
their President and watching their Chair and in any joint meetings, they're all going to be 
boxing clever and not saying much, which is again not terribly useful in an academic 
merger” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6).  
Certainly, the perceived absence of a trusting relationship at this level has had a 
considerable inhibitory impact and did not facilitate the creation of trusting relationships 
at lower levels within the Alliance. The changes in personnel outlined above also made it 
more difficult for stable, trusting relationships to form. One interviewee felt that distrust 
came from “the overall dishonesty in the process…the fact that the feeling was that this 
process was going to happen by some kind of political stroke” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
5).  
Distrust has manifested itself continuously, in various ways and at various stages 
throughout the process. For example, one interviewee noted that “the lack of trust was 
evidenced by separate positions, separate papers…just painful” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
3). The lack of trust was particularly evident in relation to the due diligence exercise. One 
interviewee commented “I think the whole rigmarole around the due diligence was a 
massive red herring and a massive delaying tactic and it spoke to the suspicions of both 
organisations of one another” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5) and added that the approach 
taken to due diligence “was a sort of ‘we want to expose all of your dirty little secrets’ 
approach” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5).  
This distrust has marred the whole process. One interviewee commented “there 
wasn’t that trust there and that clearly has played through and continues…it’s like the 
writing inside a barrel of rock - it continues with us to this day” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
6). Another stated “when you saw mistrust, no cooperation, no intention of cooperating 
really, then it became a dead duck if you ask me” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7).  Clearly 
this is a key issue which needs to be addressed by the Alliance if it is to move forward in 
any meaningful way. 
In addition to distrust, interviewees also reported feeling that the process itself 
was dishonest. This dishonesty arose both between the institutions themselves and 
between the institutions and system level actors. One interviewee referred to the fact that 
“I think there was a lot of the 'three faces of Janus' behaviour going on” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 6) and another that “the whole thing was founded on smoke and mirrors” 




and also gave rise to feelings of suspicion, rumour, and even paranoia within the 
Alliance. Comments from interviewees such as “what are the real agendas?” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 5), “they were absolutely taking direction from outside the room” (Alliance 
B, Interviewee 5), “he came in with sort of - well he appeared to have an agenda” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 2) and “they had been fed so many lies” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 4) provide clear evidence of the levels of suspicion and paranoia involved in 
the process, and led to every action by one partner being second guessed by the other, 
and each partner seeming to read an ulterior motive into almost everything the other did. 
Because of the levels of distrust, dishonesty and suspicion, it is not surprising that 
interviewees reported strong feelings of hostility, resentment and antagonism within the 
Alliance. This was acknowledged by one interviewee who commented “there was 
actually a fair degree of hostility from time to time” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2). Another 
interviewee commented 
“there has been a perceived power imbalance where (one of the institutions) see 
themselves as top dog and that they should be running the show and that we are a 
less accomplished institution certainly in the areas of research and therefore we 
are not operating at university level and that has created problems - it has created 
resentments and mistrust - so yeah it been a big factor” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
2). 
Yet another added that, “there was complete disregard for one by the other, and that 
made it hard. That disenchanted me and made me think it wasn’t going to happen” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 7). 
 
5.3.4.2 The Political Landscape 
From the publication of the Programme for Government in 2011, which 
contained a specific reference to exploring the possibility of creating a multi campus TU 
in the region, this Alliance has been subject to particular political attention. In particular, 
key national and local politicians from the region were perceived as being the main 
drivers of the TU and re-designation agenda, particularly at the early stages of the 
process. One interviewee acknowledged “I suppose the big thing was that there was a 
political driver early on for it to happen” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2).   
While this may seem unusual, given that HEIs are by their very nature supposed 




exception. One interviewee commented that “the politicians regard the IoTs as their 
playthings” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6) and that “the politics of the Department of 
Education has always been to keep the IoTs in their place, ready to receive a Minister to 
cut a ribbon for a regional aim” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6). The interviewee added  
“there's very much an element of expediency, vanity project, ribbon cutting, 
kissing the baby, new university in the (region). It’s very political, but that's kind 
of the way the Department has nurtured them to be, and they have always been 
told – ‘you will do this - you won't do that’ and that kind of culture really is right 
the way through - oh put our laimh suas [hands up] and ask can we do that – ‘is it 
ok Department of Education - is it ok that we build that or we do this or 
whatever’.  I certainly find the IoTs very, very political” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
6).  
 
Some interviewees viewed the input of key political actors as supportive, 
commenting “if we had been ready to avail of the opportunity then the political help was 
absolutely helpful” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4). However the majority of interviewees 
have been very critical, accusing key political actors of interference, causing disruption 
and of ‘playing politics’ with the merger process. One commented “so it was a political 
stroke. It’s not part of policy” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7) and another that  
“it has been inordinately politicised. I think the external political influence on the 
project from beginning to end has been extraordinarily and really, really 
disturbingly disruptive you know, so yeah it has been a political process from 
start to finish” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5). 
Political input came from all levels, including the Minister for Education and Skills, with 
one interviewee noting  
“so there has been a lot of political input in terms of party politics I suppose and 
Ministers pushing in order to see developments but that always hasn’t translated 
into being a positive force for the good of the project. In fact its maybe mired 





Another interviewee commented that “the Minister got directly involved into pulling 
heads and banging heads together in what was supposed to be a voluntary merger” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 7). 
This level of political input was particularly unwelcome amongst interviewees in 
the partner IoT which had been campaigning for university status on its own for some 
time. They felt strongly that this was an unwarranted level of political interference with 
their institution and was a political solution to avoid granting it university status, for 
which it had long campaigned. One such interviewee commented  
“there was a feeling that this was going to happen, either without us, despite us, 
it’s going to happen. And that seems to be still the way. Whatever we think 
doesn’t matter, it’s going to happen. So just let it happen. So that brought out the 
worst in both of us, which was ‘let’s get out of it what we can’, you know” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 5). 
 
Interviewees also reported that there were unrealistic expectations from 
politicians and government in relation to the merger, stating “politicians didn't want to 
know about the hard facts” (Alliance B, Interviewee 3) and another that  
“it was a big opportunity but there was never a realistic understanding of what 
was involved in terms of investment and work to make a properly functioning 
organisation and I wouldn’t expect the politicians to know. You would have 
hoped that they would have been advised by the experienced education people in 
the Department and in the HEA. But whether they didn’t listen or whether they 
weren’t given that advice, I don’t know. They seemed to think it was another kind 
of zap them together” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4).  
Some interviewees felt that the institutional leaders, cognisant of the political 
pressure, were simply ‘playing along' with the politicians and the Department, and were 
afraid to say no or to be seen as ‘dragging their heels’ with the politicians. One 
commented  
“neither of them wanted, and this was from the political appointees of the Chairs, 
and even in a sense the Presidents, neither wanted to be seen to be dragging their 




thing not happening. And that was their main concern. That put a stop on any real 
talks” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7).  
He went on to state that the institutions “play the game.  They don’t want to piss off the 
boss. And that’s what’s wrong…neither of the institutions wanted to piss off (a Senior 
Government Minister), nor did the Department or the HEA because he had the purse 
strings” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7) and added that the leaders “were kowtowing to the 
Department” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7). Certainly this raises further issues in relation to 
the autonomy of Irish IoTs.  
 
5.3.4.3 Securing the Support of the Senior Executive Team 
Throughout the process interviewees reported a perceived failure by the leaders of 
one of the institutions to get the Senior Executives on board. One of Presidents moved 
directly from being President of IoT 1 to IoT 2, and in the process, almost became 
President of both institutions. However the Governing Body in IoT 2 refused to allow 
this. This situation immediately led to mistrust between the President and the Senior 
Executive, who were clearly suspicious of the new President and who, as a result, would 
repeatedly call into question data, metrics, etc., which were presented to them. One 
interviewee commented “he never really got the trust of the management”, “he didn’t 
have the executive with him” and “his executive team didn’t trust him…he wasn’t 
aligning himself with them.” He stated  
“when the President tried to give them a sanitised version of what this merger was 
all about, it didn’t fly very well.  It certainly didn't give comfort or security to any 
of them that he was looking after the interests or the ambitions of their institution 
terribly well in all of this” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6).  
One interviewee from the partner institution commented that there was 
“mistrust in the President and evidence that the senior management team didn’t 
really bond well with the new President so any move forward that he made 
always, I think, always was being challenged. So his position increasingly became 
untenable” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2).  
This level of distrust and suspicion made the relationship very fraught and it would be 




circumstances. Indeed, eventually the President in question moved to an alternative role 
outside the institution and has since been replaced. 
 
This poor relationship between the President and the Senior Executive led to a 
significant amount of both overt and covert resistance to the merger. One interviewee 
commented  
“talk to senior managers here - well we weren't very happy with it - there was an 
awful lot of compromising - a lot of biting of lips, but we went with it for the 
greater good - for peace and quiet - to get things over the line” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 6).  
However, continued resistance ultimately culminated in the institution unilaterally 
withdrawing from the merger talks, following a much disputed external report 
commissioned by the institution. One interviewee commented “as a result of them then 
actually beginning to take control, that’s when they [the Senior Executive] eventually 
ended up saying ‘thus far and no further” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7). This did not come 
without a price however, with interviewees reporting that there “was a real fracturing in 
the organisation over the last year around this project” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6), and 
others that “there was a lot of blood spilled” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5) and “morale is 
on the floor” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6). 
In addition, various degrees of resistance on the part of the executive teams in 
both institutions manifested itself throughout the process as 'tribalism', and posturing for 
position, particularly at joint meetings of the executives. One interviewee commented 
“there's no doubt yea - jockeying for position I suppose is a phrase  I have heard around 
here and I suppose everybody is trying to look after their own back” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 3) and that “everybody was fighting turf and hanging on to what they have” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 3). Certainly the positioning that people took to protect 
themselves and their own interests throughout the process was not helpful and clearly 
inhibited progress.   
  
5.3.4.4 Lack of Government HEA & Department Support, Commitment, 
Understanding & Clarity 
In contrast to the significant interest displayed in the merger and re-designation 




‘hands off', disinterested approach from both HEA & Department, which has inhibited 
progress to date. Interviewees reported that initially the HEA were very reluctant to be a 
participant in the process. One commented  
“now considering that they wrote the national strategy and had it approved, it sent 
out a very mixed message. We had addressed the matter with them and we were 
told categorically that they were not a stakeholder in the process and that their 
only role was to assess applications as they came in. They were the funding 
agency, they were the ones setting the strategy, but we didn’t feel they were 
supportive of the project” (Alliance B, Interviewee 1).  
The DoES were also perceived as having taken a back seat, with one interviewee 
commenting “the Department seem distant from it” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2). With 
reference to the HEA one interviewee commented  
“we asked them very early on at a budget meeting, what support we could expect 
from them for a TU, and they basically said none because they said they  had to 
administer the process so they couldn’t get involved in supporting individual 
colleges in becoming a TU or meeting TU criteria” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4). 
This perceived disinterest and lack of support by the HEA certainly did not 
inspire confidence in the institutions to move on with the process. One interviewee noted  
“both the Department and the HEA, neither have been supportive of either 
institution actually. All they have been is critical. All they have been is insisting 
that what they want happens and there has been a real dishonesty about looking at 
the evidence… so I would think that neither have been helpful at all” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 5).  
This perceived inconsistency of behaviour of HEA & the Department led 
interviewees to question the motives and real intent of both throughout the process. One 
interviewee reported that  
“one senior member of the HEA actually said, in an open forum, they would be 
more than happy to see us all merging because they would have fewer lines in 
their excel spreadsheet for budgets and all the rest, fewer colleges to deal with, 
and that was in a completely open forum. So you could come into the room and 
they would say ‘so here is another college that wants to be a TU’” (Alliance B, 




Another interviewee also questioned the agenda of the HEA, stating  
“there is always questions around the HEA and the HEA board, that the whole 
agenda is being driven by the universities and the universities were happy enough 
with the mergers and to mess about with the IoT sector, but they wanted to keep 
their patch clean and didn’t want to see any more competition coming into their 
patch in terms of the TUs that may be attracting or seeking to attract more 
research funding. And there was a feeling also that the criteria to set up a TU 
were driven by the universities attempting to put up artificial barriers to stop IoTs 
being able to become TUs. So there is considerable mistrust, is probably too 
strong a word, but considerable ambivalence I think in the sector in terms of the 
role of the HEA in driving this project” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2). 
Clearly this sort of approach would not in any way facilitate the Alliance’s progression 
through the process, and would lead to serious questions being asked in relation to the 
alignment of the actions of the HEA with espoused national policy and strategy. 
Interviewees also highlighted a number of additional perceived system level 
inhibitors to progress. Some commented on the perceived lack of understanding by the 
HEA, with one commenting “what you were getting all the time is a drip-feed from the 
HEA who were completely at sea with this process, who didn’t know what they were 
about” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7). Others highlighted their failure to provide clarity 
around the process and criteria for re-designation, and the failure to prioritise the merger 
and re-designation process. The failure to enact the necessary legislation and the failure 
to provide funding mechanisms (until recently) were also key inhibitory factors for the 
Alliance, with one interviewee commenting  
“they kept the process going on a sort of a wink and a nod basis without actually 
addressing the resources issue. I mean if they were really serious they would be 
pumping money into the institutes to become bigger and better things. And it 
would be incentive driven - a reform driven agenda. There was no financial 
incentive put in place to make the policy happen. So that was a clear indication 









5.3.4.5 Blocking, Delaying Tactics and ‘Game Playing 
For a time at the beginning of the process, the Alliance seemed to be making 
progress. Project Steering Groups and Working Groups were put in place, and meetings 
occurred reasonably frequently. However, interviewees reported that very little progress 
would be made at and between meetings and eventually progress slowed, meetings 
became less frequent, working groups failed to meet or progress items, and people 
became increasingly unavailable. This appears to be the result of perceived diversionary 
and delaying tactics which it was felt were employed by people from both institutions, 
many of whom, one interviewee stated, felt as if “well I can’t be seen to be against it 
publically, but I’m not going to move it forward” (Alliance B, Interviewee 1). This led to 
what one interviewee described as “cunning blocking mechanisms” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 6) being put in place. One interviewee described an example as follows.  
“When it came, as it naturally will do in a merger, around the much more harsher 
realities of what a merger is all about, then you certainly started to hear language 
that was not of a merger type nature, even around the communication strategy - 
you know we might pilot a paper - a classic open-framed paper on 
communication strategy cross merger which had been tested against Finland and 
UK and what not.  The response was muted and the response was not action 
oriented – it was like - what was the expression - smothering the baby at birth - 
not giving it a chance to survive, so if each module of the merger was not given a 
chance to survive, then the whole thing - the sum of its parts was never really 
going to survive…they were only discussions in the abstract - there was no action 
orientated piece coming out of it so in terms of blocking - yes - if you mean a 
movement from discussion to action, - there was always a block, which I would 
describe as smothering the baby at birth - clever enough to block - it’s not overt - 
it’s not adversarial - it’s just death by a thousand cuts” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
6). 
The interviewee continued  
“one President might say - we really need to push forward on a, b and c and the 
other institution would kill it - would just not act, and equally the other institution 




would kill it and they both killed different things for their own different internal 
reasons, whether that was because they could perceive that they had a weakness 
in a particular area - research whatever - public accounts committee, quality - they 
would kill a certain module or piece of what the merger should have been about”, 
concluding “it was terribly carefully killed at birth” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6). 
 
Such actions by the partner institutions certainly prevented any real progress. One 
interviewee accused the institutions of 'game playing' and 'box ticking', stating  
“it was totally frustrating because from the outside you had this game playing 
between the two institutions with a failure to really engage…they were playing 
around…people don’t mean what they say. They play along, play to power, and 
play the game. They were ticking off things but nobody was internalising it. It has 
no carry back into the institutions” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7).  
This perceived failure to engage meaningfully in the process prevented the Alliance 
making any real progress.  
 
5.3.4.6 Power Dynamics & Negotiations between Merging Institutions 
As noted earlier, there was no history of collaboration between the two partners in 
this Alliance prior to 2011. In fact the past relationship between the two was sometimes 
strained and competitive. One interviewee noted “they wouldn’t have been natural 
bedfellows” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2). Another commented “I think we behaved as if 
we were rivals…we never recognised that we weren’t rivals you know, so I think that did 
have an impact, yeah” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5). In the past engagement or cooperation 
between the two was not encouraged, with one interviewee commenting “there was no 
engagement at all, and engagement was actually positively discouraged here, positively 
discouraged” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5).   
It is not surprising then that when negotiations begun between the two, there were 
significant power plays between them, with both institutions seeking to establish as much 
bargaining power as possible, and this has had an inhibitory effect on the process. One 
interviewee commented “logic was out the window. This was simply a power play. 




A lot of the issues appear to have stemmed from the fact that the Institutions are 
reasonably similar in size (although one is slightly larger than the other). This difficulty 
was acknowledged by the interviewees, who commented  
“I suppose the other thing too that we are trying to do, and it is very difficult, is 
that we are trying to effect a merger of equals, or near as damn as equals, so 
there’s not a great record of success in those situations” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
1). 
The smaller institution, it seems, was keen to create a merger of equals, to ensure 
equality and parity of esteem during the process and to avoid being ‘taken over’. It 
perceived the larger institution as being arrogant during negotiations, and of being 
disrespectful towards its achievements. One interviewee commented that one of the 
agreed preconditions for merger negotiations was that “it would be on the basis of 
equality” (Alliance B, Interviewee 1) and that “there would be a neutral headquarters” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 1). This was of significant importance to the smaller institution, 
who felt that the larger institution was, at times being disrespectful and simply wanted to 
take it over under sufferance, as an out-centre, and as a means of getting university 
designation. Interviewees suggested that “the plan was to tag us on to something just on 
the step to becoming a real university” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4), and that ”it wasn’t a 
David and Goliath, but the other college would never admit that” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 4). The interviewee continued   
“one of the very first meetings we ever had with (the other institution), and it 
wasn’t me in the meeting, they actually did say that we would be a feeder college. 
They actually used that term. I mean it was so disrespectful” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 4). 
The larger institution, on the other hand, had been seeking university status for some 
time, and felt that, within the smaller institution,  
“there was a slight inferiority complex that made them argue all the time for 50-
50 on everything, even though any sort of factual look at them would have 
dictated that the balance would have been somewhat different” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 5).  
Interviewees reported feeling that they were essentially already at university level and 




that it was the smaller of the two and that this needed to be taken into account. One 
interviewee commented  
“there was a sense that they were bending over backwards to accommodate some 
of the [smaller institution] people - particularly in the area of research, they felt 
they were bending over backwards to sing up the praises of [the smaller 
institution] in certain areas in order that there would be balance in whatever came 
forward…there was always a kind of a hidden nervousness about that and it was 
glossed over really. And I think the narrative of disrespect and you know, just 
because ye are the bigger partner doesn’t mean you can bully us, this type of 
thing, which was kind of the language that was coming back, particularly over the 
last year or so, really manifested that sense of discomfort on the part of [the 
smaller institution], on my analysis of it, with the fact that it is factually the 
smaller college, you know” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5).  
 
These power plays permeated the entire process and manifested themselves in a 
variety of ways. The partners were willing to use, as one interviewee commented, 
“whatever power you can get a hold of” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2). The larger partner 
focused on exerting ‘academic’ power, making arguments about research and the 
academic credentials, while the smaller partner appears to have relied on the fact that it 
was gaining ground in terms of size and scale on the larger institution, and was physically 
positioned in a better location, demographically. There was an unwillingness to 
acknowledge each other’s strengths or for the partners to be open and honest and identify 
their own weaknesses. There were also efforts by the partners to undermine each other by 
attempting to expose and exploit perceived weaknesses to exert strength and enhance 
positioning. Interviewees reported numerous instances of negative commentary, both 
formal and informal, which were unhelpful and hurtful and which inhibited the process. 
Another outcome of this was that during the entire process, there was a failure by the 
Alliance to agree on a data set for metrics and attempts to agree governance and 
management structures, particularly in relation to the location of the headquarters of the 
new institutions. This posed enormous difficulties for the process and were never 







5.3.4.7 Role of External Consultants & Facilitators 
A number of external consultants and facilitators were appointed to the Alliance 
during the process to date. Interviewees commented that these served a number of 
functions, including providing expertise and knowledge not available within the 
organisation, and acting as facilitators between the two when the process ran into 
difficulty. Interviewees spoke of the need for these external consultants to be credible, 
respected, experienced and knowledgeable. One commented “well there are two things 
you are looking for with something like that. You are looking for public credibility and 
you are looking for genuine experience to bring” (Alliance B, Interviewee 1). Another 
interviewee suggested that consultants were also being used to 'do the dirty work’ or as 
'scapegoats' for the partners during the process, who were looking for a ‘way out’, stating 
that “the experts were of use but in a situation where there isn’t a high degree of trust 
they were also maybe scapegoats to a certain degree and contributed to the distrust” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 2). 
An interesting feature of this case is that a number of consultants and facilitators 
were appointed externally, by relevant Government Ministers. However, this was not 
welcomed by all, who saw this as further evidence of political interference with the 
process and felt that some of the appointees were unsuitable. One commented  
“then of course the Ministers brought in a new Chair. We suddenly got a phone 
call to tell us that this person was coming in and this person, without any 
reference to us, had already put all of this other stuff in place – so that was a 
really bad start. A hugely bad start” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4). 
Another commented  
“The Chairman who was brought in… was a political appointment in some 
regards as he was identified by one of the senior politicians as being someone 
suitable for the job. He came in with sort of - well he appeared to have an agenda 
- but in reality he probably didn’t, he was a straightforward enough character, but 
he came in from an industrial background and he didn’t pick up on the nuances of 
the HE sector and he subsequently departed when there was a fallout” (Alliance 




One interviewee recalled a conversation he had with a senior political advisor 
after IoT 2 had withdrawn from the process, and the Minister subsequently appointed a 
consultant to draw up a report on the viability of the process. He stated  
“I said to him after [IoT 2] pulled out "listen - you are like the Monthy Python 
sketch - you’re the salesman trying to tell the punter that the parrot is still alive 
when everybody knows the parrot is dead. How many more salesmen are you 
going to send?” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7). 
 
5.3.4.8 Lack of Commitment, Belief & Passion 
While a number of interviewees expressed their individual commitment to the 
merger and re-designation, there was a perceived wider lack of commitment to, belief in 
and passion for the project. While one interviewee commented “I do believe in this 
project, I really do, and I think it is crazy, anything else” (Alliance B, Interviewee 4), the 
majority appeared to be of a different opinion, citing “a lack of belief in the process” 
(Alliance B, Interviewee 1) and “there was no enthusiasm for it” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
7). 
Others commented on the lack of commitment, stating “there was never really a 
commitment to make something happen you know, and maybe at the end of the day, 
there was never any real commitment to merger” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5). He 
continued “we never committed…neither party committed” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5), 
attributing this to the fact that the parties were “being really pushed through a process 
that very clearly from very early on they were uncomfortable with” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 5) and that “because of a failure to really engage honestly with one another, 
as we were immensely capable of doing, there was always this sense that the 
commitment wasn’t there to make it happen” (Alliance B, Interviewee 5). 
This lack of belief, commitment and passion for the project has had an inhibitory 
effect on the process to date, with one interviewee commenting “you can’t force people 
who don’t want to come together…you cannot drag them through it” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 7). 
 
5.3.4.9 Leadership & Charisma 
As discussed earlier, there was a significant amount of distrust between the 




a very negative impact on the merger process. One interviewee commented that the 
President “never really got the trust of the management and certainly never got the trust 
of either the unions or the academic staff” (Alliance B, Interviewee 7). 
There was also a considerable amount of disruption and instability during the 
process due to changes in leadership. Since the beginning of the process IoT 1 has seen 
two Presidents and two Governing Body Chairs, and IoT 2 has had four different 
Presidents and three Governing Body Chairs, with another due to be appointed shortly. 
One interviewee noted  
“there was constant changing and chopping of people in leadership positions that 
hadn’t had long term credibility built up in the organisation so it is much more 
difficult to deal with people who are in there a relatively short term, with 
doubters, you know, you don’t have the same credibility” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 1).  
This undoubtedly caused difficulties for the Alliance and made it difficult to establish 
strong working relationships during the project.   
Interviewees also reported a failure by leadership to bring the academy on board. 
One commented “they weren’t bringing the communities with them” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 7) and another “in terms of actually making it an exciting discourse and 
journey for the academics in both organisations, I think they were treated as staff as 
opposed to academics and I think that's a very poor way to set up a university because 
your academy is stronger ultimately than your President” (Alliance B, Interviewee 6).  
This has undoubtedly contributed to the IR issues which have now emerged with 
the academics trade union in both institutions. 
 
5.3.4.10 Cultural Issues, Values and Identity 
Finally, the data suggests that perceived differences in culture, values and identity 
has played an inhibitory role in the progress of this Alliance to date. Interviewees spoke 
of perceived cultural differences between the two institutions, arising from their 
individual histories, values, and geographical identity. The interviewee stated  
“I suppose culture is a difficult concept to get hold of in the first place. But the 
history of where we have got to, that determines the culture to some degree and I 
think that [IoT 2’s] history in terms of pushing for a university and in terms of 




are of university status/standing and to believe that and that’s reflected I think in 
terms of their perception of many things. [IoT 1] have had a different pathway 
there. They would not have seen the university as being such a driving force for 
them early on. Now it’s changed as we went along. The big difference is that [IoT 
1] has been more tightly managed, maybe some would say too tightly managed, 
so therefore there is less room for error with that but also there might have been a 
greater sense of control and maybe a narrower focus on certain things. [IoT2] is 
the other extreme where there certainly hasn’t been that type of management and 
in fact there is evidence that is probably quite loose, maybe even unregulated 
management there, and that reflects itself in terms of the way things are done, in 
terms of say staffing levels, teaching time, etc. It goes right through and people 
sense that in the background and it creates difficulties” (Alliance B, Interviewee 
2).  
Other interviewees cited the fact that the two IoTs were at different phases of 
their life cycle or on different trajectories as contributing to cultural differences. These 
perceived cultural differences have caused some to question whether the partners are 
suitable to merge with each other. One interviewee commented “they wouldn’t have been 
natural bedfellows” (Alliance B, Interviewee 2) and another that “you can see other 
likeminded colleges out there that this could be much more possible with” (Alliance B, 
Interviewee 4).  
There also appears to have been a failure to investigate or interrogate cultural 
issues at an early stage in the process. Interviewees commented  
“we could have been exposed to each other more in terms of the work we were 
involved in, in terms of understanding each other’s culture, having an 
appreciation of what we are good at and not so good at. And also, I mean there 
are a lot of misconceptions or looking at the other organisation and putting certain 
labels on what they are doing and we need to break through all that and it didn’t 
happen, that could have happened early on” (Alliance B, Interviewee 3).  





5.3.5 Conclusion & Recommendations 
From the above, it is clear that there are a number of key factors which are 
perceived as having inhibited the progress of this Alliance through the merger and re-
designation process, and a relatively small number which appear to have facilitated it. 
These are summarised below: 
Key Facilitatory Factors 
 At System Level  
o Input and support of key political actors.  
o Facilitators appointed by the relevant Minister to get the process back on track 
after the withdrawal of one of the partners. 
 Institutional Level 
o Appointment of a number of external consultants and facilitators to inform 
and guide the Alliance during the process to date. 
 
Key Inhibitory Factors 
 At System Level 
o Unwarranted levels of political interference, disruption and ‘playing 
politics’ with the merger process. 
o Unrealistic expectations from politicians and the Government in relation 
to the merger process. 
o ‘Hands off', disinterested approach from both HEA & Department. 
o Perceived lack of understanding by the HEA, and its failure to prioritise 
the merger project. 
o Failure of HEA to provide clarity around the process and criteria for re-
designation. 
o Failure of the Department/Government to enact the necessary legislation.  
o Failure of HEA/Department to provide necessary funding mechanisms. 
o Unsuitable, politically appointed consultants/ facilitators. 
 At Institutional Level 
o Relationship characterised by distrust, hostility, resentment, suspicion and 
paranoia between the partner institutions.  
o Institutional leaders ‘playing along' with the politicians and the 




o Failure by the leader of one of the institutions in particular to get the 
Senior Executive on board leading, to both covert and overt resistance to 
the merger.  
o 'Tribalism' and posturing for position, particularly at joint meetings of the 
executive teams. 
o Diversionary and delaying tactics employed by the partners.  
o Power plays between the two partner institutions with both seeking to 
establish as much bargaining power as possible when it came to 
negotiations, including: 
 Difficulty creating a ‘merger of equals’ and parity of esteem. 
 Unwillingness to acknowledge each other’s strengths or for the 
partners to identify their own weaknesses. 
 Efforts by the partners to undermine each other (including negative 
and hurtful commentary) by attempting to expose and exploit 
perceived weaknesses to exert strength and enhance positioning. 
 Failure to agree on a data set for metrics. 
 Failure to agree governance and management structures, 
particularly in relation to the location of the headquarters of the 
new institution. 
o Historic relationship between the partners – no history of collaboration 
and the relationship was often strained and competitive. 
o Lack of commitment to, belief in and passion for the project. 
o Distrust of the leader in one of the partner IoTs by management and the 
academy. 
o Disruption and instability during the process due to changes in leadership.  
o Failure by leadership to bring the academy on board and IR issues. 
o Perceived cultural differences and failure to investigate or interrogate 
perceived cultural issues at an early stage in the process. 
 
It is evident from the above the majority of the inhibitory factors in this case to 
date are internal, and are within the gift of the institutions themselves to resolve. 
Therefore, a number of key recommendations for this Alliance are summarised below: 
 Firstly, if both partners are truly committed to the process, trust needs to be 




o Acknowledge the past difficulties which the Alliance has faced and agree 
to move forward in a constructive manner, leaving these behind. 
o Start with small projects to gain confidence and get ‘easy wins’. 
o Establish a pre-agreed dispute resolution mechanism/process, such as an 
external or joint mediator, and avoid airing any further disputes in public, 
as this undermines the process. 
o Establish a variety of approaches and venues, both formal and informal, 
for regular communication and encourage and develop multi-layer points 
of sustained contact, which cascade through all levels of the institutions.  
o Focus on building strong relationships based on respect, honesty and 
understanding between key actors in both institutions. 
 Leaders in both institutions need to ensure that all members of their Senior 
Executive Teams are supportive of the process and will work towards achieving 
the goal of TU designation. If not, their input into and impact on the process 
should be minimised.  
 Early agreement on governance and management structures for the new 
institution, including the location of its headquarters, will be key, as will 
agreement on a combined data set/metrics, and a due diligence process. 
 The partners must be open and honest with each other in negotiations. They 
should acknowledge each other’s strengths and be honest about their respective 
weaknesses vis-à-vis the criteria. 
 Perceived cultural differences between the organisations and their different 
histories and trajectories should be acknowledged, and misconceptions about each 
other’s institution need to be addressed and corrected. 
 The €1.6 million funding which has been recently secured from the HEA should 
be used to put together a strong project team, consisting of senior people from 
both organisations who have demonstrated commitment to and passion for the 
project, and who are likely to work well together.  
 The Alliance should consider bringing some ‘fresh’ faces into the project steering 
group and implementation teams, both to re-energise and re-invigorate the 
process, and also to avoid emotional and physical fatigue on the part of those who 




 The leaders in both institutions have a significant body of work to do to get the 
academic staff on board, particularly given the public and hurtful nature of some 
of the commentary to date. They need to focus on communicating with, 
consulting and engaging staff with the project. In addition, the Alliance must 
continue to work to address the IR issues which have arisen. Ideally, this should 
be facilitated at national/system level, as similar issues arise in all of the 
Alliances.  
 To this end, and also to address other system level inhibitors, the Alliance should 
form a coalition with other Alliances of IoTs who are merging to lobby at system 






5.4 Alliance C 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This case study examines the proposed merger between three Irish IoTs who 
initially came together to form an Alliance to seek TU designation in 2011. Although the 
partners have yet to merge, this Alliance is widely perceived as being the furthest along 
the path to merger and re-designation. This case study examines the background and 
context to this Alliance, the particular facilitatory and inhibitory factors which are 
perceived to have shaped its journey on the path to merger and re-designation, along with 
a conclusion and recommendations for the Alliance. 
 
5.4.2 Background & Context 
This Alliance was formed following publication of the National Strategy for 
Higher Education in January 2011, when three existing IoTs, located within a relatively 
small, but highly populated geographical region, came together to merge and jointly seek 
designation as a new TU. After some preliminary discussions, a formal alliance was 
created in October 2011 and since then the three IoTs have been working together to 
develop a programme of work which will culminate in the submission of a joint 
application for designation as a TU. The three partners are briefly described below. 
IoT 1 is Ireland’s largest IoT, and with a student community of 22,000 students 
and staff. It is widely viewed as the sectoral leader. In 2014, it was ranked in the top 100 
universities globally under 50 years old. It can trace its origins back to the development 
of technological education in Ireland in the late 19th century, originally consisting of a 
variety of colleges which were renowned as centers of excellence in their field, spread 
over a number of city centre locations. In 1992, it was constituted as one single 
institution and was designated as an IoT, albeit under a different legislative framework 
than the other IoTs. It offers a full range of programmes and services across all the main 
discipline areas up to and including PhD level, and has a strong record in technology 
transfer, enterprise creation and applied research. Approximately 50 per cent of its 
students come from outside the city and county in which it is situated, which is unusual 
in the IoT sector. It is currently in the process of moving all of its disparate campuses into 
one new unitary campus in the city, at an estimated cost of €550 million, and has 




IoT 2 is located in the North West the same city. Established in 1999, it is 
Ireland’s youngest IoT. It has a relatively small student and staff population, comprising 
approximately 3500 full and part time students. It currently offers a range of applied and 
career focused programmes in a range of discipline areas from level 6 to level 9 of the 
NFQ. However, it currently does not offer any programmes at doctoral level (level 10). 
Its mission has focused on making education accessible to a diversity of learners and it is 
well established within its community, from which most of its students are drawn 
IoT 3 is located in South West of the city, and again, is a relatively new 
Institution, having been established in 1992. It currently has a student and staff 
population of approximately 4,000, with 32% of its students studying part-time, making 
it one of the sectoral leaders for flexible and part time provision. It offers programmes 
across a range of subjects from levels 6 to 9 of the NFQ. Like IoT 2, it does not offer 
programmes of study at doctoral level. Also like IoT 2, it has a strong reputation for 
facilitating access to higher education from those groups traditionally under-represented 
in the sector, and the majority of its student population derives from the local community. 
Table 19 below provides a summary of the key feature of Alliance C. 
 
Table 19: Alliance C - Key Points 




Relative locations All located within one large city 
Historical Context One long standing partner, with two newer partners. Little 
history of collaboration. 
Size and Scale Significant difference in size and scale – one very large partner 




Broadly similar programme profile, but only the larger partner 
offers Doctoral/Level 10 programmes 
Ethos/Missions The two smaller IoTs have strong ties to their local communities, 
from which most of their students come. Larger institution more 
nationally and globally focused 




requirements CAO/Entry points than the larger IoT 
Projected 
combined student 
numbers (as per 




5.4.3 Progress to Date 
Following the creation of the Alliance in October 2011, a high-level Steering 
Group was established to guide the three institutions towards the goal of TU designation. 
This group consisted of an independent Chair, and the Presidents of the three partner 
IoTs. Additionally, a ‘TU Support Team’, consisting of staff from all three partners (with 
the majority from IoT1), and a Project Coordinator, was put in place to co-ordinate the 
various strands of the overall implementation plan, and to facilitate the change process 
required to create a the new TU. This was in contrast to other Alliances who did not 
commit any full time staff to the project at that stage.  
An expression of interest was submitted to the HEA in July 2012, as per Stage 
One of the TU process, and, although the HEA in its documentation had indicated that it 
would advise the institutions within a reasonable period (no longer than six months) as to 
whether or not the proposal could proceed to the next stage, this did not occur (for 
reasons already alluded to earlier) until May 2013, some 10 months later, when the HEA 
published its Completing the Landscape Process for Irish Higher Education document, 
acknowledging receipt of the formal expression of interest from the Alliance and 
indicating that the proposal could proceed to Stage Two.   
The Alliance then began work on Stage Two of the process – ‘Preparation of a 
Business Plan to Meet Criteria’. This involved the preparation of a detailed plan by the 
Alliance to address how it proposed to meet the criteria for a TU, along with the process 
requirements and timelines. The Alliance relied heavily on external consultants to assist 
them with the process, and the consultants were highly influential in steering the Alliance 
through the various stages. Seven specific working groups were established, centered 
around key foundation themes which were identified by the Alliance during the 
preparation of the Stage One submission. Each of the thematic areas were led by an 
individual from one of the three partner IoTs and were supported by a number of working 




governance, organisational design, academic matters, the first year experience and  a safe 
space working group. 
In early May 2014 the Alliance submitted its ‘Business Plan to Meet the Criteria’ 
to the HEA, and as per Stage Three of designated process, the plan was subjected to 
scrutiny and review by an external international expert panel. The panel visit took place 
in September 2014, and ran concurrently with Alliance A’s Stage Three review. The 
International Panel found that the Alliance was likely to meet the criteria for designation 
as a TU within the proposed timeframe, and that it had the capacity to achieve the 
objectives of consolidation, subject to a number of considerations. The report 
commended the Alliance for its record of having begun to ‘act as one’ and said that the 
commitment and energy of senior leaders was palpable. It also commended the Alliance 
for its understanding of the importance of managing the cultural dimension of the merger 
process as well as the structural considerations, for its engagement with the local region 
and international collaborators, the establishment of a joint Graduate Research School 
and the range of joint activities already in place. 
The International Panel recommended that a number of issues be followed up on, 
and advised that these would be subject to review at Stage Four of the process. Some of 
these recommendations echoed those made to Alliance A. The Panel recommended that 
the Alliance carry out further reflection on the distinctive role and mission of the 
proposed new TU and how governance and management systems could best deliver on 
that mission. In relation to funding, they recommended that the Alliance have regard to 
potential sources of non-exchequer funding, such as co-funding from industry and 
research funding, and that it should consider conducting a risk analysis on its costing and 
underpinning financial plan. They also recommended that the Alliance stress test and 
conduct a sensitivity analysis on student number projections, and that it have regard to 
both the resource implications of recruiting staff with the appropriate qualifications and 
sustained research activity required to meet the TU criteria. 
The Alliance had originally set a date of August 2015 for merger, with the 
expectation that by summer 2016, TU designation would have been secured. However, 
despite the fact that it successfully completed Stage Three in September 2014, this has 
not been possible, and the Alliance is effectively stalled, due to a number of key 
inhibitory factors, most notably IR issues, and the absence of enabling legislation. These 




5.4.4 Key Factors Impacting upon Merger and Re-designation Process 
The data gathered and analysed has highlighted the following key issues and 
factors are perceived as having impacted upon the progress of Alliance C through the 
merger and re-designation process. These are summarised in Table 20 and discussed in 
detail below. 
Table 20: Key Factors Impacting upon Process - Alliance C 




Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration 48 4 
Communicating with Staff & IR Issues 43 4 
Relationships between Key People 30 4 
The Political Landscape 28 4 
Trust, Honesty & Understanding 27 4 
Cultural Issues, Values & Identity 22 3 
Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging 
Institutions 
21 4 
Lack Government, HEA & Department Support 
Commitment, Understanding & Clarity 
20 4 
Leadership & Charisma 18 4 





5.4.4.1Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear and Frustration 
The data suggest that feelings of uncertainty, insecurity, fear and frustration have 
impacted negatively upon the merger process in the Alliance to date. Interviewees 
reported that there is a significant degree of uncertainty, which surrounds both the merger 
and re-designation process and outcome. Indeed, they also reported uncertainty 
surrounding the very nature of what the new TU should and will be. In relation to the 
prescribed process, interviewees commented on the uncertainties surrounding TU 
designation and the fear that the institutions have about merging but not securing TU 
status. One commented “this merge before you're designated, mentally and emotionally 




Calcutta that goes on forever” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). This interviewee commented 
on the uncertainty around the nature of a TU, stating there is “a lack of clarity as to what 
this TU is - you buy an iPad - you know what you're getting - you know the feeling - that 
it's the experience, you're buying into” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4), and that this 
uncertainty around mission was unhelpful to the process. In particular, the failure to 
provide legislation has created uncertainty as regards the timeline for the process and 
staff contracts, terms and conditions. One interviewee commented “obviously it's the 
uncertainty around - will we - won't we - have the legislation” (Alliance C, Interviewee 
2). Another stated 
“there's been different interpretations as to when the pistol is starting…it's a bit 
like - the best way I can say it to you is that there is a train in Heuston Station going to 
Cork. We just don't know whether it's 10.10 or 11.10, but there's a train there and we're 
supposed to be on it” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  
 
Interviewees also reported that there was a heightened sense of uncertainty and 
fear due to a lack of communication with staff in the respective partner institutes. One 
commented  
“I think what you would see is that the greatest reluctance probably is down to the 
fact that there hasn't been the level of hand holding and communication that is 
required to re-assure people that even though there's no information, don't fill that 
vacuum with fear” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  
Another stated “I think that what is being stored up is probably a very big fear” (Alliance 
C, Interviewee 2).  
Interviewees reported feeling apprehensive about the merger itself, with one 
commenting “suddenly there are ‘oh crap moments’, as you realise this is going to 
happen” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). Interviewees from the smaller partners also 
expressed the fear of losing their identity, autonomy, and regional remit. One interviewee 
commented “if you listen to people in the TUI, who are doing the most talking about the 
fear factor, they're talking about losing the local presence and regional remit” (Alliance 
C, Interviewee 1). 
 The Alliance needs to take steps to ensure that as many of these uncertainties, 






5.4.4.2 Communicating with Staff and IR Issues 
As alluded to above, it appears that there is a significant degree of apprehension, 
uncertainty and fear in relation to the merger from staff in the partner institutions. This is 
partly attributable to the perceived lack of communication, engagement and consultation 
with staff, which all interviewees commented on. One interviewee acknowledged  
“that one of the fundamental weaknesses of what we've done, to date, has been 
the fact that we have not engaged with most of the staff associated with what 
we're doing” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3). 
Some referenced the fact that there appeared to be a “code of secrecy” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 2) around plans, with one commenting “information is kept at the top and 
there's a dearth of information at middle management from what I'm told and at general 
staff level” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  Others commented that those at the top have not 
engaged staff at ground level within the institutions, with one commenting “my concern 
might be that they are a little removed from what is the mood on the ground and they 
may get it wrong, but I hope not” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3). Interviewees were all in 
agreement with the fact that this would have to change, with one commenting “I think the 
point is that it is very, very important that from now on that everybody knows what's 
going on and everybody's told” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  
This lack of communication was referred to by one interviewee as a “vacuum 
which has now been filled with fear” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1) by the trade unions, and 
has resulted in very significant trade union resistance and IR issues with the merger. One 
interviewee noted  
“I think there are many academics who would rather have an academic contract 
that they understand and can manage, rather than the fear and uncertainty - rather 
than the uncertainty of an academic contract that still has to be described, within a 
future TU state, so that uncertainty can be used to kind of - if you like - fix people 
and have them not necessarily shouting for a new future” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 3). 
These IR issues now pose a serious threat to the progress of the merger and must be 





5.4.4.3 Relationships between Key People 
One of the key factors which interviewees perceived as having contributed to the 
relatively successful progress of this Alliance to date is the development of strong 
interpersonal relationships between key people in the Alliance.  Interviewees particularly 
stressed the importance of strong personal relationships between the Presidents of the 
three partner IoTs, based on trust, respect and parity of esteem. One interviewee 
commented  
“so if you like there are multiple layers in the relationship building that goes on, 
but I think once the President's sat down and built that solid relationship, it sort of 
gave a  validity to the informal networks that had existed prior to the fact” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 1). 
 
Interviewees commented that while the three Presidents have dramatically 
different in personalities “the collection of the three current ones is a very powerful 
collection for multiple reasons” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4), noting that they are a critical 
team whose personalities and strengths complement each other, and that there is “a 
warmth - they get on - you can tell they get on” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). The 
interviewee also commented 
“they need to know each other well enough to know their children's names and 
their birthdays and this kind of carry on.  They have to know each other well.  
They need to be able to say 'are you for real', without going into a huff…there has 
to be a huge trust among them” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
Building these personal relationships clearly took time, and one interviewee 
suggested that it was easier because three, rather than two, individuals were involved. 
The interviewee stated  
“at President level, I think there was some initial getting to know you and the 
usual kind of jockeying but funny enough, the dynamic around three or four is 
very different from the dynamic around two.  Two are almost directly competing, 
three are more of a community and certainly four is an even bigger community.  It 
may be a bit more fragmented but it's actually easier to build dynamic and I 




In addition to strong interpersonal relationships at leadership level, the Alliance 
has also succeeded in building strong personal relationships between others working on 
the merger project. This is perhaps attributable to the fact that a single TU office was 
established and that people were seconded from their former roles to work full time on 
the project. One interviewee commented that “the relevant people in the three 
organisations know each other very well - have a good strong working relationships - so 
that's working quite well” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3) and another added “what worked 
well was how we got to know each other” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4), reporting that they 
would feel comfortable in each other’s institutions or boardrooms, and that “there is no 
question that we all know each other an awful lot better” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). 
That interviewee stated that the Alliance chose an  
“engaging participative approach to figuring out how we want to shape the TU 
and we have layered that down through multiple layers of the organisation, 
starting with the Senior Managers and we got to the point of knowing each other 
and knowing each other's first names and knowing our children's names and 
things like that and it went from there down to the Heads of School, who have 
hundreds of people and down into the Heads of Function and their staff” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 4), 
 although this opinion is not necessarily echoed by others in the Alliance, who feel that 
engagement outside of the leaders and the core project team has been unsatisfactory.  
These strong relationships were not built overnight however, and one interviewee 
commented that it “took a lot of work” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3). Another added  
“there would have been minor bumps.  I think, really, why they're minor bumps, 
is that certainly, if I look at the support team that we have here, we're all very, 
very different in terms of our personality profiles and backgrounds, but I think 
there's a sufficiently cohesive degree that we're working towards a common 
purpose” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  
In fact, ensuring that the project team is working towards a common goal and that 
the members of the team focus on the greater good is a key facilitatory factor. One 
interviewee likened the process to changing the team you support. He commented  
“so the way I looked at it was - I took off the (Individual IoT) jersey and put on a 




had a number of team meetings in this room where we asked 'what does it mean 
and what are we doing' and I would have said, the issue of the metaphor of 'what 
jersey are you wearing' came up and for the most part, people said that they 
wearing a TU jersey” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).  
However, allegiance to the new TU was not, it appears, universal across the all 
members of the team. As one interviewee commented   
“we are not the land of the lotus eaters either…what has become clear to me, 
despite what might be said, but in terms of facts on the ground, is that some 
people never took their jerseys off. They simply put on TU jersey's over their own 
jersey, and so their own jerseys were always closer to their heart” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 3). 
Recently there has been a change in leadership in one of the partner IoTs and the 
TU project coordinator has also changed, as have some members of the TU support team. 
While this may be beneficial in terms of freshening up the merger team and perhaps 
reinvigorating the process, the Alliance must ensure that the new team continues to 
develop and maintain strong personal relationships and dynamics based on honesty, 
openness and trust, if the merger process is ultimately to be successful.  
 
5.4.4.4.The Political Landscape 
The Irish political landscape is another key factor which is perceived as having 
impacted upon the merger process in this Alliance. In particular, interviewees 
commended the political support which the partners had received during the process to 
date. One commented  
“I mean to say any and all political involvement has always been positive.  I 
mean, just about every possible Minister has come in and proclaimed their 
support for what we're doing” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).  
Another stated  
“the role of the Minister is absolutely critical.  On several occasions over the last 
number of years, I and several others - off line - would have said to the Minister 
directly 'you have no idea how important it is for you to grunt positively in public 
about this, not for the public, but for our own staff’- that they have to believe 




In contrast to Alliance B, this political support has been well received by the 
partners, most likely because it aligns with the partner institutions real ambitions. One 
interviewee recalled a conversation with a relevant Senior Government Minister in 
relation to the merger process, and particularly his concerns about merging but not being 
re-designated as a TU, stating  
“I can remember, as clear as day in the Gresham Hotel one day, in this meeting 
with (a Senior Government Minister) at the time, and we were having this 
conversation and the bottom line on this issue if we could get stuck in the black 
hole, (the Senior Government Minister) said as clear as day 'you don't mess with 
us - we won't miss with ye', so the political intention was not to get anyone stuck 
in the black hole” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
One would have to question the wisdom of this sort of an approach to TU 
designation. However, it does illustrate just how political the Irish process is and how 
supportive this particular Minister was of the Alliance. Since that time, there has been a 
change of government, and this of course brings with it political uncertainties for the 
Alliance. Nonetheless, the political support it has received to date has certainly been a 
facilitatory factor.  
 
5.4.4.5 Trust, Honesty and Understanding 
Interviewees from this Alliance spoke of the levels of trust, openness and honesty 
which existed between the partner institutions as being a perceived facilitatory factor to 
the process. Most interviewees attributed this to the fact that the three Presidents had a 
formed a trusting and honest relationship, and this then set the tone for the rest of the key 
members of the Alliance. One interviewee commented  
“the need to engage honestly is very, very important and the need to make 
decisions and not to play cute and you know, some people might say - being open 
and honest is naive, but at the end of the day if there isn't that level of disclosure, 
there won't be that level of confidence in the process” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).   
One example of the level of trust which has been established is in relation to due 
diligence, which this Alliance has yet to complete, although it is at an advanced stage of 




“if you're about building trust, the wrong place to start is to say ‘by the way - 
we're going to run a big check on you first to make sure that you're a suitable bed 
partner’” and continued “if you're trying to go back to your language of inhibitory 
and facilitatory - to my mind, facilitatory is ‘yes - let's trust each other for now 
and at a point in time, we're going to have to check out a few things’ - to the 
extent that we haven't already exchanged information between us” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 4).  
This is in direct contrast to the approaches to due diligence taken in the other two 
Alliances.  Alliance A has already completed its due diligence, and in Alliance B, the 
partners fell out over the need for and process for completion of due diligence. Certainly 
the partners in Alliance C seem willing to place a considerable amount of trust in each 
other and the process, and this has facilitated their progress to date.  
 
5.4.4.6 Cultural Issues, Values and Identity 
As would be expected given the profiles of the partner institutions, significant 
perceived cultural differences have arisen during the merger process, particularly 
between the two smaller IoTs and their much larger partner.  The two smaller IoTs, as 
one interviewee noted, are  
“twinned in mind, body and soul.  They were the last two Colleges to be 
established.  They were new.  They weren't re-named RTC's. So (IoT 3) was 
established in 1992 or 1993.  10 Years later, (IoT 2) was established here.  The 
very first day (IoT 2) was established, all the staff were on the payroll in (IoT 3) 
as (IoT 2) didn't have a payroll.  Large numbers of staff went over and back.  It 
just feels like - I'm in a different building - it could be the same college. The 
geographic draw is roughly the same, so those two colleges never had a problem 
with each other and would often work together and would complement each 
other.  We were in two different locations, but I would suspect are as similar in 
philosophy and spirit as any two colleges you could pick out in the country” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
The interviewee stated that the two smaller institutions see themselves as being “much 
more responsive/re-active…participating in the employment creation initiatives, 
engaging with the springboards, the accelerated technician programmes and all those type 




In contrast, the larger institution is seen by the two smaller partners as being 
extremely hierarchical, more formal, slower to make decisions and less responsive to the 
industry and the community.  One interviewee commented “even the management 
structure, I think, you know a porter here would talk to the President, but I don't know if 
that would happen here to the same extent in [the larger institution]” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 1). Another interviewee commented that the larger institution is seen as 
being “in many ways, similar, much more similar to a traditional university” and as 
portraying “an aura of being ‘superior’ (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
These cultural differences have certainly caused difficulties for the Alliance. One 
interviewee commented that  
“the culture between those two (smaller IoTs) and the hierarchy involved in 
getting a decision made in (the larger institution) has led us to huge issues - so 
that culture and the lack of clear mission would probably be the biggest 
difficulties” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1).  
However, the cultural differences have not been insurmountable, with 
interviewees suggesting that when you look a bit deeper and get to know each other 
better, people are not all that different. One stated “when you got in under the hub and 
the propaganda, the people were very similar”, adding 
“so again as we got to meet the layer down - the Heads of School and what they 
call Assistant Heads of School - Heads of Department, those type of people would 
be very similar and we would have had a lot of commonality.  We're all on the 
same contract of employment.  We're all on the same arrangement with the 
Department, so from a structural point of view, we were quite similar, so even 
from though optically, the organisation might have felt differently, actually - at an 
operational level -very similar, and again when we started to engage, get the 
exams office people - they could be living in the same world, because they have 
the exact same issues and the exact same concerns” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
Indeed, there appears to be a strong commitment from the partners to create a new 
culture, which was commended by the International Panel. One interviewee stated “this 
whole endeavor is not [to] merge three institutes, we actually want to transform 






5.4.4.7 Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging Institutions 
Given the particular constitution of this Alliance, with two small and one very 
large partner, it is not surprising that as one interviewee stated “there will be the 
suspicion that the larger organisation will gobble up the smaller organisation…the worry 
I think, always in a merger situation is that the core always takes from the periphery” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 1). Clearly the two smaller partners have real concerns about 
losing autonomy and power and being 'taken over' or 'swallowed up' by the larger 
partner. One interviewee stated  
“one of the metaphors that has been trotted out and it's an interesting one and 
probably not a bad one, is that what we're trying to do is a bit like the Irish 
breakfast where the hens are involved but the pig is committed. And so you know 
the (two smaller IoTs) are committed because they go away - if you want to say - 
in that they're dissolved into (the larger institution) to use the language of the Bill, 
whereas (the larger institution) is involved because it will still stay as it is, so in 
that sense, you could say it's easier for (the larger institution) because it doesn’t 
really have to do anything” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).   
Such fear is certainly legitimate in this Alliance due to the fact that under the 
proposed legislation, merger will mean that both of the smaller partner IoTs will be 
dissolved and have their powers and functions transferred to the larger partner. This is in 
contrast to the other two Alliances which would see all partner institutions dissolved and 
a new entity formed at the point of merger. This has naturally heightened fears about loss 
of autonomy and being ‘taken over’, although interviewees pointed out that this was done 
as the larger institution has full awarding powers of its own under a different legislative 
framework than the other IoTs, so it made sense to hold onto that. However, interviewees 
noted that this had come at a cost, with one commenting  
“the flaw in all of that was that by keeping [the larger partner] alive it made a 
very unbalanced see-saw for the conversation…if I had my time back again, I 
would do differently.  I would probably have put the three of them out of 
business…As I said there were unintended consequences from an emotional and 




The interviewee suggested that perhaps the two smaller partners should have merged first 
so that they would not have been such “a trivial player”, stating 
“if I had my time over again, I might have merged the two similar ones first and 
then went in with a harder bargaining position to the other partner for negotiation 
purposes, being wise after the event, but you could never have imagined that you 
would need to do that” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).   
Certainly there were and are tensions around the negotiations in relation to the 
power and size imbalance of the partner institutions.  The smaller institutions want to 
resist being perceived as a feeder college for the ‘real university’ so equality of purpose 
is important to them. An interviewee from one of the smaller partner IoTs reported that  
“there was an assumed establishment, where we'd all just suck in under the 
structures of [the larger IoT] and we said 'stop the lights - not necessarily - only if 
it suits us' and that caused huge disruption and other than that, it would have been 
a 'hostile takeover'.  We said ‘no - hang on now, this isn't a takeover - we're going 
to re-invent ourselves to meet the student's needs - now that we have a bigger 
resource’” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). 
Another noted  
“because we didn't have a crisis that was driving this, we had no natural decision 
maker or we weren't prepared to accept that the biggest fellow makes the 
decisions” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).  
The two smaller institutions were also keen to ensure that the management and 
governance structures of the new TU is representative of and fair to all three partners. 
One interviewee commented  
“it would be important that there is an executive structure for the university 
ultimately that requires a presence in (the two smaller IoTs), so that they are not 
perceived to be peripheral or outliers and that everything is sucked into (the larger 
institution) and I think the Steering Group have been aware of this” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 1). 
On the other hand, an interviewee from the larger IoT reports that they feel they 
have to be accommodating to a disproportionate extent to ensure that the smaller partners 




“I think, because they're the smaller partner, they probably feel that they have the 
greatest to lose, and therefore they needed to have a far greater say in what was 
actually happening in the developments associated with it, so they set out to do 
that” (Alliance C, Interviewee 2).  
Yet despite, or perhaps even because of this power imbalance, the Alliance has managed 
to progress through the process to date with these issues in hand.  
 
5.4.4.8 Lack of Government, HEA and Department Support, Commitment, 
Understanding & Clarity 
In contrast to the other two Alliances, the majority of interviewees reported that 
they felt the HEA and the Department, had in general, been supportive of the process to 
date, with one key exception in relation to the failure to enact the necessary legislation. 
Members of this Alliance did not appear to have met with the same level of apathy, 
disinterest or even resistance to their proposal from the HEA, with interviewees 
commenting “the HEA, in short have been very supportive” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4) 
and “I would think that the Department are supportive” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1). 
Another stated “there are people in the HEA who have been positive and constructive.  I 
certainly don't think they have ever thrown any wobblies or [put] any road blocks in front 
of what we're doing, at all” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).  
However, a key perceived inhibitory factor to the process has been the failure of 
government to enact the necessary legislation to allow the partners to merge. This has 
caused enormous difficulties for the partners, who cannot set a date for merger or merge 
until the legislation is in place. One commented  
“the delay in the legislation has hugely affected us.  This exercise should have 
taken two years max, and it does not get easier and it does not get better by being 
dragged out.  We're going four years now and it's still no end in sight.  That is 
laughable from a commercial business perspective” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4). 
This delay has led to questions being raised of the commitment of government to the 
process. One interviewee stated  
“I suppose the one thing that you might say is that ‘Hunt’ issued January 2011 - 5 
years on, we don't have the legislation, so there is a legitimate question there, with 
regard to commitment…the Government didn’t give us the legislation is the 




The delay in enacting the legislation has also led to questioning about whether the 
merger will actually go ahead. One interviewee stated  
“the legislation is a major motivator.  It tells you this is going to happen and I 
think not having it, makes it harder to actually get real work done.  If I look at 
everything that we've done and achieved to date, an awful lot of it is planning, an 
awful lot of it is aspirational, but because the legislation isn’t there” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 2).  
Another commented  
“I do believe that people work to deadlines.  We need to know what our target 
date for merger is.  I understand, actually, and have sympathy with, the fact that 
because the legislation hasn't been adopted, the Steering Group are very reluctant 
to state now what their goal is, with respect to a date for merger, but it would 
make it an awful lot better” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3). 
The sense of frustration and annoyance at the legislation not been passed is palpable 
within this Alliance. One interviewee likened the uncertainty in this regard to “waiting 
for Godot but Godot never showed - you know - he never showed up” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 1). 
 
5.4.4.9 Leadership & Charisma 
Another key perceived facilitatory factor for this Alliance has been the 
commitment of its leaders to the merger project, which has been consistently strong 
throughout the process. One interviewee commented “I think the resolve from the top - 
good strong leadership from the top and no dithering, no ‘will we - won't we?’ It was 
from [strong] the very beginning. I think there was a resolve there that travelled out” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 2).  
Another interviewee commented that “nobody questions the commitment of the 
Presidents to what we're trying to do. That’s fundamentally important” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 3) and “the one thing I would say is the strong commitment on the part of the 
three Presidents to collaborating and getting closer, was an important positive contributor 
to that as well” (Alliance C, Interviewee 3).  
In addition to the commitment of the Presidents, the commitment of the Project 
Chair was also referenced by interviewees, who felt that his support had been 




 Finally, interviewees spoke of ‘champions’ within the Alliance who demonstrated 
leadership in relation to the project and who have helped to facilitate the process.  One 
interviewee commented  
“when I look at some of the key people - there have been some great champions 
among the group of people that got involved in this…there are some great people 
involved in the leadership piece of that - some of those champions have been a 
real positive influence on the whole process” (Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
The work of these individuals has facilitated the progress of the Alliance through the 
process to date.  
 
5.4.4.10 Building and Maintaining Momentum & Stability 
Not surprisingly, this Alliance has found it difficult to build and maintain 
momentum throughout the process, and this has been perceived as being problematic. 
One interviewee illustrated this point, commenting  
“we were physically not able to [merge] because we have no legislation.  We 
were meant to merge last September.  We had psyched everyone up by the time 
they went home last June that we had all the stuff done, so we could be merged by 
September, and they had [psyched themselves up].  By May, clearly we were not 
getting legislation and we're saying like ‘finish the work lads - finish the work’ 
and they did and they went home.  The whole thing was stopped, but it's much 
harder to get the wheels’ spinning the second time than to keep it spinning” 
(Alliance C, Interviewee 4).  
Another comment “ye've had the same issue with on again/off again – ‘for God's sake 
lads - this is a joke.  If it was that important, how did it take you this long to get your acts 
together’, so the longer it goes on, the less credible this process is” (Alliance C, 
Interviewee 4). The failure to enact the necessary legislation has also provided time and 
space for opposing trade unions to rally the troops. 
Some interviewees feel that the loss in momentum has led to a decline in 
enthusiasm for the project. One commented “I would say I have seen in the last year, a 
decline in enthusiasm” (Alliance C, Interviewee 1). Another stated “the challenge is to 
keep enthusiasm going so I think it’s, can we keep the charge of enthusiasm going long 




(Alliance C, Interviewee 2). There is clearly a danger for the Alliance here which needs 
to be addressed.  
 
5.4.5 Conclusion & Recommendations 
From the above, it is possible to identify a number of key factors, arising both at 
institutional and system level, which are perceived as having either facilitated or 
inhibited the progress of this Alliance through the merger and re-designation process. 
These are summarised below: 
 
Key Facilitatory Factors 
 At System Level 
o Support from successive key political actors. 
o Generally supportive approach from HEA & Department. 
 At Institutional Level: 
o High levels of trust, openness and honesty between the partner institutions.  
o Establishment of strong formal and informal relationships between key people 
in both institutions, both at leadership level and between those working on the 
TU project. 
o Creation of a single TU office at an early stage in the process and 
commitment by the partner IoTs to providing the necessary human resources 
to the project. 
o Commitment from the partners to transform and create a new culture for the 
new institution. 
o Strong committed leaders (Presidents and Project Chair) who have driven the 
project. 
o Champions within the Alliance who demonstrated leadership in relation to the 
project and who have helped to facilitate the process. 
 
 
Key Inhibitory Factors 
 At System Level 
o Failure of government to enact necessary legislation and the resultant 




o Failure of HEA to provide funding mechanisms. 
 At Institutional Level 
o Feelings of uncertainty, fear, frustration and insecurity in relation to the 
merger process and outcome. 
o Uncertainty surrounding the mission and the very nature of what the new TU 
should and will be. 
o Failure to engage staff to a sufficient extent in the process, which has led to a 
significant degree of apprehension, uncertainty and fear in relation to the 
merger and considerable IR issues. 
o Cultural differences between the two small institutions and its large partner. 
o Concerns of smaller institutions about power imbalance, the possibility of 
losing identity or autonomy and being ‘swallowed up’. 
o Inability to build and maintain momentum throughout the process and 
resultant loss of momentum and enthusiasm for the project. 
 
There is a real danger that if these inhibitory factors are not addressed soon, 
enthusiasm will wane and the project may falter. Consequently, there are a number of 
actions which I suggest the Alliance should take to further progress the merger and re-
designation process. These are summarised below: 
 Reconsider the distinctiveness and relevance of the proposed mission and vision 
for the new TU, in line with the International Panel’s recommendations. Clarity 
around mission, vision and purpose will help to address and alleviate some of the 
uncertainties and fears which currently exist. 
 Continue to work to address the IR issues. Ideally, this should be facilitated at 
national/system level, as similar issues arise in all of the Alliances. However, at 
institutional level, the Alliances need to focus on communicating with, consulting 
and engaging staff with the project, as this has been perceived as being a 
weakness with the process. 
 Form a coalition with other Alliances of IoTs who are merging to lobby at system 
level for legislation, funding and facilitation mechanisms. 
 Set a date for merger and work to that date, despite the lack of legislation. This 




pressure on system level actors to resolve issues at their end. It should also assist 
in re-generating enthusiasm for the project, which has waned. 
 Secure and commit the necessary financial resources to the project and seek 
alternative sources of funding to address any shortfall in exchequer funding, as 
per the International Panel recommendation.  
 Take active steps to continue to develop and maintain strong working 
relationships, particularly between the new staff who have recently been brought 
in to work on the project. 
 Address the specific concerns of the smaller partners to ensure negotiations run 
relatively smoothly. Agreement on the governance and management structure is 
key to this and should be secured as soon as possible. Another option would be to 










6. CROSS CASE ANALYSIS, FINDINGS & DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents cross-case analysis and discussion of the data. Firstly, a 
comparative analysis is presented, both to identify similarities, which would be expected 
at system level, and differences, which may be more prevalent at an institutional level, 
between the individual case studies. This facilitates the identification of the key factors, 
both facilitatory and inhibitory, which are perceived to be impacting upon the process in 
the Irish context 
Secondly, a cumulative cross case analysis is presented, which analyses the data 
set in its entirety and therefrom proposes a broad framework or classification around 
which the full range of relevant factors can be positioned and conceptualised. 
 
6.2 Comparative Cross Case Findings &Analysis  
The within case analysis of each of the three Alliances provides evidence of a 
complex interplay of both system and institutional level factors at work within each case.  
The key factors or themes identified by participants as relevant to each Alliance are 
summarised in comparative form in Table 21 below.  
As would be expected, certain key themes are common to all three Alliances, and 
others are shared across two. There is quite a degree of commonality between Alliance A 
and C, both of whom have made relatively steady progress. As could be expected, 
Alliance B, which has encountered significant difficulties during the process, has got the 
greatest number of unique key themes. This is useful as it allows me to identify and ring-
fence those factors which are potentially attributable to the break-down in negotiations 
between the partners, although it must be stated that all of the key themes identified are 
shared to some extent across all three Alliances. 
Each key theme is discussed in further detail below, with reference to the relevant 
literature or theoretical framework to explain the findings. It is important to note that 
these are not intended to be hierarchical in nature, but rather are all interlinked and 






Table 21: Comparative View of Key Factors emerging from each Case 
 






Lack of Government HEA & Department Support, 
Commitment, Understanding & Clarity 
X X X 
Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging 
Institutions 
X X X 
Trust, Honesty & Understanding X  X 
Relationships between Key People X  X 
Communicating with Staff & IR Issues X  X 
Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration X  X 
Building and Maintaining Momentum & Stability X  X 
Leadership & Charisma  X X 
The Political landscape  X X 
Cultural Issues, Values & Identity  X X 
Role of External Consultants & Facilitators X X  
Distrust, Hostility, Resentment & Suspicion  X  
Securing the Support of the Senior Management 
Team 
 X  
Blocking, Delaying Tactics and Game Playing  X  
Lack of Commitment, Belief & Planning    
Resources X   
Project Planning X   
 
6.2.1 Lack of Government, HEA & Department Support, Commitment, 
Understanding & Clarity 
Certain key themes are common across all three cases. The first and most 
prevalent of these is the perceived lack of Government, HEA and Department support, 
commitment, understanding and clarity. This is perhaps unsurprising as they are system 
level actors, so commonality across all three Alliances would be expected. Both Davies 




facilitating the collaboration and merger planning and implementation process through a 
variety of factors, many of which are clearly absent in the Irish context. This research 
provides evidence that there was a perceived failure at system level to: 
o Provide certainty and clarity on the overall desired shape of the Irish HE 
system before inviting proposals to merge from IoTs 
o Provide certainty and clarity on the model/paradigm, nature and role of a 
TU within the Irish system along with a failure to demonstrate an 
understanding of the necessary system or institutional boundary 
conditions required 
o Provide certainty and clarity regarding the process, stages, timeline or 
criteria required for re-designation 
o Enact the necessary legislation 
o Provide necessary or appropriate funding mechanisms  
o Provide system level advice, support or facilitation mechanisms for 
merging IoTs 
o Provide clarity on contentious issues, such as staffing and IR matters 
The data strongly supports the proposition that all three Alliances perceive these 
system level factors as inhibitory. Indeed, the absence of legislation is not only 
inhibitory, but is absolutely preventative in nature. The alignment of the merger 
requirement with the creation of TUs has created additional confusion and dissatisfaction 
within the sector. 
With regard to Davies (2013) continuum of government/agency positioning on 
collaborations and mergers, adopted from Tannenbaum and Schmidt’s (1976) model the 
Irish government/government agencies approach to merger and re-designation is clearly 
closer to the ‘Tells and Sells’ end of the continuum, than it is to the ‘delegates’ end of the 
spectrum. System level actors decreed not only the process, as would be expected, but 
also left the individual IoTs with little real choice about who to merge with. Therefore, 
even though the mergers are being sold as voluntary, in reality the IoTs had no choice but 
to merge to become a TU, and little to no real choice regarding partner choice.  
As discussed earlier, this ‘Tells and Sells’ approach has historically been the 
approach taken to the Irish IoT sector, and has inhibited and slowed development in the 
sector in the past. This research provides evidence that it is perceived to be continuing to 
do so. It is interesting to note that both Alliances A and B perceived that the HEA took a 




process. Interviewees from both Alliances questioned the agenda of the HEA and even 
questioned if it was aligning itself to national policy.  Alliance C, on the other hand, felt 
that the HEA and the Department had been generally supportive. This is an interesting 
finding, particularly as Alliance C has been the most successful to date, and also the 
Alliance which reported the most positive political support for the merger. In fact, the 
lack of system level support reported by Alliances A and C have led them to question the 
motives and real agenda of the HEA, and has also led to questioning about whether or not 
there is any real alignment at system level between those tasked with the formulation of 
national HE policy, strategy and its implementation.  
6.2.2 Power Dynamics and Negotiations between Merging Institutions 
Although the existing literature on HE mergers is relatively silent on this factor, it 
is perceived as critical in the Irish context. All three cases provide ample evidence of the 
key role which power dynamics are perceived to play in the negotiations between partner 
institutions, with factors such as relative partner size, academic reputation or success or 
political connections being used to exert or gain bargaining power or strength by one 
partner over the other. All cases show evidence of the smaller partners fear of being 
swallowed up or taken over, their fear of loss of autonomy and of losing their regional 
remit.  Smaller partners within the Alliances were keen to establish parity or equality of 
esteem, respect for achievements, equal representation on groups, committees, etc., and 
were keen to secure a fair share of senior posts in the new institution. Larger partners, on 
the other hand, felt that the smaller partners were acting out their insecurities and that as 
a result, the larger partners were making more concessions than might be justified by an 
objective look at both institutions. Alliance A took positive steps in the form of an 
integration agreement to help address these issues and this appears to have facilitated the 
progress of that Alliance. Within Alliance B, on the other hand, the partners ended up in 
a public dispute where both attempted to undermine perceived strengths and exploit 
perceived weaknesses of the other. The data gathered from Alliance B also supports the 
proposition that the closer the partners are in size, the more difficult the negotiation and 
merger process may be. 
In relation to the number of partners within an Alliance, conflicting opinions 
arose. Within Alliance B, interviewees felt that it was easier to plan a merger with two 
partners, rather than three, supporting the proposition by Harman & Harman (2003) and 




those between multiple partners. However, within Alliance C, interviewees, particularly 
from the smaller Alliance, felt that having three partners was easier, as it gave the two 
smaller partners greater collective strength vis-a-vis their larger partner. 
Clearly then, these power dynamics, if not managed carefully, have the potential 
to drag any prospective merger negotiations down, and this research suggests that they 
are much more influential than the existing HE merger literature acknowledges. To this 
end, agreement at as early a stage as possible in negotiations about the name, governance 
and management structures, location of headquarters and positioning of senior posts 
within the new institution, along with other post-merger integration issues, appears to be 
critical for success. It also appears to be important to ensure that smaller partners are 
equally represented and respected during the negotiations process, and that there is a pre-
agreed dispute resolution mechanism for the disputes which, it appears, will inevitably 
arise. 
6.2.3 Trust, Honesty & Understanding  
All three cases illustrate the absolute need to build, establish and maintain trust, 
honesty and understanding between the partners. This echoes findings by Mohr and 
Spekman (1994), Cullen et al. (2000), Abodor (2005), Kale and Singh (2009), Brown et 
Al (2004) and Curry J (2013) in relation to the importance of inter-organisational trust in 
mergers and collaborations. Both Alliances A and C, who have made relatively good 
progress despite the system level inhibitors, reported that the establishment of trust, 
openness, honesty, understanding and even frankness between the partners was a key 
facilitatory factor in the process, and has enabled the partners to get though difficulties 
which arose during the process. This is despite the fact that there was no real history of 
collaboration between the partners before this current process. The partners in Alliance B 
on the other hand clearly failed to establish trust, honesty or understanding. In fact, data 
from that Alliance is an excellent example not only of the absence of trust, but of active 
distrust, hostility, suspicion and resentment caused by a number of factors, including a 
history of a competitive relationship, perceived differences in cultures, values and 
trajectories, changes in key personnel and poor working relationships between key-
people. It not only demonstrates distrust at an inter-organisational and interpersonal level, 
but also at an intra-organisational level, where there appeared to be enormous distrust of 
one of the leaders within his own organisation. This was perceived as being a major 




This research strongly suggests that inter-organisational, intra-organisational and 
interpersonal trust between key actors is a sine qua non for a successful merger process. 
While the absence of a history of successful collaboration between the partners is not 
detrimental, an acrimonious history between the two may be, unless specifically 
acknowledged and addressed.  Huxham and Vangen (2005) recommend the use of their 
trust building loop, which focuses on aiming for realistic and successful outcomes (which 
are initially modest), and using this as a base for reinforcing trusting attitudes and gaining 
underpinnings for more ambitious collaborations. It also identifies the need for the 
partners to trust each other initially, to be willing to be vulnerable and take a risk, while 
acknowledging that the partners form expectations about the future of the collaboration 
based on reputation or past behaviours or contracts and agreements. This could be used 
as a model for future partner institutions who wish to undergo a merger process. 
6.2.4 Relationships between Key People  
The findings from all three cases highlight the importance of establishing strong 
formal and informal relationships between key people in the partner institutions. Both 
Alliances A and C seem to have succeeded in building up strong working relationships 
based on trust and honesty between both the Presidents and other key people within the 
partner institutions and this has contributed to the success of progress made to date. 
Interviewees commented on the need for strong personal chemistry and a positive 
dynamic between the Presidents and of the need for key staff working on the project to 
get along with each other. Interviewees suggested that early agreement about the futures 
of the Presidents in these Alliances, both of which notably involved one partner which is 
significantly larger than the other(s), also helped. This supports findings by Brown et al 
(2004) and HEFCE (2010) who identified that early agreement on the position of the two 
heads of institution post-merger is an important issue.  
In contrast there were serious difficulties within Alliance B in establishing strong 
working relationships, due to a number of factors, including the fact that there were a 
considerable number of changes in leadership, both at President and Chair of Governing 
Body level, within the institutions during the course of the merger process. There was 
also a failure to agree at an early stage about the futures of the Presidents. The lack of 
strong personal relationships at any senior level across the two partner organisations is a 
perceived inhibitor to the progress of Alliance B.  The implication from this is that strong 




critical to the success of the merger process, and the absence of these can lead to serious 
difficulties.  
6.2.5 Leadership and Charisma  
The data from both Alliance B and C highlight the importance of strong, 
committed leadership within merging institutions. Leaders must be willing and able to 
take ownership of the process and drive it forward, even in the face of the likely 
resistance from some within the ranks. This supports the findings of Brown et al (2004) 
on the importance of strong leadership. Leaders in the merging institutions must also be 
able to able to influence, gain the support of, and if necessary, manipulate others in the 
organisation, to secure the success of the project. They need to use formal and informal 
networks of ‘champions’ across all levels of the institution. Alliance C is a good example 
of a case where strong leadership has been evident and leaders have committed to and 
pushed on with the merger project. In contrast, difficulties with leadership in Alliance B, 
particularly the failure of a leader to bring the Senior Executive team and wider 
organisation on board, has caused significant difficulties for that Alliance. It is clear that 
if the necessary leadership in any of the partner institutions is lacking, the project is likely 
to falter.  
6.2.6 The Political Landscape 
Another system level, macro-political factor which has played a key role in the 
process is the Irish political landscape, and particularly the political support for, or as 
some would see it political interference in, the process. This is a factor which has not 
been previously identified HE literature, and perhaps this is not surprising, given the 
autonomous nature of most HEIs. Irish IoTs however, are a different animal.  As outlined 
earlier, since their establishment they have been tightly controlled by the DoES, and 
more recently, the HEA, in an extraordinarily tight, steering-from-centre approach, 
operating under inflexible financial, staffing and legislative frameworks. Their regional 
remit has made them attractive propositions for politicians who want to be seen to be 
supportive of their region and many of the members of their Governing Bodies, including 
the Chairs, are political appointees.  It is maybe then not surprising that there has been a 
strong political influence. 
Alliances B and C provide contrasting cases in point. Within Alliance C, political 
support was welcomed and perceived as positive and facilitatory towards the process. In 




Government 2011-2016, interviewees felt that there had been an unwarranted degree of 
political interference with the process, that politicians were ‘playing politics’ and that 
there was political misunderstanding and dishonesty, which had been unhelpful to the 
process. Such a reaction would support the propositions made by Harman & Meek (2002) 
and Thompson (2012) that considerable external pressure or force to effect a merger is 
often not helpful to the process and that if a proposed merger is forced, and one or both 
of the parties rejects the idea or benefits of merging, the merger process can become very 
arduous and laborious (Thompson, 2012).  Certainly there seems to have been an 
inordinate amount of political wrangling in relation to this Alliance, including for 
example, the statement in the Programme for Government, various Ministers appointing 
chairpersons, facilitators, consultants, etc., and meetings between the institutions and the 
Minister when the process became unstable.  
These political factors, along with the perceived lack of HEA and Department 
understanding, commitment, support and clarity, demonstrate the critical role that macro-
political system level factors play can play in the merger process. 
6.2.7 Communicating with Staff & IR Issues 
Findings from both Alliances A and C highlight the need to ensure that staff, both 
administrative and academic are consulted during and engaged with the merger process at 
all stages. Cartwright, Tytherleigh and Robertson (2007), Harman (2010) and Brown et al 
(2004) all highlight the importance of consulting and involving staff, who may be 
concerned about their job security. Such consultation, they stress, must be genuine and be 
reflected in the subsequent merger process to avoid heightening negativity towards the 
merger process. Harman (2000) recommends that to facilitate the process, guarantees be 
given as soon as possible in the process to staff about security of employment, where 
feasible. In the Irish context, this has not happened for a number of reasons. For example, 
Alliance A was reluctant to commit resources to the project or to engage staff to any real 
extent until they knew if it was feasible and indeed, likely. However, by the time they 
realised that the project was a real possibility, the information vacuum they had created 
had been filled “by fear” with the unions, who had time in the interim to build opposition 
to the merger. This opposition was bolstered by the fact that as the legislation has not yet 
been approved, it is difficult for the Irish Alliances to give guarantees to staff, beyond 
that they will not be made redundant or have their salary reduced. Perhaps it is surprising 




but a variety of contextual issues, such as the economic downturn with resultant salary 
cuts and additional workload, and the premium placed on certainty and security by many 
staff in the sector, have led to growing disquiet and industrial action being threatened by 
the academic trade unions, who have effectively blocked the process at a national level 
for the past 18 months, severely inhibiting the progress of all of three Alliances.  The 
perceived difficulty in communicating a vision for a new TU to staff and to selling the 
potential benefits of it to them, along with an aura of secrecy around the project in some 
of the Alliances, is certainly contributing to IR difficulties and a failure to get ‘buy in’ 
from staff. The obvious implication here is that, as the literature suggests, early regular 
communication, consultation and engagement with staff is critical to the success of the 
process and that a failure to do this is likely to result in difficulties further along the line.  
6.2.8 Feelings of Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration  
Interviewees from both Alliances A and C expressed feelings of fear, insecurity, 
frustration and uncertainty around the merger process. Both of these Alliances had 
completed Stage Three of the process, yet were extremely anxious around aspects of the 
process and possible outcome, frustrated with the lack of progress and enabling 
mechanisms, and afraid of the unknown. It seems that the closer the Alliance gets to the 
merger becoming a reality, the more apprehensive or fearful people become, as the 
possible becomes probable and real. It is notable that interviewees from Alliance B were 
not as anxious or fearful about the outcome, likely because it looks as if a merger is not 
on the cards in that Alliance for some time.  
Merging institutions, therefore, must be cognisant of and acknowledge these 
emotions, and address them where and when possible. While communication at an early 
stage in the process is important, what is equally as important is that communication is 
‘ramped up’ as the process develops, to help allay concerns and fears which naturally 
arise. 
6.2.9 Cultural Issues, Values & Identity 
Issues surrounding culture, values and identity were prevalent across all three 
Alliances, and were highlighted in particular in both Alliances B and C. Both of these 
Alliances consisted of larger IoTs who had been pursuing University designation for 
some time, and indeed had previously submitted applications for same, and their smaller 
partners who had not necessarily been on that trajectory. This gave rise to perceived 




some member IoTs who were very explicitly values led organisations, and whose 
partners did not necessarily share those same values. This led to culture clashes and 
implies that values led HEIs may be more difficult to merge, due to a strong allegiance to 
existing institutional culture and values. This supports propositions by Harman (2002) 
and Harman and Harman (2003), who identified the powerful influence which culture has 
in some merger situations, and Buono and Bowditch (1989), who found that the  ‘thicker’ 
the culture and the greater the degree of shared beliefs and values within an organisation, 
the more potent the influence of that culture will be. 
6.2.10 Building & Maintaining Momentum & Stability 
 Harman and Harman (2003) propose that mergers work best if institutions that 
have agreed to merge can move as quickly as possible to merger implementation. They 
argue that long delays increase anxiety levels and give opponents increased time to plot 
against the merger and can ultimately lead to the demise of the process. Research by 
Brown et al (2004) echoes this and found the shorter the time scale between the decision 
to merge and the legal implementation of that decision, the better, as it reduces the 
chances of unforeseen changes in key people, limits time for opposition to gain 
momentum and minimises the chances of external changes undermining the proposal. In 
the Irish context, it is difficult to imagine how things could have been done any slower. 
Since the publication of the National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030 (DoES, 
2011), which first mooted the possibility of merger and the creation of TUs, almost six 
years have passed without any merger, let alone re-designation, having taken place. By 
any international standards or benchmark, this is unacceptably slow and has led to a 
variety of problems, which the case studies clearly demonstrate.  
At almost every stage throughout the process to date, there have been difficulties 
and delays. The data from both Alliance A and C provides evidence of the stop/start 
nature of the process due to a number of factors, including delay on the part of the HEA 
and other system level actors, particularly in relation to the lack of necessary legislation, 
IR issues and the failure to invest the necessary human resources to support the project. 
These delays have made it very difficult to build any real momentum and have allowed 
unions and other objectors to build support. It has also led many to become sceptical of 
the process and to question if it will ever happen. Delay has also led to frustration, stress 
and burnout amongst those working directly on the merger and re-designation process. 




enthusiasm for the project has waned due to the delays and failure to generate 
momentum.  
In relation to stability in the process, Alliance B provides numerous examples of 
both external and internal factors which created an extremely unstable process which 
undermined confidence of both staff and stakeholders. These factors include, but are not 
limited to changes in key personnel, a number of extraordinary external events, such as a 
Statutory Inspection of one of the IoTs, and overt distrust between the partners. 
6.2.11 Role of External Consultants & Facilitators  
Brown et al (2004) found that external change agents or brokers, who have no 
vested interest or commitment to either institution, may facilitate the merger process, 
although there is little empirical evidence in the HE literature to date on this point.  
However, case studies A and B both provide examples of the key role which external 
appointees can play during the merger process. Consultants or facilitators are appointed 
by the partner institutions either individually or collectively to provide confidence and 
comfort both internally and externally, and to gain access to knowledge and expertise not 
readily available within the Institution. Both Alliances provided evidence that each 
partner IoT brought its own external consultant(s) to negotiations, to represent and 
protect the institutions interest, and to counterbalance consultants which had already been 
appointed by their partner. All Alliances also appointed an independent external chair. It 
should be noted that all external consultants, whether chairs or not, potentially act as 
significant change agents during the merger process. 
External consultants and facilitators have acted as project chairs across all three 
Alliances, They generally work to steer the process by monitoring and maintaining 
progress, ensuring deadlines are met and quite often, facilitating conflict resolution. 
These external chairs are generally perceived as being objective and neutral when it 
comes to dealing with contentious issues between the partners and may suggest ways 
through bottlenecks, etc. In essence, they act as mediators, both formally and informally, 
and both between the partners themselves and between the partners and other external 
stakeholders and system level actors. The level of HE expertise amongst these chairs 
varied across the three Alliances, and those with no HE experience tended not to get 
involved in substantive matters, leaving that instead to other appointed HE consultants 




has the necessary skill set to be of real benefit to the process. Otherwise, the external 
change agent might inhibit, rather than facilitate the merger.  
The second category of external change agent are external consultants who bring 
to the project significant experience and expertise in HE, mergers, multi-campus HEIs, 
organisational structure, change management, research strategy, HR, etc. They are 
appointed by the institutions as ‘content’ experts, and are called upon when necessary to 
provide advice and opinions and to assist in drafting policy or discussion papers, 
proposals and other documentation, including the preparation of formal submissions. Of 
course, they may also act in a conciliatory fashion between the partners from time to 
time. It is interesting to note that there was a suggestion within Alliance B that external 
consultants can sometimes be used as ‘scapegoats’ or to undertake tasks or have 
conversations which for whatever reason, the individuals within the institution may find 
unpalatable or politically difficult. 
Whatever role the external change agent assumes, this research has found it is 
questions of perceived authority and legitimacy are crucial, as is independence of action 
and judgement. Examples emerged of consultants appointed by politicians who failed to 
secure buy in from the partners, consultants who were perceived as taking one partners 
side over the others, and consultants being used as scapegoats during the process.  
Unsurprisingly, such actions only serve to undermine, rather than support, the merger 
process. 
6.2.12 Blocking, Delaying Tactics and ‘Game Playing’  
Alliance B provides evidence of the sort of covert tactics which can and are used 
by institutions and/or individuals who may not be fully committed to the success of the 
project. The existing HE literature does not specifically identify these factors, yet they 
were perceived as having played a significant inhibitory role in Alliance B, where 
interviewees reported that some individuals used blocking, delaying tactics and ‘game 
playing’ to delay the process. Interviewees also suggested that some parties were giving 
the impression to external stakeholders, particularly the government and key politicians 
that they were committed to the process, but were using underhand tactics to stall and 
block the process. This led to a failure to make any real process. 
6.2.13 Lack of Commitment, Belief & Passion  
The data analysed from Alliance B highlights the fact that there was a perceived 




from a sizeable number of participants. Again little attention has been paid to this in the 
literature, as perhaps it is assumed that those responsible for leading and working on such 
projects will be committed to the process.  This lack of commitment, belief or passion did 
not arise as a key factor in Alliances A or C. Perhaps the lack of belief within Alliance B 
may be attributable to the fact that some within the Alliance felt that their hands were tied 
by political actors who had mandated that the possibility of merger and the creation of a 
TU between the IoTs be put into the Programme for Government, and therefore the 
impetus for the initiative did not come from the institutions themselves. Other 
interviewees noted that the partners would not have been natural bedfellows and that 
perhaps other more suitable partners might have been sought had the Programme for 
Government commitment not been made. As a result some felt that the merger was going 
to happen with or without their cooperation, and this led to a lack of commitment and 
passion and a failure to take ownership of the process. In addition, one of the partners in 
this Alliance had been pursuing designation as a traditional university on its own for 
some time, and found the concept of a TU which could only be formed by merger 
difficult to buy into or truly believe in. A comparative examination of the data across all 
three cases in relation to this factor supports the proposition that a lack of belief, 
commitment or passion is a distinct inhibitory factor. 
6.2.14 Resources  
This issue of resources, or perceived lack thereof, arose most strongly in Alliance 
A, although it was also mentioned as being an issue across the other two Alliances. The 
literature suggests that a significant amount of financial and human resources are 
required for successful mergers, and that the non-availability of such funding or 
additional resources can be a significant inhibitory factor to the process (Brown et al, 
2004). This has been identified by interviewees as an inhibitory factor, particularly in 
Alliance A, which has felt starved of resources both at system and institutional level. This 
is in contrast to Alliance C, which invested more heavily into the project, although 
arguably it had greater resources at its disposal  
The fact that the merger and re-designation process in Ireland was first mooted at 
a time of an unprecedented economic crisis in the State is not insignificant, with many 
suggesting that it was designed to be a cost saving measure which would rationalise the 
sector. Trying to effect a successful merger and create an internationally benchmarked 




almost impossible, and one would have to question the wisdom of policy makers in this 
regard.  Brown et al (2004) warn that HEIs, or indeed governments, may see mergers as a 
way of quickly reducing costs and that institutions themselves may be tempted use cost 
saving arguments to strengthen the business case. Indeed, one of the factors which the 
Stage Three International Panel picked up upon was the lack of funding mechanisms and 
the proposed costings submitted by the Alliances, which it advised they reconsider. The 
bottom line here is that mergers cost money in both the short and medium term, and the 
case studies illustrate the difficulties faced when the necessary funding is not available.  
 
6.2.15 Conclusion  
By undertaking a comparative analysis of the data across the cases, it has been 
possible to identify key system and institutional level factors which are impacting upon 
the process in the Irish context, and provide some empirical contextual evidence about 
the varying ways these factors can arise and interplay with each-other. 
 
6.3 Cumulative Cross Case Findings & Analysis 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Following the comparative analysis of the within case data, I conducted a broad, 
cumulative cross-case thematic analysis, which analysed the data set in its entirety.  This 
was conducted in an inductive manner, using the theoretical frameworks identified from 
the literature as a loose guide for the analysis.  
My analysis firstly identified all of the various factors perceived by participants as 
impacting upon the process across the cases. I then placed these factors into wider groups 
or categories, at a broader conceptual level than that which exists in HE literature base at 
present. Thus a broad framework or classification around which the full range of factors 
found across the cases can be positioned, conceptualised and explained was developed. 
This framework is outlined in Figure 10, and consists of five key categories of factors, 
which are discussed in further detail below.  Table 22 below presents details of the 









Figure 10: Proposed Framework of Key Factors impacting Upon the Merger 




Table 22: Prevalence of Key Factors across Data Set 
Category References in Data 
Set 













Historic & Cultural Factors 
 
206 18 
6.3.2 Political Factors 
The data suggests that the merger process in Irish HE is perceived as being highly 
political in nature, with both macro and micro political factors having a significant 
impact on the process. In fact, political factors were the most prevalent grouping within 
Political 
Factors 












the data set, which emphasises the critical role that both system level and institutional 
politics has played in the process. This is an interesting finding, given that the existing 
literature on HE mergers has not placed such a key emphasis on the politics of merger as 
these case studies suggest is the case in the Irish context. This finding supports Davies 
(1985) proposition that there are numerous factors which reinforce and interplay with 
each-other both within and outside the HE system which make rational, planned policy 
formation and implementation difficult. He states that policy formation in HEIs is 
inevitably a political process and centres on the disposition of power, the capacity to 
control key organisational influences and the use of levers or incentives for the fulfilment 
of particular preferences. Certainly this is reflective of the case in the Irish context, and is 
a point to which I will later return.  
 
Macro Political Factors 
At macro-political level, the participants identified the following key factors as 
impacting upon the merger process: 
 A lack of Government/Department or HEA commitment, support and clarity;  
 The Irish Political Landscape 
 Opposition from Traditional Universities  
 Support and pressure from regional stakeholders.  
Many of the issues which arise in relation to the perceived lack of support, 
commitment, understanding and clarity from the Government, Department of Education 
& Skills and the HEA, which interviewees across all Alliances felt had hindered their 
progress, have already been discussed. In particular, the failure to enact the necessary 
legislation and to provide certainty and clarity on the process and criteria are key 
inhibitory factors, as is the failure to provide the necessary funding, advice and support 
mechanisms for institutions. Many interviewees felt that there was inconsistency in 
behaviour and a ‘hands-off’, disinterested approach from the HEA and the Department of 
Education & Skills, with many questioning if they actually wanted the policy to be 
implemented at all. There certainly appears to be a perceived lack of alignment at system 
level between policy makers and implementers, and this is causing difficulties for all 
three Alliances. 
The second key macro political factor identified as important to the process is the 
Irish political landscape. The data highlighted the important role that political support or 




Commitment given in 2011. Some interviewees commented on the fact that the notion of 
a TU in the Irish context is itself a political solution to a politically problematic series of 
bids for university status which had been made by a number of IoTs in the recent past. 
The data identified the critical role that key political actors played in driving forward the 
merger and TU process, particularly senior politicians who have allegiances to a 
particular region. However, these were not always seen as helpful, with many 
interviewees accusing politicians of interference, of causing disruption in the HE system, 
playing politics with HE and trying to control the IoT sector. While the data suggests that 
political support was initially perceived as strong, at least in some quarters, this has 
declined due to a relatively uncertain Irish political landscape, which has seen changes in 
a number of key political positions and actors in recent times. Some interviewees 
reported that they now felt there is political apathy towards the project, and that this was 
related to a general failure of the political system to prioritise HE in Ireland. Others felt 
that the politicians and the Irish government had unrealistic expectations of what could 
be achieved and that institutional leaders were at times simply playing along with 
politicians, and that they didn’t want to be seen to be dragging their heels with them, as 
ultimately they control the purse strings.  
Other key macro political factors perceived as impacting upon the process 
included opposition from existing ‘traditional’ Irish universities, who had lobbied against 
the creation of TUs, amid fears of reduced funding and increased competition, and 
finally, support and pressure for the merger and re-designation projects, which has come 
from local and regional stakeholders.  
 
Micro Political Factors 
At a micro-political level, a range of themes emerged from the data, including: 
 The role of power dynamics and negotiations between merging institutions 
 The importance of strong, credible, charismatic and committed leaders and 
stability in leadership 
 The need to develop strong formal and informal relationships between key 
people in the merging institutions 
 The need to secure the support of the Senior Executive team, and the wider 




 The need to avoid blocking and delaying tactics, and ‘game playing’ between 
institutions   
  In particular, the key role of power dynamics and negotiations between merging 
institutions featured strongly, with factors such as differences in academic reputation or 
trajectory or differences in partner size being used to gain bargaining positioning. Smaller 
partners expressed concern about losing autonomy or being ‘swallowed up’ by a larger 
partner, and cited perceived arrogance or superiority on the part of the larger institution. 
Data from interviewees from larger institutions indicates that they sometimes perceive the 
smaller institution to be acting defensively or with an inferiority complex, while partners of 
relatively equal size spoke of difficulties around creating a purported merger of equals. 
Certainly, there is a significant amount of intra-institutional power play involved in the 
merger process, with merging institutions fighting for bargaining power and representation, 
and using either academic reputation or strength or size as a bargaining tool. Some appear 
to have adopted a strategy which also manifests in a perceived unwillingness to 
acknowledge partners strengths or to acknowledge its own weakness, and seizing upon 
purported weaknesses of its partner(s) in order to strengthen its bargaining position. This 
supports the proposition by Harman and Harman (2003) that mergers which are presented 
as consolidations, which is the case here due to the ‘voluntary’ nature of the process, are 
often more laborious, costly and inefficient. At an individual level, interviewees also 
reported individual power plays and self-promotion as being an inhibitory feature of the 
process.  
The data also highlighted the importance of strong, credible, charismatic and 
committed leaders, and builds on the work of Brown et al (2004) in this regard. The data 
indicates that leaders must be perceived as being loyal to their organisation, must have 
the ability to secure the support of the Senior Executive Team, and be able to influence, 
and if necessary, incentivise or manipulate others in the organisation to achieve their 
goal. Leaders must be politically astute and use political power and networks across their 
organisation to get staff on board, particularly given the rather non-hierarchical nature of 
HEIs.  The use of ‘spies’ and ‘champions’ in the organisation is one way of doing this. 
Leaders must also be willing to identify and side-line or remove problematic people at 
senior level who are in opposition to the merger. The leader must be able to ‘sell’ the 
merger to the academy and wider staff and where necessary, tailor the message to suit the 




excellent example of case where instability in leadership has had a critical impact upon 
the process. 
Also at a micro political level, the need to develop strong formal and informal 
relationships between key people in the merging institutions was highlighted, as was the 
importance of key people agreeing mutually beneficial terms for their futures at an early 
stage of the process. The data also demonstrated the types of negative tactics which can 
be employed by individuals who for whatever reason, attempt to block and delay the 
process, both covertly and overtly, and again, this is a factor which has not been 
identified in the HE literature to date. Table 23 on page 186 identifies the key political 
factors perceived as impacting upon the process, along with the number of references to 
them in the data, and number of sources who referred to them. Please see Appendix 8 for 
a more detailed classification of the key political facilitatory and inhibitory factors 






Table 23: Prevalence and Categorisation of Key Political Factors impacting 
upon the Process 
Category Group Factor Refs Sourc
es 




 424 18 
The Political Landscape 116 18 
Opposition from ‘Traditional’ Universities 14 9 
Lack of Government/Department/HEA Commitment, 
Supports, Understanding & Clarity 
126 17 
Support & Pressure from Regional Stakeholders 37 15 
Micro 
Political 
 405 17 
Power Dynamics & Negotiations between Merging 
Institutions 
91 16 
Leadership & Charisma 64 16 
Relationships between Key People in the Merging 
Organisations 
68 15 
Securing the Support of the Internal Senior Executive 
Team 
72 16 
Securing the Support of the wider Academy and 
Administrative Staff 
72 16 
Blocking & Delaying Tactics & ‘Game Playing’ 44 10 
 
6.3.3 Strategic Factors 
The data suggests that there are a number of key strategic factors which are 
perceived as relevant to the merger process in the Irish context. These are further 
classified and discussed below. 
 
The Strategic Environment 
The strategic environment,  and in particular the impact of the National Strategy 
for Higher Education to 2030 and the difficult economic climate were cited by 
interviewees as having played a key role in institutional decision making. The National 
Strategy, which focused to a large extent on the IoT sector, set the impetus for change 
and opened up the possibility for re-designation for the IoTs. The difficult economic 
climate has led to financial challenges for some IoTs, who need to secure their future 
financial viability and sustainability. Merger and re-designation was seen as a way of 




levels to adequately fund the endeavour has been a consistent inhibitory factor 
throughout the entire process to date.  
 
Drivers & the Case for Merger 
  Participants identified that the drivers for merger and the case for merger were 
critical to the process. While there were varied strategic drivers for merger, TU designation 
unified all institutions and Alliances as a key objective. Some Alliances were focused on 
creating critical mass in key areas, enhanced opportunities for research, a desire to 
transform competitive positioning and on improving access to educational opportunities 
within the region. However, certain factors, such as uncertainty around the concept of a 
TU, a failure to clearly and honestly articulate the academic case for merger, and the 
failure of policy makers to explain or justify the merger pre-requisite or to explore 
alternatives to merger, have caused difficulties during the process. These findings support 
the propositions by Davies (2013) who highlighted the importance of developing a shared 
vision, which is inspirational, rather than operational, and focusing upon this as the genesis 
for the proposed merger. This also aligns with accepted change management frameworks, 
such as those advocated by Kotter (1996), which emphasises the need to create a sense of 
urgency and a clear vision for change. In the absence of a compelling need for change and 
a clear vision for the future, is has been difficult to get ‘buy in’ into the concept of a TU, 
and secure wider support for the Alliances.  
 
Making Key Strategic Choices 
Finally, the data suggests that making key strategic choices about who to partner 
with, the mission and vision of the new institution and the name, governance and 
management structure of the new institution are critical to the process. Interviewees 
acknowledged the limitations imposed on institutions in this respect by national policy 
and political dictat. Participants identified the fact that some were reluctant ‘bedfellows’, 
or at different stages of their life cycle, as being problematic for the process. Although 
the mergers are sold as being ‘voluntary’ the reality is that some IoTs have limited 
options regarding their choice of partner. The data also suggests that contentious issues in 
relation to name, governance and management structure of the new institution may often 
lead to conflict, and should be resolved as early as possible in the process. This supports 




on the position of the two heads of institution post-merger is an important issue, and can 
often be a reason that some merger proposals never progress past the initial stage(s). 
Table 24 below identifies the prevalence and categorisation of the key strategic 
factors perceived as impacting upon the merger process. Please see Appendix 8 for a 
more detailed classification of the key facilitatory and inhibitory strategic factors 
impacting upon the merger and re-designation process. 
 
Table 24: Prevalence and Categorisation of Key Strategic Factors Impacting 
upon the Process 








 60 17 
Impact of National Strategy  41 13 
Economic Climate 19 8 
Drivers & 
the Case for 
Merger 
 168 17 
Strategic Drivers for Merger 36 14 
University Designation as Driver for Merger 56 16 
Academic Case for Merger 14 7 
Creation of Efficiencies & Rationalisation 26 13 
Regional Impact 27 13 




 103 17 
Selecting Partners 41 14 
Name, Governance & Management Structure of 
New Institution 
34 11 
Vision & Mission 28 9 
 
6.3.4 Emotive Factors 
There are a large number of unanticipated findings which suggest that emotive 
factors, which are particularly prevalent in the data collected, yet underexplored and 
underdeveloped in the literature on mergers in H.E., play a significant role in the merger 
process. Indeed, emotive factors feature higher than both strategic, and historic and 
cultural factors in terms of number of references in the data (See Table 22 above). This is 
of significance, given that not a single direct question about emotions was asked in the 
interviews. The emotive factors identified in the data deal with both personal and 








In terms of personal emotive factors, interviewees reported that personal 
commitment, belief and passion were critical to the success of a purported merger 
project. Belief and commitment from the very senior levels of the organisation is 
perceived as critical, as is commitment to the outcome rather than the institution. If there 
is a lack of belief or commitment, this does not bode well for the process. This supports 
findings by Brown et al (2004) that a lack of commitment or belief is a key inhibitory 
factor to HE mergers. 
The most prevalent emotive factors in the Irish context were uncertainty, 
insecurity, fear and frustration as a result of the merger process. Interviewees reported 
feelings of uncertainty due to the lack of clarity around the process and criteria, political 
instability and a lack of communication. Many were left questioning if the merger would 
in fact happen at all. Interviewees reported that they were afraid of being left behind in 
the sector or in their institution and were apprehensive about the future post-merger. 
Interviewees reported feelings of insecurity, and fear of losing their institutional identity, 
autonomy and power.  
Many were frustrated with the merger process, were feeling drained, stressed, 
pressured or sapped of energy and were worried about a perceived lack of control around 
the process. There was also a belief amongst some interviewees that there was a level of 
dishonesty within the process. The data suggests that feelings of uncertainty and fear had 
led to conjecture, rumour and perhaps even feelings of paranoia and conspiracy during 
the process. These emotions have clearly played a significant role in the merger process 




In terms of interpersonal emotions, the data reflects the need to ensure respect, 
equality and parity of esteem between the partners, regardless of their size, academic 
reputation, etc. Mutual respect is essential, and if this ingredient is missing it leads to 
feelings of resentment, along with allegations of arrogance and superiority, often against 
the larger partner. The data suggests that it is essential to develop feelings of trust, 




sensitivity is required. The partners must accept that while some degree of suspicion is 
normal at the beginning of the process, they must work together to actively build trust, 
and not simply think that it will just happen, particularly in the absence of a prior history 
of collaboration.  
This research also highlights that distrust, suspicion, hostility and resentment, if 
allowed to develop or continue between partners, will be detrimental to the process. 
Interviewees provided examples of the corrosive effect of distrust on the process. Distrust 
during the process can manifest itself between merging organisations, within individual 
organisations or between merging organisations and government or system level actors. 
Feelings of distrust, suspicion, antagonism, hostility, resentment and paranoia were 
surprisingly prevalent in the data, and if not acknowledged, addressed and resolved at an 
early stage, may be fatal to the process.  
Table 25 below identifies the prevalence and categorisation of the key emotive 
factors impacting upon the process. Please see Appendix 8 for a more detailed 
classification of the key facilitatory and inhibitory emotive factors impacting upon the 
merger and re-designation process. 
 
Table 25: Prevalence and Categorisation of Key Emotive Factors Impacting 
upon the Process 
Category Group Factor Refs Sources 
Emotive  390 18 
Personal  117 17 
Commitment, Belief & Passion  62 14 
Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & Frustration 115 15 
Interpersonal  212 18 
Respect, Equality & Parity of Esteem 30 8 
Trust, Honesty & Understanding 88 16 
Distrust, Suspicion, Hostility & Resentment 94 16 
 
6.3.5 Operational Factors 
There are a large number of key operational factors which the data suggest play a 







Role of Key Actors 
Firstly, the role of key actors in the process, particularly external consultants, 
facilitators and mediators has been perceived as important in providing knowledge, 
comfort and confidence internally and confidence and credibility externally. External 
consultants have also acted as a neutral and independent voice and as both formal and 
informal mediators, although in some cases were perceived to have been used scapegoats 
during the process. The degree to which external consultants were involved in the process 
certainly varied across the Alliances, with one in particular relying quite heavily on their 
input. All three Alliances also appointed external Chairs to their high level Steering 
Committees. These external chairs were appointed to oversee and steer the process and, 
critically, to act independently of all of the partners.   
Internally, while the Academic Councils have had little input into the process to 
date, many of the Governing Bodies have played a key role in driving the process, 
particularly the Chairs who have been very actively involved and supportive. Where joint 
Governing Body meetings took place these were thought to be positive and supportive of 
the process. Interviewees did however identify weaknesses in terms of the difficulties of 
getting all of the Governing Bodies to agree to the same thing at the same time, and felt it 
would have been better to have one joint or merged Governing Body in situ at an early 
stage of the process to facilitate decision making. Such a body, while perhaps transient 
and embryonic in nature, would have fostered greater trust and understanding between 
the organisations, as well as facilitating the necessary high-level decisions which must be 
made during the pre-merger process. It may also have prevented misunderstandings and 
miscommunications both between and within institutions which were evident in the data 
collected. 
All three Alliances appointed a Project Manager/Coordinator to manage the 
operational aspects of the merger process. In fact, Alliances A and B appointed 2 separate 
project coordinators, one from each partner IoT. The degree to which this was perceived 
as successful appears to have been dependent upon the ability of these individuals to 
form strong personal relationships with their counterpart in the partner IoT, and also their 
ability to network and influence others both up and down through the multiple layers of 







Project Structures, Planning & Resources  
Secondly, in relation to project structures, resources, project planning and 
timelines, the data identifies that it is important to have a single decision making body 
and one project office where project managers or coordinators are based. As noted above, 
only one of the Alliances established a joint project office with a single agreed project 
coordinator, and this was perceived as having facilitated that Alliance in progressing 
through the stages.  
In addition to the project coordinator, various thematic task/working groups were 
established in all three Alliances to manage and co-ordinate work across various key 
areas, such as academic programmes, research and development, internationalisation, IT, 
finance, HR, etc. These groups were intended to be used as a vehicle for completing the 
necessary pre-merger work in the particular area, and also to foster closer working 
relationships, trust and understanding between participants from the various partner 
institutions. However, the data gathered indicated that the success of these thematic 
working groups in achieving their objectives varied from Alliance to Alliance, with 
Alliance B in particular encountering difficulties. 
In terms of resources, the data suggests that there has been a perceived 
underestimation of the work and resources required to effect a successful merger, and a 
failure to accurately cost the project. It also suggests that both the HEA and institutions 
themselves have failed to commit the necessary human and financial resources required 
to effect a merger, and that this may be linked to a reluctance to invest significant 
resources due to uncertainty with the process and outcome, and due to the fact that the 
legislation has not yet been enacted.  
Interviewees suggested that project planning had been made more difficult than 
necessary throughout the process due to the difficulty in planning timelines in the 
absence of enabling legislation and certainty around the process and criteria. Interviewees 
also referred to an apparent inability or reluctance of steering or implementation groups 
to make decisions. The research found that agreeing an MOU early in the process, having 
joint budgets, getting the right project leaders in place and engaging in peer reviews in 
parallel with the formal re-designation process facilitated the process from a project 
planning perspective.   
The issue of due diligence and risk assessment gave rise to differing perspectives 




beneficial, but others felt that it was not necessary and that pushing for the completion of 
due diligence was a sign of distrust.   
The findings suggest that it is critically important to build and maintain 
momentum and stability during the process, to set and adhere to clear dates and timelines 
and to move quickly to prevent opponents to the merger from gaining traction. 
Interviewees reported that a lack of momentum due to the stop start nature of the process 
to date had caused difficulties and reported delays caused both by external (failure to 
enact legislation, political instability and change, failure to provide funding mechanisms) 
and internal (IR issues, changes in key personnel, lack of resources, ‘game playing’) 
factors. This supports and builds upon the findings of Brown et al (2004), Harman 
(2003)) that a short time scale between the decision to merge and the legal merger 
facilitates the process. 
 
Communicating with Staff & IR Issues 
The data suggests that there is a continued need for communication, engagement 
and support throughout the process. This supports findings by Locke (2007), Cartwright 
et al, 2007, Harman (2010) and Brown et al (2004), that clear, timely and genuine 
communication with staff is required throughout the process. The data shows that it is 
critical that staff, both academic and administrative, are communicated to and engaged 
with the process, and that this happens from an early stage, via a variety of methods, 
which may include ‘town hall’ meetings, workshops, departmental or local meetings, etc. 
The data also suggests that different communication strategies may be necessary to deal 
with administrative and academic staff within the institution. Failure to engage or consult 
with staff or to get them engaged in the process, an unwillingness or inability to provide 
clarity, or secrecy or a lack of information can all inhibit the merger process to a 
significant degree and can lead to IR issues, including resistance and opposition from 
Trade Unions, and a heightened sense of fear due to uncertainty on the part of institute 
staff. The data also suggests that communication and engagement are not only necessary 
internally, but also externally, throughout the process, and there is a clear need to engage 
with stakeholders, establish a narrative with them and to sell the vision of the new 







Engagement & Support 
Throughout the process, training and support for the senior executive and 
management team around change management, mergers and strategy has been identified 
as a facilitatory factor to the merger process, and failure to invest in management training 
and development, or to address the additional pressure and stress placed on senior 
managers is a factor which has been shown by this research to inhibit the process. 
Engagement with and support from key regional stakeholders is also considered to be 
important. One of the inhibitory factors identified in the data was the general lack of co-
operation across the Irish IoTs who have formed Alliances to merger. There has been 
little to no co-operation or collaboration, particularly at senior levels, although 
interviewees all commented that they thought such action would have facilitated the 
process. 
Table 26 below identifies the prevalence and categorisation of the key operational 
factors perceived as impacting upon the merger process. Please see Appendix 8 for a 
more detailed classification of the key facilitatory and inhibitory operational factors 
impacting upon the merger and re-designation process. 
 
Table 26: Prevalence and Categorisation of Key Operational Factors Impacting 
upon the Process 
Category Group Factor Refs Sourc
es 





 302 18 
Structures 19 8 
Resources 72 14 
Project Planning 131 17 
Due Diligence & Risk Assessment 21 12 
Building & Maintaining Momentum & Stability 59 13 
Engagement 
& Support 
 31 11 
Engagement with Stakeholders in the Wider 
Region 
9 4 
Training & Support for Executive Team & 
Managers 
11 6 
Lack of Cooperation Across IoT Sector 11 4 
 
Role of Key 
Actors 
 120 15 
Role of Academic Council 11 5 
Role of Governing Body 36 14 









Staff & IR 
Issues 
 108 16 
IR Issues 36 15 





6.3.6 Historic & Cultural Factors 
Finally, the data indicates that both history and culture have an important role to 
play in the merger process.  
 
Historic Factors 
The historic relationship between the partners is perceived as being of critical 
importance. The data suggests that while the absence of a history of collaboration may 
not be fatal, a history of competition or strained relations, or indeed the failure of a 
previous collaboration between the two, does not bode well.  
Other factors such as historic positioning are important, and the data indicates that 
similarities in historical development, orientation and trajectories will help to facilitate 
the process, whilst differences between the partners in this regard, and particularly in 
relation to trajectories towards university designation, can inhibit the process. 
Additionally, a historic lack of strong co-operation across the IoT sector more generally 
emerged as being relevant inhibitory factor, and it appears that the IoT sector as a whole 
does not have strong system level representation.  
 
Cultural Factors 
In cultural terms, the public sector, risk adverse nature of Irish IoTs was 
perceived to be an inhibitory factor to the process. The lack of a hierarchical or 
managerial organisational culture, along with the historic lack of independence or 
autonomy of IoTs is also problematic for the process, as is a collegiate culture which 
engenders a high degree of allegiance to the organisation, and greater resistance to 
change. The inflexible boundary and operating conditions in the sector were also cited as 
cultural factors which have acted to inhibit progress, particularly difficulties around staff 
contracts.   
Perceived or actual cultural differences between institutions were found by Brown 




to HE mergers. This research identifies that differences in academic reputation, trajectory 
and positioning, values, identities and allegiances between merging organisations are 
perceived as being particularly problematic. A failure to investigate and interrogate 
cultural issues, value systems and issues of identity, can cause significant problems for 
the merger process, as can attempting a merger between partners who have different 
geographical and regional identities.  
Table 27 on page 195 identifies the prevalence and categorisation of the key 
emotive factors impacting upon the process. Please see Appendix 8 for a more detailed 
classification of the key facilitatory and inhibitory historic and cultural factors perceived 
as impacting upon the merger and re-designation process. 
 
Table 27: Prevalence and Categorisation of Key Historic & Cultural Factors 
Impacting upon the Process 
 




 206 18 
Cultural  150 18 
Nature of Irish IoTs 15 7 
Inflexibility of Boundary & Operating Conditions 30 8 
Cultural Issues, Values & Identity 65 15 
Regional Focus 26 13 
Academic Reputation 14 7 
Historic  55 13 
 Historic Relationship between the Partners 32 12 
Historic Positioning & Trajectory 12 6 




The data presented above from the cross case analysis highlights the complexity 
of merger processes in HE. It details the political, emotive, operational, strategic and 
historic and cultural factors which are perceived as impacting upon the Irish IoT sector as 
it prepares to undergo a series of mergers. The analysis indicates that the merger process 
in the Irish IoT sector is a highly politicised and emotive process, which is both complex 
and ambiguous. Based on a rigorous thematic analysis of the data across all three 




Key macro and micro political factors, such as the Irish political landscape and 
power dynamics and negotiations between Institutions emerge from the data as being 
critical to the process, as do emotive factors such as uncertainty, insecurity, fear and 
frustration, trust, honesty and understanding, and distrust, suspicion, hostility and 
resentment. It is also evident that the perceived lack of support, clarity and understanding 
from system level actors in the Irish system has severely delayed and inhibited the 
process to date, and calls into question the commitment at that level to the process.  
This research highlights just how important and influential both the political and 
emotive dimensions to HE mergers are, and argues that it is these factors, rather than 
strategic or operational considerations, which are often most the powerful.  The findings 
demonstrate the need for leaders of merging institutions to be cognisant of and to operate 
across all dimensions discussed above, both formally and an informally. Institutional 
leadership is key to the process and leaders need to continuously build support both 
internally & externally for the merger, being mindful of the political, historical and 
cultural, operational and emotive factors outlined above. Leaders must move beyond 
tribal considerations to focus on the new institution. This research suggests that it is good 
people management, as opposed to process or project management that may ultimately 
lead to the merger going ahead or not.  
Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of alignment in the Irish context which 
is creating significant difficulties for the institutions involved in the process. This lack of 
alignment exists between national policy and strategy and between policy-makers and 
policy implementers. It also appears that the objectives of government and policy makers 
to reduce fragmentation in the sector, to have fewer, larger institutions with critical mass, 
to reduce duplication and to create efficiencies and economies of scale do not align to the 
objectives of the merging institutions themselves, who are primarily concerned with 
institutional transformation to TUs, both to strengthen their competitive/market position 
and to provide for growth. In addition, the data suggests that within Alliances there is 
also a lack of alignment between the motives and desires of individual merging partner 
institutions, and also even between the motives and desires of those within individual 
merging institutions. This lack of alignment poses serious difficulties for Irish IoTs who 
are proposing to merge, and must be addressed at both system and institutional level if 





7. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the answers to my research questions, based upon the 
findings presented and discussed in Chapters Five and Six. This chapter also asserts the 
significance of my study in terms of its contribution to academic knowledge and offers a 
self-reflection upon the limitations of my research design, data collection, analysis and 
findings. Finally, it presents recommendations, both for further research on the topic and 
for practice. 
 
7.2 Answers to Research Questions 
The central research question of my study is: What are the key factors which 
facilitate on one hand, or inhibit on the other the merger process in the Irish IoT sector?  
My findings, based on the perceptions of my interviewees as discussed in Chapters Five 
and Six above, suggest that there are a broad range of political, strategic, operational, 
historic and cultural, and emotive factors which are impacting upon the merger process, 
both at system and institutional level, within the Irish HE system. The key facilitatory 
and inhibitory factors identified from my research are summarised below, along with the 
identification and explanation of the particular features of the Irish context which may 
explain the emergence of these factors. I also examine the micro-political/policy phases 
through which the proposed mergers must proceed and suggest some critical success 
factors which can be drawn from the three case studies for HE mergers generally.  
 
7.2.1  What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main 
facilitators of the merger process?  
From the data collected and analysed, the following key factors, presented in 
Table 28 below, are perceived by management within the Alliances to have facilitated the 
progress of some or all of the Irish Alliances through the merger and re-designation 
process to date. These factors are categorised into system and institutional level factors, 
using the classification proposed in Chapter Six.  
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Table 28: Key Facilitatory Factors in Irish IoT Merger & TU Re-Designation Process 
 System/Macro Level Institutional/Micro Level 
Political  Input and support of successive 
key political actors.  
 
 Strong committed leaders (Presidents and Project Chairs) who have driven the project. 
 Establishment of strong formal and informal relationships between key people in merging 
institutions, both at leadership level and between those working on the TU projects. 
 Champions within the Alliances who demonstrated leadership in relation to the project and 
who have helped to facilitate the process. 
 Providing necessary reassurances to the smaller partner through an integration agreement. 
 
Strategic   Driver to become a TU and to ensure future viability and sustainability. 
Operational  Facilitators appointed by the 
relevant Minister to get the 
process back on track after the 
withdrawal of one of the partners. 
 
 Commitment by the partner IoTs to providing the necessary human resources to the 
project. 
 Getting the right project managers in place, who are committed to the merger and have a 
strong working relationship. 
 Creation of a single TU office at an early stage in the process.  
 Appointment of credible and knowledgeable external consultants to provide advice, 
guidance, comfort, confidence and credibility, both internally and externally. 
Historic & 
Cultural 
  Commitment from the partners to transform and create a new culture for the new 
institution. 
Emotive   High levels of trust, openness, honesty and understanding between partner institutions.  




7.2.2 What do management in Irish IoTs perceive to be the main inhibitors 
of the merger process?  
From the data collected and analysed, the key factors, presented in Table 29 
below, are perceived by management within the Alliances to have inhibited the progress 
of some or all of the Irish Alliances through the merger and re-designation process to 
date. These factors are categorised into system and institutional level factors, using the 











Table 29: Key Inhibitory Factors in Irish IoT Merger & TU Re-Designation Process 
 
 
System/Macro Level Institutional/Micro Level 
Political  Uncertainties within and difficulties with the HEA criteria and process 
for merger and re-designation. 
 Failure of government to enact necessary legislation and the resultant 
uncertainty regarding timelines for merger, staffing concerns, etc.  
 Perceived lack of alignment between HEA and Department & 
Government objectives. 
 Failure of Government/HEA to provide necessary funding mechanisms. 
 ‘Hands off', disinterested approach from both HEA & Department. 
 Lack of understanding by the HEA, and its failure to prioritise the 
merger project. 
 Unwarranted levels of political interference, disruption and ‘playing 
politics’ with the merger process. 
 Political ‘dictat’ vis-a-vis partner choice. 
 Unrealistic expectations from politicians and the government in relation 
to the merger process. 
 Unsuitable, politically appointed consultants/ facilitators. 
 Concerns of smaller institutions about power imbalance, the possibility of losing 
identity or autonomy and being ‘swallowed up’. 
 Difficulty creating a ‘merger of equals’ and parity of esteem. 
 Power plays between partner institutions, who were seeking to establish as much 
bargaining power as possible when it came to negotiations. 
 Unwillingness of partners to acknowledge each other’s strengths or for partners to 
identify their own weaknesses. 
 Efforts by the partners to undermine each other by attempting to expose and exploit 
perceived weaknesses to exert strength and enhance positioning. 
 Disruption and instability during the process due to changes in leadership.  
 Failure by leadership to bring the academy on board.  
 Failure to get the Senior Executive Team on board. 
 Distrust of leader(s). 
 Leaders ‘playing along' with the politicians and the Department. 
 'Tribalism' and posturing for position. 
Strategic  Failure to clearly articulate the nature of what the new TUs should be. 
 
 Uncertainty surrounding the mission and the very nature of what the new TU will be. 
 Failure to agree governance and management structures, particularly in relation to the 
location of the headquarters of the new institution. 
Operational   Failure to commit the necessary human and financial resources to the project. 
 Failure to engage the wider staff community in the merger project and resultant IR 
Issues. 
 Diversionary and delaying tactics employed by the partners.  
 Inability to build and maintain momentum throughout the process and resultant loss of 
momentum and enthusiasm for the project. 
Historic & 
Cultural 
  Historically strained and competitive relationship between the partners. 
 Perceived cultural differences and failure to investigate or interrogate perceived cultural 
issues at an early stage in the process. 
Emotive   Lack of commitment to, belief in and passion for the project. 
 Feelings of uncertainty, fear, frustration and insecurity in relation to the merger process 
and outcome. 
 Relationships characterised by distrust, hostility, resentment, suspicion and paranoia 





7.2.3 Do any of these factors differ from those identified in the literature as 
being facilitatory or inhibitory factors for HE mergers, and if so, what were the 
particular features of the Irish context that led to these differences? 
The factors identified above differ to those already recognised in the literature as 
being facilitatory or inhibitory factors for HE mergers in a number of respects. Firstly, 
the emphasis on system level factors and how these are perceived to have inhibited the 
progress of the Alliances is something which has clearly emerged from this study, yet has 
not been evidenced in the literature to any significant extent to date. In particular, the 
uncertainties and difficulties with the process and criteria for merger and re-designation, 
along with the failure to enact the necessary legislation to allow for merger, and the 
failure to provide funding, advice or support mechanisms to institutions have been 
significant inhibitors to the process and raise questions about the perceived lack of 
support from and alignment between the HEA, the Department and Government. The 
lack of either understanding, willingness or both to provide the necessary ingredients, in 
terms of resources, boundary or operating conditions and supports, for a successful 
merger and re-designation process, is particularly evident in the Irish context. 
The second differentiator lies in the presence and prevalence of political factors, 
both macro and micro, which have impacted upon the process to date. At a macro 
political level, there has been inordinate interest from some key regional actors, which 
has been viewed by some as supportive, but by others as interference, disruption and 
‘playing politics’ with the process. The inclusion in the Programme for Government in 
2011 of a specific reference to one of the Alliances provides an example of  what some 
have viewed as political ‘dictat’ in relation to merger and partner choice. Political 
interference is also evidenced by the appointment of external consultants/facilitators to 
the Alliances by senior Government Ministers. Interviewees reported that it appeared as 
if politicians and government had unrealistic expectations in relation to the merger 
process, and underestimated the resources required to create a truly credible TU. In fact, 
so little attention was given to the concept, nature and characteristics of a TU at system 
and policy level, that it is no wonder confusion is still apparent within the Irish HE 
system over exactly what a TU should be. In relation to micro-political factors, my 
findings emphasise just how political the merger process is. Key issues around power 




parity of esteem are evident. Power plays between partner institutions, who sought to 
establish as much bargaining power as possible when it came to negotiations, were 
prevalent. This research provides some excellent examples, not yet evidenced in the 
literature, of these power plays manifesting themselves in the form of unwillingness of 
partners both to acknowledge each other’s strengths and to identify their own weaknesses 
and even efforts by the partners to undermine each other by attempting to expose and 
exploit perceived weaknesses to exert strength and enhance positioning. These factors 
were particularly prevalent in the Alliance which was specifically mentioned in the 
Programme for Government, and thus forced the hands of the partners somewhat to 
engage in the process, whether they believed in it or each other. The political nature of 
Irish IoTs, and the perception that politicians have viewed them as their ‘playthings’ 
certainly had an impact on the process, with interviewees suggesting that institutional 
leaders felt that they had little choice bar to go along with the politicians and the 
Department. This study also provides empirical evidence of how other micro-political 
factors such as disruption and instability during the process due to a changes in 
leadership, the failure of leadership to bring the academy and senior executive team on 
board, and ‘tribalism' and posturing for position, can adversely affect the merger process. 
The third key differentiator, between this research and the existing body of HE 
literature is the identification and emphasis on the importance of emotive factors in the 
merger and re-designation process. This is largely an unanticipated finding, as no specific 
questions were asked of any interviewee about their emotive state, or how emotions had 
impacted upon the process. Nonetheless it is evident from the data that a wide range of 
influential emotive factors, both facilitatory and inhibitory, have impacted significantly 
upon the process. Trust, openness, honesty, understanding, uncertainty, fear, frustration, 
insecurity, distrust, hostility, resentment, suspicion, paranoia, and a lack of commitment 
to, belief in and passion for the project were the key emotions which emerged from the 
data. Perhaps their prevalence in the Irish context can be explained by a number of 
factors. Firstly, the fact that the process has been ongoing for such a long period of time 
has probably led those involved with the process to feel heightened levels of frustration, 
anxiety, etc. than might otherwise be the case. Secondly, the lack of guidance and support 
including the enabling legislation, from system level actors, has created a landscape 
where uncertainty has been allowed to fester and has now developed into suspicion and 




contentious IR issues, which are now plaguing the process in the Irish IoT merger and re-
designation efforts.  
 
7.2.4 What are the micro-political/policy phases through which the proposed 
mergers may proceed? 
The data strongly suggests that mergers are political phenomena, which provide 
an arena for the accumulation and use of power by institutional leadership. My findings 
illustrate the need for strong, charismatic, credible leaders, who have the ability to use 
political power and networks within the institution to achieve their goal. This is 
particularly necessary in the Irish HE context due to the collegiate, rather than 
hierarchical nature of IoTs.  Leaders wishing to effect a merger must be able to influence, 
incentivise and manipulate others in the organisation, and should know which levers to 
pull and/or incentives to use. The leaders must also identify credible, respected, 
knowledgeable champions at all levels of the organisation who are supportive of the 
merger and who will influence others across the organisation. The leaders must be able to 
identify, isolate, side line or remove problematic people at senior levels in the 
organisation, and to ‘sell’ the message both to the academy, administrative staff, and 
indeed, stakeholders. There should be early negotiation and agreement about senior posts 
in the new institution to avoid the tribalism and posturing evident in some of the case 
studies. 
Davies (1985) suggested that there are numerous factors which reinforce and 
interplay with each-other both within and outside the HE system which make rational, 
planned policy formation and implementation difficult. He stated that policy formation in 
HEIs is inevitably a political process and centres on the disposition of power; the 
capacity to control key organisational influences and; levers or incentives for the 
fulfilment of particular preferences. This proposition is certainly supported by the 
findings of this research and has important implications for HE Alliances planning a 
merger. Too keen a focus on the mechanical, rational, process orientated aspects of the 
merger, without due consideration being given to the macro and micro political aspects 





Broadly speaking, the data collected and analysed suggests there are a number of 
distinct micro-political phases through which HE mergers proceed. These are outlined 




Figure 11: Micro Political/Policy Phases during HE Merger Process 
 
These phases each have distinct functions, inputs, processes and outputs, and are 
explained in more detail below. 
1. Merger Justification  
This phase involves the identification of a problem, issue, challenge or 
opportunity facing a HEI, and the relevant solution. During this phase, the 
rationale or driver(s) for merger become clear, and merger is seen as a 
solution to a problem or a means to an end. It is critical at this stage to clearly 
articulate the need or rationale for the merger.  
2. Search and Screening  
This phase involves the search for suitable partner or partners for the merger. 
This may involve building upon existing collaborative relationships or 
forming a new relationship with another HEI(s). This phase may take some 
time and may involve some potential partners withdrawing until a workable 



















3. Negotiation  
During this phase the partners agree on the key terms of reference and goals 
for the merger, usually in the form of a MOU (a Memorandum of 
Understanding). This is usually negotiated by a small group of senior leaders 
from each HEI. Ideally, at this stage, agreement should also be reached on 
contentious issues such as the name and location of headquarters of the new 
institution, and the future of the existing Presidents and or senior executive 
teams.  
4. Merger Planning  
At this stage, formal and informal structures to effect the merger should be 
established. Usually a high level steering group, along with a project co-
ordinator and project team, with distinct working groups, is provided for. 
External consultants, if not already engaged, may also be brought on board. 
An outline project plan with clear target dates and the necessary financial and 
human resources is put in place in place. The various groups will then work 
on preparing a business case and plan for merger and on completing the due 
diligence exercises. 
5.   Influencing and Incentivising  
Throughout the entire process, leaders and those involved in the project must 
continuously build up support for the merger both internally and externally. 
As stated above, leaders need to sell the message, and influence, incentivise 
and manipulate as necessary to ensure that the senior executive team, the 
academy and administrative staff are engaged with and broadly supportive of 
the merger process.  
5. Merger  
Once a formal final decision to merge has been made, a date is set and the 
necessary legal mechanisms are put in place to allow the merger take place. 
The merger is essentially a legal process at a point in time whereby two 
separate legal entities/HEIs are dissolved and a new legal entity/HEI is 
formed.   
6. Post-Merger Integration 
Once the merger has taken place, the focus then shifts to post merger 
integration and to adding value, creating efficiencies and achieving whatever 





The phases proposed above broadly align to Davies (1985) four-phase ‘political 
systems model’ of policy formation for HEIs, based around Enderud’s (1977) work. The 
merger justification phase aligns to Davies (1985) ‘garbage can’ phase which is a highly 
ambiguous period in which the problem must be defined. The search and screening and 
negotiation phases align to Davies (1985) ‘negotiation and political’ phase, where a 
workable coalition of interests must be established. The merger planning and 
incentivising and influencing stages broadly align to  Davies (1985) ‘persuasion and 
legitimation phase’ which is essentially a collegial period where agreement is reached on 
policy lines of action; and finally, the merger and post-merger integration phases align to 
a Davies (1985) ‘bureaucratisation’ phase, where the policy is implemented.  
 Naturally, these phases may not be as linear as suggested above, and there are 
possibilities of loop backs or jump forwards, depending on the particular set of 
circumstances. As the partners move through the phases, they ideally progress from a 
highly ambiguous, informal state, towards a more certain, defined, formal conclusion.  
Figure 12 below presents an adapted version of Davies political systems model, 
as I suggest it applies to HE mergers. It includes the key inputs, processes and outputs 







Figure 12: Political System Model of HE Merger Policy Formation & 
Implementation (Adapted from Davies 1985)
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Davies (1985) opines that if any phase is missed, or is given insufficient time, 
problems may arise later in the process process. Davies cites examples such as a failure 
to appreciate the magnitude and dynamics of political feeling generated by policy 
proposals, or reluctance of top management to get involved in bargains and incentives to 
develop support for policy packages, as being some of the reasons why policy proposals 
may flounder.  
In the case studies which formed part of this research, there is evidence of a 
failure to address some of the phases proposed in my model above to a sufficient extent. 
For example: 
 During the search and screening phase, we saw a case of partners who were 
essentially forced together, despite their own misgivings, for a political end, 
and this had an inhibitory effect on the process.  
 During the negotiation phase, there appeared to be reluctance in some of the 
Alliances to address contentious issues, compromise and strike a bargain, 
along with an inability or unwillingness to build constructive working 
relationships. Again this failure had negative consequences for those 
Alliances.  
 During the merger planning phase, the consequences of a failure to invest the 
necessary human and financial resources into the project was evident across 
two of the case studies and acted in an inhibitory fashion.  
 During the influencing and incentivising phase, there were clear failures 
across all three Alliances to fully appreciate the adverse feelings generated by 
the merger proposals and to address these before they got out of hand. There 
was also a marked reluctance, perhaps due to the highly regulated nature of 
Irish IoTs, of senior leaders to get involved in bargaining and to use 
incentives to garner the necessary levels of support for the merger, 
particularly at executive level.  
These examples from the case studies provide evidence of the importance of each 
of the key phases outlined above and support the proposed political system model for 
merger policy formation and implementation. It also illustrates how the proposed model 
may be used to examine, identify and conceptualise why some merger proposals and 
processes might fail. 
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7.2.5 What critical success factors for HE mergers can be identified from 
these cases? 
 The key factors which are perceived to have facilitated and inhibited the merger 
process in Irish IoTs have been discussed in detail above. While the merger process in all 
three Alliances is ongoing, and thus cannot yet be considered as either successful or not, 
the data does illustrate the importance of a number of key factors perceived to be critical 
for the success of the process itself. These include: 
 
o At system level: 
 The provision of clarity and certainty around the desired HE system 
configuration, merger process, stages and criteria (if any) and the 
paradigm of the desired new model of HEI to be created. 
 Alignment between national policy, strategy and its implementation. 
 Consistency in approach and communication. 
 Provision of the necessary financial resources, advice, support and 
facilitation mechanisms. 
 Clarity on contentious national issues, such as staffing and IR matters. 
 Provision of the necessary legislative framework as early as possible, and 
preferably before, the process starts. 
o At institutional level  
 Strong, credible, trusted, committed leaders who believe in and are 
passionate about the merger project. 
 Build and maintain strong working relationships between key actors in the 
merging HEIs, based on trust, honesty, openness, respect, empathy and 
understanding. 
 Acknowledgement of and respect for differences in the merging 
institutions histories, identities, relative sizes and trajectories. Provision of 
reassurance to the smaller partners as necessary.  
 Understanding by the leaders of the need to influence and incentivise to 
get ‘buy in’ to the merger project, not least amongst his/her senior 
executive team, and of the micro-politics of the merger process.  
 Early and regular communication, consultation and engagement with staff 




acknowledgement of feelings of fear, insecurity, frustration, uncertainty 
and suspicion. 
 Interrogation and resolution of cultural issues at an early stage in the 
process and commitment to creating new culture. 
 Provision of the necessary financial and human resources for the merger. 
 Build and maintain momentum and stability during the process. 
 
7.3 Contribution to Literature 
This thesis has made an original theoretical, geographical and practical 
contribution to existing knowledge on the merger process in HE. Research to date in this 
area has focused primarily on what factors led to the successful implementation of an 
agreement to merge and has not focused on the dynamics of the merger process itself to 
any great extent (Brown et al, 2004). Indeed, much of the research conducted on HE 
mergers to date has taken place retrospectively, many years after the completion of the 
process. In addition, little research has been conducted in the Irish HE setting, which due 
to its particular history, culture and structures, is worthy of further investigation. My 
research, which took place concurrently with the merger process, provides a real and 
contemporaneous insight into the merger process in Irish HE and has highlighted the 
political and emotive nature of the mergers in the sector.  
  This thesis has contributed to the theoretical literature in this area both by 
identifying the key micro-political policy phases through which merger proposals in HE 
progress, and also by identifying and classifying the wide range of factors which can 
operate to facilitate and inhibit that process.  
  Firstly, my thesis identifies the key perceived facilitatory and inhibitory factors to 
merger processes. It proposes that these be classified into political, strategic, operational, 
historic and cultural and emotive factors, and argues that HE leaders who wish effectively 
negotiate the merger process must be cognisant of and operate in all of those dimensions.  
  Secondly, my thesis proposes a framework, adapted from Davies (1985) of the 
key micro-political phases through which HE mergers proceed, and argues that HEIs who 
fail to afford sufficient attention to any of these phases may find themselves in difficulty as 




  Thirdly, my thesis demonstrates the critical role that system level actors and 
supports play during the merger process, and illustrates how in the absence of the 
necessary system level clarity and supports, the entire process can be undermined.  
  Fourthly, it provides evidence of the highly ambiguous, political nature of 
mergers in HE, and demonstrates the hugely significant role which both macro and micro 
political factors play during the process. It argues that the leaders must be able to use levers 
and incentives to get what they want and must also be able to negotiate the often difficult 
macro political landscape.  
  Fifthly, my thesis provides evidence of the critical role of emotive factors which 
impact upon merger process in HE, and argues that these powerful factors are often 
overlooked by leaders who may focus on process rather than people, to their detriment. 
This thesis provides an example of a case where negative emotions, such as distrust, 
insecurity, resentment, suspicion and paranoia, were allowed to develop and fester between 
partners, and the significant detrimental impact which those feelings had on the process. It 
provides excellent empirical data on the key role of trust in HE mergers, which is often 
referred to but rarely illustrated in an empirical manner.  
  Sixthly, my research has made a theoretical contribution regarding the impact of 
factors such as power dynamics and negotiations, the importance of maintaining 
momentum and stability throughout the process, and the key roles which external change 
agents can play, during the process.  
  Finally, my thesis has made a contribution to theoretical knowledge by testing 
some assumptions and findings in the existing body of literature.  My findings challenge 
the proposition that single sector collaborations and mergers are easier to manage and that 
mergers between institutions with complementary missions and academic profiles is more 
straightforward (Harman & Robertson Cuninghame, 1995; Eastman and Lang, 2001). In 
fact, it found that significant cultural differences can exist between institutions in the same 
sector, with similar academic profiles and missions, and this can lead to culture clashes and 
difficulties during the merger process. It also found that values led HEIs may be more 
difficult to merge, due to a strong allegiance to existing institutional culture and values. 
This supports propositions by Harman (2002) and Harman and Harman (2003), who 
identified the powerful influence which culture has in some merger situations, and Buono 
and Bowditch (1989), who found that the  ‘thicker’ the culture and the greater the degree of 
shared beliefs and values within an organisation, the more potent the culture’s influence 




generally easier to manage than multi-partner mergers (Harman & Harman, 2002; Kyvik & 
Stensaker, 2013), I found conflicting opinions. Some interviewees reported that it was 
easier to plan a merger with two partners, rather than three, supporting the proposition by 
Harman & Harman (2003) and Kyvik & Stensaker (2013) that mergers between two 
partners are easier to manage than those between multiple partners. However, within one of 
the Alliances, interviewees (particularly from the smaller Alliance), felt that having three 
partners was easier, as it gave the two smaller partners greater collective strength vis-a-vis 
their larger partner. This is an interesting finding which challenges the findings of Harman 
& Harman (2003) and Kyvik & Stensaker (2013). My research also supports the finding by 
Harman & Meek (2002) and Thompson (2012) that considerable external pressure or force 
to effect a merger is often not helpful to the process and that if a proposed merger is forced, 
and one or both of the parties rejects the idea or benefits of merging, the merger process 
can become very arduous and laborious (Thompson, 2012).   
  In terms of a geographical contribution, this research has contributed in a 
significant way to our knowledge of HE mergers in the Irish context, which due to its 
particular history, legislative and regulatory framework, structure, culture and wider 
environmental conditions, is worthy of investigation and differentiation from other 
contexts. Little research has been conducted on mergers in the Irish HE context to date, and 
my research highlights factors particular to the Irish setting such as the recent economic 
crisis and resultant lack of resources, unusually high levels of political interference, along 
with relatively low levels of institutional autonomy, a steering from centre approach to 
regulation and questionable alignment between national policy, strategy and its 
implementation, which have led to context specific difficulties and challenges for the three 
Alliances. This provides a valuable insight into the Irish HE merger and re-designation 
process and should be of use, not only to Irish HE researchers and practitioners, but also to 
the wider international HE community. 
  Finally, this research has made a practical contribution to knowledge by providing 
guidance for governments, policy makers and legislators on what system level factors can 
facilitate or inhibit merger processes, thus contributing towards the achievement of 
national policy objectives. It has also provided guidance to HEIs themselves, who will no 
doubt come under increasing pressure to merge in near future, on what institutional level 
factors can contribute towards a successful merger process, and provides specific guidance 





7.4 Reflections & Limitations 
  As with any piece of research, decisions made at every stage of the process will 
have an impact upon the final outcome, and leaves the study open to scrutiny and challenge 
in a number of ways. Firstly, my choice of theoretical frameworks necessarily focused the 
attention of the study onto certain aspects of the merger process, while perhaps 
downplaying other aspects which an alternative framework may have considered 
significant. Unfortunately, the research on mergers in HE largely lacks an accepted 
theoretical lens which is widely applied. Therefore the frameworks utilised in my study 
drew broadly upon all leading research in the area, along with theories on change 
management and micro-political policy and strategy implementation in HE. These theories, 
along with my own experience of the merger process to date, formed the basis of my 
interview questions and my initial data analysis. However, while the substantive 
framework was used as a guide for interview questions, it was no more than that and the 
loose semi-structured nature of the interviews and the approach to data analysis employed 
allowed for new themes and insights into merger process in HE to emerge. This is 
evidenced, for example, by the emergence of the prevalence of political and emotional 
factors during the process, which the existing literature and frameworks, I argue, do not 
adequately acknowledge. 
  In addition to the impact of the theoretical framework on the research, 
consideration must be given to my research design, along with my methods of data 
collection and analysis. It is acknowledged that the use of a case study approach may raise 
issues in relation to external validity and means that caution should be exercised when 
generalising based on the results outside of the particular context of the study (Bryman and 
Bell 2003). However, I considered such an approach the most suitable to investigate the 
ongoing merger phenomenon in the various Alliances in the Irish IoT sector. Had I not 
adopted a case study approach, and for example, conducted a series of interviews across all 
the cases and presented the findings, the data would have been entirely without context, at 
least at an institutional level. As this study shows, there are significant differences between 
the Alliances which would have been missed in the data had a case study approach not 
been chosen. Of course, the fact that I conducted three case studies, along with a cross case 
analysis, meant that the depth of overall analysis possible in any one case was necessarily 
diluted and it was only possible to present a snapshot of the range of issues which arose in 
each case in this thesis. While the selection of just one case would have allowed greater 




  In relation to data collection, this research relies heavily on documentary data and 
analysis for context, and for interview data and observations for its findings. The choice of 
data collection methods was necessarily influenced by the research questions, and other 
methods, such as questionnaires, for example, were not utilised due to the limited nature of 
the data which would emerge from such an approach. Due to the relatively short time 
period within which the research was conducted and the fact that the research was carried 
out by me individually, it was not possible to conduct a large number of interviews across 
all of the Alliances and with other actors in the sector. Consequently the data gathered 
from the eighteen interviews I conducted may not be representative of all or indeed the 
majority of the senior members of the organisations under investigation. If time and 
resources allowed, a larger number of interviews would have be conducted in each 
organisation. A cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal approach to the interviews was 
chosen, largely for pragmatic reasons around timing and trying to complete this study, but 
it would certainly be worthwhile to revisit the Alliances in say 12 months’ time, to monitor 
progress and investigate further factors or issues which may have arisen during the merger 
process. Had a longer time period, of five years for example, been available to conduct this 
research, then a longitudinal study could have been employed.  
  When planning the research design, I was apprehensive about the possibility of 
institutions closing ranks and refusing to participate in the research. Thankfully, this was 
not my experience, and all were willing and interested in taking part, perhaps partly due to 
the fact that many appeared to want to share their frustration with what has been a rather 
slow and laborious process to date. I was also concerned that as the merger and re-
designation process is on-going, participants may not have spoken as freely as they would 
if the process was completed. However, the interviewees all participated voluntarily and in 
the main, appeared to be open and honest about the issues at hand. As there has been a high 
degree of friction between the partners in one of the Alliances regarding the merger 
process, this may have resulted in a more negative view being offered by the interviewees 
than would otherwise have been the case before the friction arose, or perhaps into the 
future if trust is established. However, it certainly provided some fascinating insights into 
what can go wrong during the process which have not been evidenced elsewhere in the HE 
literature. 
  My approach to data analysis was structured and rigorous, using the steps 
outlined in Braun & Clark’s (1996) thematic analysis, and utilising NVivo as a data 




and themes in an inductive manner, using the frameworks and factors identified from the 
literature as an initial guide. However, the data analysis developed these into broader 
themes and categories which were largely absent from the literature to date, allowing a 
definite contribution to be made. The choice to present findings using both within case and 
subsequent cross case analysis allowed for rich contextual data on each case to emerge. 
While this limited the depth of the analysis and findings presented for each case, it also 
made it possible to compare the data across the cases and to unpick further the key system 
and institutional level factors which were facilitating or inhibiting the process. 
  As I hold a management post in one of the IoTs which forms part of one the 
Alliances under investigation, I was effectively an ‘insider researcher’ (Costley et al, 2010) 
in respect of that particular case. As a result, I was conscious that the interviewees may 
have been wary of fully disclosing their real opinions about the merger process. However, 
all interviewees hold more senior posts than I and were not coerced into participating in the 
study. Additionally, as I had established strong inter-personal working relationships with 
the majority of the interviewees within this Alliance, I was satisfied that their motives and 
disclosures were authentic, and felt that the strong relationship I had built with some of the 
participants allowed them to speak more openly than might have otherwise been the case. 
The interview data, I suggest, bears testament to this. My role and experience in working 
on the early phases of the merger project in that Alliance also allowed me to generate and 
draw upon my own insights into the merger process to date. It also allowed me to ‘validate’ 
the observations and findings made by others, and certainly contributed to the findings and 
recommendations made.   
  Finally, I must acknowledge that the merger and re-designation process is still 
ongoing, and flux and change in the sector continued while the research was being 
conducted, and as I write this conclusion. Volatility and uncertainty continues to surround 
the composition of Alliances, and indeed, the merger requirement itself, which has come 
under political scrutiny and may yet be dropped from the proposed Bill. Such 
environmental flux may mean that emerging factors impacting upon the process have not 
been captured in the interview data. It also means that it is not possible to measure the 
ultimate success or failure of the merger projects and to attribute this to various factors. 
However, this study does not purport to do so. Instead it captures data from and represents 
a point in time on the journey towards merger and re-designation. It is focused on the 
process and the factors impacting upon that process, rather than outcomes. Therefore it is 




examined a critical but neglected phase during the merger process, and I would argue that 
it was both possible and preferable to do this concurrently with the process itself, and that 
this is evidenced, for example, by the emergence of rich data on aspects of the merger 
process which other research has not retrospectively evidenced.  
7.5 Recommendations & Implications 
This research has a number of implications for both theory and practice in the 
field, which are discussed below. 
7.5.1 Recommendations for Further Research 
Several key themes for future research emerge from the findings, which could add 
to the body of knowledge on mergers in HE. These include: 
 Developing greater insights into the critical impact of system level factors 
on the merger process in HE. To this end a comparative analysis of the 
Irish context with other jurisdictions which have undergone waves of 
mergers in HE would be particularly useful. 
 Further testing of the proposed quinquepartite classification of political, 
strategic, operational, historic and cultural, and emotive factors in HE 
merger processes. 
 Developing our knowledge of the full range of emotive factors which 
impact upon merger processes in HE, how these can positively or 
adversely affect the process and how best to manage them to a successful 
conclusion. 
 Developing our knowledge of the full range of political, particularly 
micro-political factors, which impact upon merger processes in HE, and 
examining how these can positively or adversely affect the process. 
 Further testing of the proposed adapted micro-political system model of 
HE merger policy formation and implementation, with a particular focus 
on the use of the model as a tool for identifying and examining why some 
merger processes succeed and why others fail.  
7.5.2 Recommendations & Implications for Practice 
In addition to theoretical recommendations, the findings of this research also have 
clear implications for both institutional and system level actors who are planning or 




already been presented in the within case analysis for each Alliance (see Chapter 5 – 
Sections 5.2.5, 5.3.5 and 5.4.5). On a broader level, there are some important 
considerations and recommendations which derive from my findings.  
I would make the following recommendations for practice at institutional level: 
 Firstly, institutional leaders who are planning to merge or who have begun the 
process must be absolutely credible, trusted and committed and must believe 
in and be passionate about the merger project. They must be able to espouse 
the need for change and influence and incentivise others at all levels of their 
organisation to come on board with the proposal. The leaders must manage 
the micro-politics of the merger and must ensure that they have their 
executive team on board. 
 Secondly the leaders must focus on building and maintaining strong working 
relationships between key actors in the merging HEIs, starting at leadership 
level and working down through the senior executive other management 
teams. Relationships must be based on trust, honesty, openness, respect, 
empathy and understanding. This aspect of the process cannot be 
underestimated, and this research has shown evidence of the draconian 
consequences of the failure to establish and build trust. Too strong a focus on 
process, to the neglect of the people element of the merger, is not advisable.  
 All mergers will involve power plays of some kind, and compromise. 
Acknowledgement of and respect for differences in the merging institutions 
histories, identities, relative sizes and trajectories is absolutely key. Smaller 
partners will likely need greater reassurances about future plans and actions.  
 Early and regular communication, consultation and engagement with staff and 
staff representatives in relation to the project is critical. The emotions 
experienced by those involved in and subject to the merger process are quite 
powerful and these feelings, which can range from fear, insecurity, frustration, 
uncertainty and suspicion, are natural and should be acknowledged, discussed 
and addressed. The earlier assurances can be given to staff regarding 
contracts, remuneration, place of work, etc., the better. 
 Institutions must ensure that they provide the necessary financial and human 
resources for the merger. A decision to merge is likely to be the most 




resourced as such. It is important to get the right project managers and teams 
in situ and operating as soon as possible once the process begins. 
 There should be interrogation and resolution of possible cultural differences 
or issues at an early stage in the process. Ideally both partners should be 
committed to creating a new culture in the new institution. 
 If others in the sector are undergoing a similar process, a network of merging 
institutions, which can share experience and advice, and collectively lobby 
system level actors, should be formed.  
 Finally, it is critical that momentum is built and maintained throughout the 
process, that clear deadlines are set and adhered to and that the process is as 
stable as possible. Timing is of the essence, and the longer the process 
continues, the more time is provided for challengers to build opposition to the 
merger, and for participants to become frustrated and lose belief in and 
passion for the project.  
As this study clearly shows, even if institutional leaders play their part during the 
process, inhibitors at system level can nonetheless make the process extremely difficult. 
Therefore I propose the following recommendations for system level actors, whether they 
are relevant politicians, the Department of Education & Skills and/or the HEA: 
 Before the process begins, there must be clarity and certainty around the 
desired HE system configuration and alignment between the policy, 
strategy and implementers about how best to achieve it. 
 It should be clear to institutions what the objective(s) of the process are. 
For example, is it to create new universities, or is to secure cost savings 
and rationalisations in the sector, due to a difficult economic climate? By 
collapsing differing agendas into one process, the waters get muddied and 
it allows detractors to build opposition. 
 Certainty, clarity and transparency must also be provided around the 
prescribed merger process, stages and criteria (if any) and the paradigm of 
the desired new model of HEI to be created.  
 If legislative amendments or a new legislative framework is required, it 
should be provided for early as possible, and preferably before, the 
process starts. The legislative framework must be suitable for the needs of 




 There is wide acknowledgement that mergers require a significant amount 
of investment, and if mergers are an important part of national HE policy 
and strategy, then institutions must be provided with necessary financial 
resources to successfully navigate the process. 
 System level actors also have a critical role to play as regards providing 
advice, support and facilitation mechanisms for merging institutions, 
particularly around contentious national issues, such as staffing and IR 
matters. 
 Finally, there is a need for consistency in approach and communication 
from all system level actors, who need to have one voice when it comes to 
the process. 
In the Irish context, some immediate steps must be taken if the proposed mergers 
are to progress successfully. It is imperative that the legislation be enacted immediately 
to provide clarity and certainty and that additional financial resources are made available 
to the merging institutions as a matter of priority. IR issues, particularly the issue of staff 
contracts, must also be addressed at system level if any progress it to be made. Without 
these immediate steps, the merger process across all three Alliances will be in real danger 
of collapsing.  
 
7.6  Conclusion 
To conclude, my research has found that the merger process in the Irish IoT 
sector is highly political and emotive process, which is both complex and ambiguous. It 
has identified and classified the wide range of political, strategic, operational, historic 
and cultural, and emotive factors which are impacting upon the process to date. This 
research argues that it is these political and emotive factors, rather than strategic or 
operational considerations, which are often most the powerful.  The findings demonstrate 
the need for leaders of merging institutions to be cognisant of and to operate across all 
dimensions discussed above, on both a formal and an informal basis, and of the critical 
need to build relationship based on trust, honest, understanding, respect and empathy 
between the partners.  
My research has also provided an excellent example of the challenges involved in 
merging HEIs when some of the expected system level supports are lacking, including 




process, stages and criteria. The lack of alignment between system level actors and the 
institutions themselves in terms of desired outcomes, and the collapsing of various 
differing agendas into one merger process, has led to significant difficulties in the sector. 
The failure of government to recognise that the creation of larger HEIs does not 
necessarily have to be achieved through merger has remained a constant difficulty 
throughout and has led the institutions on a reluctant journey through uncertain waters.  
Finally, my research has identified the micro-political phases or steps  through 
which HE mergers must proceed, and proposes an adapted model which may be of use in 
identifying the factors which might ultimately lead to success or failure on the part of 
HEIs.  
While we await the final outcome of the Irish process, it is clear that lessons can 
be learned from experience to date, not just for the three Alliances who formed part of 
this research, but for others, both in Irish and international HE, who will undoubtedly 
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DBA (Higher Education Management) Research Project: 
Facilitatory and Inhibitory Factors in Higher Education Mergers 
 
Interviewer: Allison Kenneally  Interviewee: __________________ 
Date:  _______________  Time:  __________________ 
Nature and Purpose of Study: 
This research aims to provide a contemporaneous account of how the Irish IoTs are 
organising themselves for merger and examines the substantial challenges which lie 
therein. This research aims to identify the key factors which facilitate on one hand, and/or 
inhibit on the other, the merger process in HE, both at a system and institutional level. 
This knowledge will be useful to policy makers and other higher education institutions, 
particularly in Ireland’s IoT sector, which is likely to experience a wave of mergers over 
the coming decade.   
 
Research Design 
In order to address the question, I have designed a qualitative study, employing a 
multiple case study approach, which will investigate the facilitatory and inhibitory factors 
across Alliances of Irish IoTs who are proposing to merge, through document analysis, 
interview and the use of audio and visual materials. 
Data Protection & Confidentiality 
This interview is voluntary, confidential and anonymous in nature. You will not be 
named or in any other way identified, directly or indirectly, or associated with any 
institution in my research. All information gathered will be used for the purposes of 
private research only. Once my research is completed and the data is no longer required 
for the purposes of any associated examination, the data will be destroyed, again in 
accordance with the Data Protection Acts 1998-2003. 







Origin of the Merger Proposal  
1. Can you tell me a little bit about the Alliance –  
 why was it formed?  
 how was it formed?  
 when was it formed?  
2. What is the key driver(s) behind the proposed merger? (Political, strategic, 
financial and other drivers at play?) Were these drivers primarily internal or 
external? 
3. Were any alternatives to a full merger considered by the Alliance? If so, what 
alternatives were considered? If not, why? 
4. Was there a history of previous co-operation, and collaboration between the 
partners, or was the relationship a competitive one? Can you give some 
examples? What impact, if any, has this had on the process? 
5. Were specific steps taken to establish and build trust and understanding between 
the partners when the Alliance was formed, or was it taken for granted that it 
already existed?  
Organising the Merger Process 
6. How has the Alliance gone about organising itself for the merger process? 
 What groups or structures have been put in place by the Alliance to further 
the merger proposal and how have these worked in practice?  
 What physical or human resources were allocated to the process and how 
were these secured? Were or are any other resources required? 
 Are the arrangements effective from your point of view? If you were 
starting again now would you have sought to set up different structures for 
taking the proposal forwards? If so, what would they be? 
 Were any external consultants/change agents brought in to support the 
project? If so, at what stage did they become involved? What role have 
they played in the process? Has it been positive or negative? Can you give 
some examples? 
 
7. How has the Alliance progressed though the 4 stage merger and TU process 




 At what stage of the process is the Alliance now?  
 Is this broadly in line with that was envisaged at the beginning of the 
project or have timelines accelerated or slowed down? If so, why and what 
impact has this delay had on the process? 
 What was your experience of the other stages (initial proposal, business 
plan, evaluation by international panel)? What difficulties or issues, did 
you encounter during this process, either with the preparation of the 
business plan, or the evaluation of the plan? 
 Was a due diligence exercise completed? If yes, when? If not, when is it 
likely to happen? What issues would you expect to be covered in the Due 
Diligence? 
8. To what extent has the Alliance engaged in consultation with various 
bodies/groups during the process (e.g. staff, students, management team, Trade 
Unions, Regional Industry, Politicians, etc.?) Has this benefited or hindered the 
process?  Can you give some examples? 
9. What role, if any, has the Academic Council and Governing Body played in the 
process? 
10. What role, if any, have local and/or national politicians played in the process? 
 
Role of Government/Government Agencies/Legislators 
 
11. From a system perspective, to what extent has the government/government 
agencies/national legislators supported you through process?  
12. What government/HEA measures or actions have helped the Alliance through the 
process? 
13. What additional supports or clarifications could they have provided which would 
have helped the process? 
14. Do you think the proposed legislative framework allows enough autonomy for the 
creation of truly entrepreneurial TUs? 
 
Facilitatory Factors/Success to Date 
 
15. What has worked well with the process to date?  










17. Did the Alliance experience any major difficulties and potential deal-breaking 
issues?  
 If so, what were they and at what stage of the process did they arise? 
 Had these issues been anticipated? 
 Did these issues arise as a result of internal or external factors? 
 How were these issues overcome?  
 With hindsight could these difficulties have been anticipated and 
circumvented, and if so how? 
18. What other key challenges did the Alliance during the process to date? Could 
these have been avoided and how? 
 
Group Dynamics 
19. Have any noticeable cultural differences emerged between the partners to date, 
and if so, how have these been dealt with? 
20. Have any issues regarding actual or perceived power imbalance emerged between 
the partners to date, and if so, how have these been dealt with? 
21. Have the partners differed in regard to project timescales and what impact, if any, 
has this had on the process? 
22. Have blocking or delaying tactics been used by the partners at any stage? Can you 
give any examples? 
23. How have the relationships between Presidents and Chairs, both between and 
within institutions, impacted upon the process? 
 
Benefits/Costs 
24. Have there been any benefits to your organisation accruing from the merger 
process even though the merger has not yet gone ahead? 
25. Have there been any negative outcomes to your organisation accruing from the 
merger process to date? 
26. Have there been any negative outcomes/ramifications for subsequent 
collaboration and more generally for the relationship between the two institutions 
arising from the merger process to date? 
 
Wrap up 
27. What are you most apprehensive about for the remainder of the process? What 
challenges lie ahead? 





Appendix 2 – Within Case Description Outline 
 
Explain how and why the Alliance was formed (Focusing on drivers for the process – 
political, strategic, financial and other; partner choice; type/classification of merger, other 
alternatives to merger/current partner?) 
Explain how the Alliances have organised themselves for the proposed merger and what 
progress has been made to date? (Focusing on process, structures, resources, timelines, 
milestones, project management, consultation; vision and mission, business planning and 
due diligence) 
Explain who the key actors in the process are and what their role has been during the 
process? (e.g. Govt., national and local politicians, management teams, external 
consultants, institute staff, unions, external stakeholders) 
Discuss the key challenges which the Alliance has faced/is facing during the merger 
process and how have these impacted upon the process? (Focus on prior relationship 
between the partners/history of collaboration, cultural issues, relationships, supports from 
govt. and other CSF’s for mergers) 
In particular, focus in the interviews on: 
 importance of maintaining momentum and stability throughout the process  
 roles which external consultants/ change agentshelpful? If so, how? Negative 
aspects 
 key role of government/government agencies/national legislators in the process  
 how was trust established, or was it, and how was eroded 
 research aims to make a theoretical contribution on the political dimension of HE 











Appendix 3 –Data Analysis Phase 1 – Initial Themes/Concepts 
 

































































































































































































































































































Appendix 8 – Detailed Classification of Facilitatory & Inhibitory Factors 























Subset Grouping Factor 
Macro-Political The Political Landscape  Facilitatory Factors 
o Political 'Push' or Support 
o Programme for Government 2011 
o Importance of Key Political Actors 
o TU Policy as a political response to bids for University Status 
o Need to Understand and 'Manage' the Political Landscape 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Changing Political Landscape and Uncertainty 
o Declining Political Support 
o Failure to Prioritise HE 
o Leaders 'Playing Along' with the Department & Politicians 
o Political Apathy 
o Political 'Control' of IoTs 
o Political Interference, Disruption and 'Playing Politics' 
o Unrealistic Expectations from Politicians and Govt. 
 
 Opposition from ‘Traditional’ 
Universities 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Fear of Competition & Reduced Funding 
o Universities Lobbying Against, Opposing and Attacking TU Policy 
o University Representation on Board of HEA 
o Universities Using Political Pull to ensure as few as possible new TUs 
 
 Lack of Govt./Dept./HEA 
Commitment, Supports, Understanding 
& Clarity 
 Facilitatory Factor 
o HEA & Dept. Supportive of the Process 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure to Address Issues regarding Staff Contracts 
o Failure to enact necessary Legislation 
o Failure to Provide Funding Mechanisms 
o Failure to Prioritise Merger Project 
o Failure to Provide Advice Mechanisms to Institutions 
o Failure to Provide Clarity around Process & Criteria 
o 'Hands Off' Disinterested approach from HEA & Department 
o Inconsistency or Dishonesty of behaviour of HEA & Dept. 
o Interference by the HEA in its own Processes 
o Lack of Alignment between HEA and Department & Government Objectives 
o Lack of Support or Funds to the HEA from Govt. 
o Lack of Understanding by the HEA or Dept. 




o Unclear Policy Drivers 
 
 Support & Pressure from Regional 
Stakeholders 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Pressure from Local & Regional Stakeholders 
o Need to build a support network of local and regional stakeholders 
o Desire to Maintain Regional or Local Presence 
o Changing Stakeholder Perceptions 
 
Micro-Political Power Dynamics & Negotiations 
between Merging Institutions 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Differences in Academic Reputation 
o Concern about losing autonomy and power by being 'Taken Over' or 'Swallowed Up' 
o Differences in Size of Merging Institutions 
o Difficulties due to 'A Merger of Equals' 
o Individual Power Plays & Self Promotion 
o Larger Partner Exercising 'power' over Smaller Partner 
o Perceived Arrogance or Superiority of Larger Institution 
o Power Plays between Merging Institutions 
o Unwillingness to Acknowledge Partners Strengths or Identify Own Weaknesses 
o Smaller Institutions attempting to Strengthen Bargaining Position 
 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Ensuring Equality & Parity of Esteem 
o Providing Reassurance to Smaller Partner through integration agreements, equality of representation, etc. 
o The fewer the better... 
 
 Leadership & Charisma  Facilitatory Factors 
o Importance of Charismatic Leaders 
o Importance of Commitment and Leadership from the Top 
o Importance of Leader selecting, using and rewarding Champions and 'Spies' in the organisation 
o Importance of Stability in Leadership 
o Importance of Strong Leadership 
o Integrity and Credibility 
o Loyalty to the Organisation 
o Necessity for Leaders to be able to Influence and Manipulate others in the organisation 
o Necessity of using Political Power & Networks due to Non-Hierarchical nature of HEIs 
o Need to 'Sell' the Message to the Academy 
o 'Tailoring' the Message for Specific Audiences 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Disruption and Instability due to Change of Leadership 
o Distrust of Leader 
o Failure to Bring the Academy on Board 
o Leaders 'Playing Along' with the Department & Politicians 




o Poor Leadership 
 
 Relationships between Key People in 
the Merging Organisations 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Importance of 'Informal' Personal Relationships 
o Importance of Key People Agreeing Mutually Beneficial Terms for the Future 
o Importance of Strong Relationship between Presidents based on Trust, Respect & Parity of Esteem 
o Importance of Strong Relationships between Steering Groups or Implementation Teams 
o Important to 'Show Unity' at Highest Levels 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Disruption & Instability due to Change of Leadership 
o Problematic Personal Relationships between Key People 
 
 Securing the Support of the Internal 
Senior Executive Team 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Supportive Executive Team 
o Criticality of getting Senior Executive Team on Board 
o Strategically Limiting Input of Senior Executive Team 
o Need to Conduct an Analysis of Senior Executive Team to determine which Incentives or Levers to Use 
o Need to Identify and Use Credible, Respected, Knowledgeable Champions who support the merger 
o Need to Identify, Isolate, Side-line or Remove Problematic People at Senior Level 
o Need to 'Incentivise' Senior Executives 
o Need to Negotiate & Agree about Senior Posts in new Organisation at an early stage 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Difficulties with Disunity in Senior Executive Teams 
o Failure of Leader to get Senior Executive Team on Board 
o Failure to Communicate satisfactorily with Senior Team 
o Senior Executive Team Resistance to Merger 
 
 Securing the Support of the wider 
Academy and Administrative Staff 
 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Different Communication Strategies for management vs administrative vs academic staff 
o Importance of Early Communication or Consultation 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Different Communication Strategies for management vs administrative vs academic staff 
o Failure to Consult or Communicate within Institution 
o Failure to get Wider Staff Involved or Engaged  in the Process 
o Importance of Early Communication or Consultation 
o Inability to Provide Clarity to Staff 






 Blocking & Delaying Tactics & ‘Game 
Playing’ 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Blaming each other for Delays 
o Break Down in Negotiations 
o Employing Diversionary or Delaying Tactics 
o 'Game Playing' and 'Box Ticking' 
o Two-ing and Frow-ing during Negotiations 





Subset Grouping Factor 
The Strategic 
Environment 
Impact of National Strategy  
 
 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Focus on IoTs not Universities 
o Imperative for Mergers & Restructuring 
o Enhanced Collaboration & Clustering 
o Mission Specificity and Institutional Diversity 
o Strategic Dialogue linked to Funding 
o National Strategy & TUs to address the clamour for University Status 
 
 Economic Climate  Facilitatory Factors 
o Financial Challenges 
o Need to Secure Financial Future of Organisations 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Reduction in Funding to HEIs & 
 
Drivers & the Case for 
Merger 
Strategic Drivers for Merger  Facilitatory Factors 
o Creation of Critical Mass 
o Competitive Positioning 
o Ensuring Future Viability 
o Desire to 'Transform' 
 
 University Designation as Driver for 
Merger 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Fear of Being 'Left Behind' as an IoT and Dilution of IoT Brand 
o Mergers of 'Convenience' to create a TU 
o Specific Features of TUs 
o The 'Brand Value' of a University 
o TU as Recognition of Existing Academic Standing or Position 
 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 





 Academic Case for Merger  Facilitatory Factors 
o Creation of Critical Mass and Access to Additional Resources 
o Enhanced Quality Assurance 
o Improved Educational Opportunities for the Community & Region 
o Further Opportunities for Research 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure to Clearly and Honestly Articulate an Academic Case for Merger 
 
 Creation of Efficiencies & 
Rationalisation 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Creation of Efficiencies & Economies of Scale 
o Financial Viability and Sustainability 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Funding of HE 
o Rationalisation & Consolidation Agenda 
o Reservations from Institutions towards Efficiency Agenda 
 
 Regional Impact  Facilitatory Factors 
o Focus on Serving Regional Needs and Agenda 
o Potential to Contribute to Regional Economic Growth 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure of HE Policy to Align with Approach Regional Development 
 
 Alternatives to Merger  Facilitatory Factors 
o Inability to Explore Alternatives to Merger due to National Strategy 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure of Policy makers to 'Explain' or Justify the Merger Prerequisite 
o Failure of Policy Makers to Explore Alternatives to Merger 
 
Making Key Strategic 
Choices 
Selecting Partners  Facilitatory Factors 
o Choosing a Likeminded Partner 
o The Fewer, the Better... 
o Choosing An 'Easy Target' 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Policy Limitations & Influence 
o Political Interference & Dictate 
o Reluctant Bedfellows 




o Partners Withdrawing 
o Issues of Geographical Identity & Allegiance 
o Partners on Different Trajectories or at Different Stages of their Life Cycle 
o Trying to Avoid being 'Swallowed Up' 
 
 Name, Governance & Management 
Structure of New Institution 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Agreement on Organisational Structure 
o Agreement on the Name of the New Institution 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Challenges to Agreeing New Organisational Structure 
o Difficulty Agreeing on the Location of HQ of new Institution 
o Failure to Agree on Organisational Structure 
 
 
 Vision & Mission  Facilitatory Factors 
o Importance of Creating and Communicating a High level Vision 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 





Subset Grouping Factor 
Project Structures, 
Planning & Resources 
Structures  Facilitatory Factors 
o Importance of Having an Adjudicator or Single Decision Making Body 
o Importance of Having One Project Office 
o Project Managers or Coordinators 
o Steering Group with Independent Chair 
o Implementation Groups 
o Working Groups or Areas 
 
 Resources  Facilitatory Factors 
o Finding Alternative Funding Sources 
o Providing Additional Funding and Resources 
o Making Do with Existing Resources 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure of Govt. or HEA to Provide Necessary Financial Resources 
o Failure of Institutions to Commit the Necessary Human & Physical Resources 




o Reluctance to Invest Resources due to Uncertainty with Process and Outcome 
o Underestimation of Work Required to Merge 
 
 Project Planning  Facilitatory Factors 
o Benefits of having a Joint Budget 
o Agreeing an MOU 
o Engaging in Peer Reviews 
o Getting the Right Project Leaders in Place 
o Formal and Informal Process Operating in Parallel 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Difficulty Planning Timelines 
o HEA Criteria 
o HEA Process & Stages including International Panel Reviews 
o Inability or Reluctance of Groups to Make Decisions 
 
 Due Diligence & Risk Assessment  Facilitatory Factors 
o Completing Due Diligence Early in the Process 
o Due Diligence as a Legal Requirement 
o Benefits of Completing Due Diligence 
o Key Areas in Due Diligence 
o Use of External Consultants to Complete Due Diligence 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Delaying Due Diligence 
o Failure to Agree on Due Diligence 
o Due Diligence and Distrust 
 
 Building & Maintaining Momentum 
& Stability 
 Facilitatory 
o Importance of Building and Maintaining Momentum 
o Importance of Moving Quickly 
o Importance of Stability 
o Need to Set and Adhere to Clear Dates and Timelines 
 
 Inhibitory 
o Lack of or Losing Momentum 
o Stop Start Nature of the Process 
o Delay due to External Factors - e.g. Legislation, Funding, Inspections, Political Change etc. 





Communicating with, Consulting & 
Engaging Staff 
 Facilitatory 
o Deploying Different Communication Strategies for Management vs Administrative vs Academic staff 
o Importance of Early Communication or Consultation 






o Failure to Consult or Communicate within Institution 
o Failure to get Wider Staff Involved or Engaged in the Process 
o Inability to Provide Clarity to Staff 
o Secrecy or Lack of Information 
 
 Engagement with Stakeholders in 
the Wider Region 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Need to Establish the Narrative with Stakeholders and 'Sell' the vision 
o Need to Manage Stakeholder Expectations 
o Stakeholder Engagement Process 
o Stakeholder Support 
o Improving Stakeholder Perceptions 
 
 IR Issues  Facilitatory Factors 
o Need for Engagement and Honest Dialogue between Staff and Management 
o Some Trade Unions on Board 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Resistance from TUI 
o Academic Contract 
o Delay in Process which Allows Time for Opposition to Build Momentum 
o Fear of Staff due to Uncertainty 
 
 Training & Support for Executive 
Team & Managers 
 Facilitatory 
o Provision of Training & Development around Change Management, Strategy & Mergers 
 
 Inhibitory 
o Failure to Invest in Management Development and Training 
o Pressure & Stress on Senior Management 
 
 Lack of Govt/Dept/HEA Support  Facilitatory Factor 
o HEA, Dept. or Govt. Supportive of the Process 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Failure to Address Issues regarding Staff Contracts 
o Failure to Enact Necessary Legislation 
o Failure to Provide Funding Mechanisms 
o Failure to Prioritise Merger Project 
o Failure to Provide Advice Mechanisms to Institutions 
o Failure to Provide Clarity around Process & Criteria 
o 'Hands Off' Disinterested approach from HEA & Department 
o HEA Perceived as being more 'University' friendly 
o Inconsistency or Dishonesty of behaviour of HEA & Dept. 
o Interference by the HEA in its own Processes 




o Lack of Alignment between HEA and Department & Government Objectives 
o The Need for a more Open Dialogue 
o Unclear Policy Drivers 
o Lack of Understanding by the HEA or Dept. 
 
 Lack of Cooperation Across IoT 
Sector 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Willingness to Collaborate 
o Possible areas for Collaboration 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Lack of National or Sectoral Coordination 
o Informal Collaboration 
o Failure to collaborate at senior levels of IoTs 
 
Role of Key Actors Role of Academic Council  Failure to Engage or Empower AC's 
o Lack of Coordination between AC's 
o Limited Role of AC in Process 
 
 Role of Governing Body  Facilitatory Factors 
o GB as Key Decision Making Body 
o Importance of Providing All Necessary Information & Briefings to GB 
o Importance of Strong Relationship between Chair and GB 
o Importance of Strong Relationship between Chair of GB and President 
o Joint GB Meetings or Sub Groups 
o Key Role of Chair of GB 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Difficulties Getting All GB's to Agree to the Same Thing at the Same Time 
o Failure of GB to 'Drive' the Process - 'Leaving it' to the Executive 
o Failure to hold Joint Meetings of or Generate Engagement between GB's 
o Perceived Lack of Independence & Instability of GB 
 
 Role of External Consultants, 
Facilitators & Mediators 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Change Catalysts for the Process 
o Need to be Credible, Respected, Experienced & Knowledgeable 
o Provide a Neutral & Independent Viewpoint 
o Provide Expertise & Knowledge not available within the Organisation 
o Provide Comfort and Confidence Internally 
o Provide Confidence & Credibility Externally 
o Act as Informal Mediators between Chairs & Presidents of Alliances 
o Act as Facilitators 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Consultants being Appointed Externally by HEA or Govt. 
o Consultants being Perceived as being either 'Theirs' or 'Ours' 




o Ignoring the Advice of Consultants 
o Consultants being used to 'Do the Dirty Work' or as 'Scapegoats' 
 
 
CULTURAL & HISTORIC FACTORS 
 
Subset Grouping Factor 
Cultural Nature of Irish IoTs  Inhibitory Factors 
o 'Public Sector' Nature of IoTs 
o Lack of Hierarchical or Managerial Organisational Culture 
o Internally Political nature of IoTs 
o Historic Lack of Independence or Autonomy of IoTs 
o Collegiate Culture and Allegiance to Organisation 
 
 Inflexibility of Boundary & 
Operating Conditions 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Inflexible Work Practices and Culture 
o Impact of Inflexibility of Staff Contracts 
 
 Cultural Issues, Values & Identity  Facilitatory Factors 
o Creating a New Culture 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Cultural Differences between Academics and Administrators 
o Cultural Differences between Merging IoTs 
o Cultural Similarities between Merging IoTs 
o Failure to Investigate or Interrogate Cultural Issues 
o Geographical Identity and Culture 
o Differences in Culture due to Organisational Size  
o IoTs at different phases of their life cycle or on different trajectories 
o Risk Adverse Culture which Fears Change 
 
 Regional Focus 
 
 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Culture of 'Serving the Region' 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Need to move beyond 'Regional' Considerations 
 
 
 Academic Reputation  Inhibitory Factor 





Historic Historic Relationship between the 
Partners 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o No History of Collaboration between Partners 
o History of a Competitive or Difficult Relationship between the Partners 
o Failure of Previous Collaboration 
 
 Historic Positioning & Trajectory  Facilitatory Factory 
o Similarities in Historical Development 
o Historical Trajectory and Orientation towards achieving University Designation 
 Inhibitory Factor 
o Historical Trajectory and Orientation towards achieving University Designation 
 
 Lack of Cooperation Across IoT 
Sector 
 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Willingness to Collaborate 
o Possible areas for Collaboration  
o Informal Collaboration 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Lack of National or Sectoral Coordination 
o Failure to collaborate at senior levels of IoTs 
 
EMOTIVE FACTORS 
Subset Grouping Factor 
Personal Commitment, Belief & Passion  Facilitatory Factors 
o Belief 
o Commitment from Very Senior Levels of the Organisation 
o Commitment to the Outcome rather than the Institution 
o Passion 
o Personal Commitment or Champions 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Lack of Belief & Commitment 
 Uncertainty, Insecurity, Fear & 
Frustration 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Acceptance 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Dishonesty or 'Game Playing' 
o Fear of Being 'Left Behind' in the Sector 




o Feeling Drained, Stressed, Pressured or Sapped of Energy 
o Frustration with the Process 
o Insecurity, Fear of Losing Identity or Autonomy 
o Lack of Control around Merger Process 
o Paranoia, Conspiracy, Rumour and Conjecture 
o Questioning if the Merger will ever happen 
o Uncertainty due to a Lack of Clarity around the Process 
o Uncertainty due to a Lack of Communication 
o Uncertainty due to Political Instability 
 
 
Interpersonal Respect, Equality & Parity of 
Esteem 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Equality & Parity of Esteem 
o Mutual Respect 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Disrespect 
o Superiority or Arrogance 
 
 Trust, Honesty & Understanding  Facilitatory Factors 
o Honesty & Openness 
o Importance of Building Strong Personal Relationships between Organisations 
o Sensitivity 
o Trust 
o Trust at Leadership Level 
o Initiatives to Build Trust 
o Re-building Trust 
o Understanding and Empathy 
 
 
 Distrust, Suspicion, Hostility & 
Resentment 
 Facilitatory Factors 
o Acceptance that Some Degree of Suspicion 'is normal' 
 
 Inhibitory Factors 
o Antagonism 
o Dishonesty or 'Game Playing' 
o Distrust between Organisations 
o Distrust of Government or System Level Actors 
o Distrust within Organisation 
o Hostility 
o Paranoia, Conspiracy, Rumour and Conjecture 
o Resentment 
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